IxS 


/\> 


,R3 


MRS.   T.  .T.    DSIvTrEY 

IN  MEMOE.T  OF  RVAl  [JROTIIEH 
JAJVIES  RICE 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2011  with  funding  from 

Boston  Library  Consortium  IVIember  Libraries 


http://www.archive.org/details/makingofmodernarOOradi 


Général  de  Division 
René  Radiguet 

Former  Commander  of  the  21st  Division  (Marne),  French  Army 


THE   MAKING    OF 
A  MODERN  ARMY 

AND 
ITS    OPERATIONS    IN    THE    FIELD 

A  STUDY  BASED  ON  THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THREE 
YEARS  ON  THE  FRENCH  FRONT 

.  (1914-1917) 


BY 

RENÉ    RADIGUET    f#* 

GENERAL    DE    DIVISION,    ARMY    OF    FRANCE 
TRANSLATED   BY 

Henry  P.  du  Bellet 

FORMBRLY    AMERICAN    CONSUL    AT    RHEIMS 


G 


G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 
NEW    YORK   AND    LONDON 

XTbe  iknlcfterbocftec  press 
1918 


BOSTOÏf  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 
CHESTNUT  HILL,  MASS. 


Copyright,  191 8 

BY 

RENÉ  RADIGUET 


Ube  ftn(cI:erl)ocfier  press,  l^ew  il?ork 


A  l'Honorable  Newton  D.  Baker, 

Ministre  de  la  Guerre, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Excellence  : 

Vous  avez  bien  voulu  m 'autoriser  à  vous  dédier 
cette  étude. 

Veuillez  y  voir  l'hommage  d'un  vieux  soldat  de 
France  pour  le  talent  et  l'énergie  que  vous  avez  dé- 
ployés depuis  cinq  mois  pour  hâter  l'envoi  sur  le  front 
français  des  troupes  Américaines. 

Veuillez  agréer,  Excellence,  l'expression  de  mon 
plus  profond  respect. 

GÉNÉRAL   RaDIGUET. 

New  York, 
November,  igi7 


FOREWORD 

Divers  missions  sent  to  the  United  States  by 
the  Allied  armies  are  now  giving  the  benefit  of 
their  practical  experience  to  the  American  army. 
These  missions  are  imparting  to  the  officers  of 
every  arm  the  knowledge  of  the  details  it  is  neces- 
sary for  them  to  acquire. 

The  purpose  of  this  book  is  to  show  to  the 
American  officers,  and  also  to  the  civilians  who  take 
an  interest  in  war  matters,  how  a  large  army  on 
the  European  Front  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  year 
191 7  is  made  up. 

In  the  course  of  general  considerations  we  have 
explained  what  is  meant  by  the  words  "strategy 
and  tactics";  we  have  described  those  interior 
lines  which  have  been  of  such  powerful  assistance 
to  Germany;  we  have  dwelt  on  the  composition 
of  the  large  units  of  an  army,  and  more  especially 
on  that  of  a  division  as  a  fighting  unit. 

We  have  next  examined  the  question  of  the 


vi  FOREWORD 

command,  and  we  have  attempted  to  define  its 
duties  as  well  as  those  of  the  staffs. 

We  have  then  devoted  special  chapters  to 
the  study  of  Aviation,  the  Field  Fortifications,  the 
Artillery,  the  Supply  of  Munitions,  and  the 
Infantry. 

It  is  not  at  random  that  we  have  placed  the 
various  topics  in  this  sequence.  It  will  facilitate 
the  comprehension  of  the  last  chapter,  in  which 
we  describe,  with  examples,  how  an  attack  is  to 
be  prepared  and  by  what  means  its  success  can  be 
assured. 

We  have  deemed  proper  to  close  with  a  few 
remarks  on  the  discreditable  means  of  warfare 
employed  by  the  Germans:  they  have  played  too 
great  a  part  in  important  operations  not  to  be 
mentioned. 

Our  readers  will  understand  the  reason  why  in 
certain  instances  we  have  merely  alluded  to 
possible  impending  improvements  of  some  parts 
of  the  armament,  without  going  into  details  which 
could  not  be  given  without  danger. 

The  few  examples  we  cite  have  been  selected 
with  due  consideration.  We  have  either  per- 
sonally played  a  part  in  them  or  they  have  been 
supplied  to  us  by  officers  whom  we  trust  implicitly. 


FOREWORD  vii 

The  perusal  of  this  book  will  enable  those  who 
have  sons  in  the  European  armies  to  follow  them 
more  intelligently  through  the  operations  in 
which  they  will  soon  take  part,  for  we  are  in  a 
position  to  state  that  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment has,  for  the  formation  of  the  American  army, 
adopted  the  figures  which  experience  has  taught 
France  to  decide  upon.  Consequently  what  we 
say  of  the  French  and  even  of  the  British  forces 
will  apply  to  the  American  armies. 


CONTENTS 

Synopsis  of  the  Principal  Military  Opera- 
tions OF  THE  Allies  on  the  Western  Front 

THE   MILITARY  SITUATION   IN   OCTO- 
BER, 1917 

WAR  PRINCIPLES  (For  1917)      . 

Strategy  and  Tactics  are  Unchanged 

Violation  of  the  Laws  of  Warfare — In 
fluence  of  science  .... 

FIGHTING  UNITS      .         .         .         . 

A  Glance  at  the  Normal  Composition  of  a 
Division  .... 

The  Command       .         .         .         .         . 

The  Staffs  ..... 

Aviation — Its     Military    Beginnings,    its 
Increasing  Importance 

Use  and  Scope  of  Aviation  . 

Different    Kinds    of     Aircraft — Battle- 
planes       

Bombing-Planes 

ix 


PAGE 


6 
10 
10 

16 
17 

18 
22 

24 

29 
32 

34 
36 


X  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Observation  or  Scout-Planes       .         .         .40 

Use  of  Scout-Planes  to   Direct  Artillery 
Fire 


Use  of  Scout-Planes  to  Direct  the  Move 
MENTS  OF  Infantry    .... 

Hydroplanes        .         .         .         .         . 

Balloons — Zeppelins  .... 

Trench  Organization — General  Remarks 


General  Plan  of  an  Entrenchment  System      5 


Communication  Lines  . 

Mines  and  Counter-Mines  . 

Special  Railway  Troops 

Transportation  by  Road 

Camouflage         .         . 

ARTILLERY,  RETROSPECTIVE  VIEW 

Artillery  of  an  Army. 

"    "  Army  Corps 
"              "a  Division 
Trench  Artillery        .... 
Tanks  


Mission  and  Use  of  the  Artillery  in  the 
Fight 


43 

44 
48 
48 


66 
69 
70 

73 

75 

77 
80 

81 

82 

83 
84 

86 


CONTENTS 

xi 

Anti-Aircraft  Artillery     .         . 

PAGE 
.            92 

Armoured  Motor-Cars 

.       94 

Advance  or  Withdrawal  of  the  Arti 

LLERY        95 

MUNITION  SUPPLY  .         .         .         . 

.       100 

Sketch  of  the  Railroad  Organization 

.       100 

Organization  of  the  Munition  Parks 

.       ICI 

Divisional  Parks         .         .         .         . 

.       103 

Replacing  the  Guns    .         .         .         . 

.       107 

Different  Issues  of  Ammunition 

.       109 

INFANTRY          .         .         .         .         . 

.       112 

Arms  of  the  Infantry 

.       112 

Machine-Guns     .... 

.       113 

Machine-Gun  Rifle     .         . 

.       117 

Bayonet      

.       118 

Grenades    ...,., 

.       119 

Trench  Knives 

.       121 

Automatic  Pistols 

.       121 

Instruction 

.       122 

Duties  of  the  Officers 

.       123 

Shock-Troops  (Stosstruppen) 

.       129 

Mission  and   Use   of   the   Infantry 
Division 

IN    A 

.       131 

xii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Assaulting  and  Occupation  Troops      .         .135 

Offensive    Engagements — Their     Prepa- 
ration     .......     136 

Defensive  Engagements      .         .         .         .142 

Prolonged  Engagements      .         .         .         .143 

Signalling  .         .         .         .         .         .     146 

Battalions  of  Three  Companies  .         .     147 

Framework  of  the  Army      .         .         .         .147 

Cavalry       . 148 

FORBIDDEN  WEAPONS     ....     150 

Asphyxiating  Gases     ....         .     150 

Tear-Producing  Gases — Gaz-Vesicant         .     152 

Liquid  Fire  (Flammenwerfer)         .         .         -153 

Conclusion .156 

Index 161 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

GÉNÉRAL  DE  DIVISION — ReNÉ  RadIGUET 

Frontispiece 

Former  Commander  of  the  2ist  Division  (Marne), 
French  Army 

Battlefield  of  the  French  Offensive  of 

THE  22D  October,  1917   .         .         .         .       15 

Ailles    and   its    Western    Approach — Feb- 
ruary 10,  191 7 — 2.30  P.M.         ...       54 

Southeast  of  Ailles — February  10,  191 7 — 

2.30  p.M 58 

Southeast  of  La  Bovelle  Farm — February 

10,  191 7 — 2.30  P.M.    ....   62 

Diagram  of  Campaign  Intrenchments  .         .      66 

Urtebize — January  29,  1 91 7 — 12.30  p.m.        .     118 

La  Bovelle — December  20,  191 6 — 3  p.m.       .     122 

South  of  La  Bovelle  Farm — January  29, 

1917 — 12. 30  p.M 126 

West  of  Ailles — April  24,  191 7 — 10.00  a.m.  .     128 

La  Bovelle— May  5,  1 91 7 — 10.30  a.m.  .         .     130 

:dii 


xiv  ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGB 

North  of  La  Bovelle — April  24,  191 7 — 10 

A.M 132 

La  Bovelle — May  5,  191 7 — 10.30  a.m.  .         .     134 

Trench     '*  Battemburg" — May     4,     191 7 — 

Noon .138 

West  OF  Ailles — May  4,  191 7 — Noon    .         .     140 

View  Taken  about  10  a.m.  during  the  Attack 

OF  May  5,  1917 142 

View  Taken  about  10  a.m.  during  the  Attack 

OF  May  5,  191 7        .         .         .         .         .     144 

View  Taken  about  10  a.m.  during  the  Attack 

OF  May  5,  191 7 146 


The  Making  of  a  Modern  Army 


The  Making  of  a  Modern 

Army 


Synopsis  of  the  Principal  Military  Opera- 
tions OF  THE  Allies  on  the  Western 
Front 

It  has  often  been  said  that  after  the  battle 
of  the  Marne  the  Germans  were  virtually  beaten. 
The  feats  of  the  German  armies  since  that  day 
on  such  numerous  and  varied  fields,  the  strength 
that  they  have  so  often  been  proven  to  possess, 
prevent  us  from  concurring  in  that  opinion. 

We  believe  that  their  defeat  will  be  due  to  the 
accumulation  of  the  mistakes  they  have  made. 

In  September,  19 14,  their  superiority  in  num- 
bers and  in  armament  was  considerable.  Their 
armies  were  holding  in  France  positions  that 
enabled  them,   after  a  rapid  reorganization,   to 

assume  a  new  and  vigorous  offensive  against  the 

I 


2  MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

French  Army,  their  sole  adversary  at  that  time 
in  the  West. 

The  inconceivable  pride  of  the  German  military 
party  had  encouraged  it  to  despise  the  enemy, 
and  to  blindly  undertake  that  formidable  rush 
through  Belgium  for  the  capture  of  Paris.  This 
dream  vanished  under  the  blows  struck  by  General 
JofEre  and  his  marvellously  responsive  armies. 

Her  hatred  for  England  in  the  first  place, 
and  in  the  second,  her  thirst  for  conquest,  were 
about  to  lead  Germany  to  commit  serious  blun- 
ders, and  to  lose  the  prize  by  grasping  at  its 
shadow. 

To  prevent  the  mobilization  of  the  British 
armies,  the  Kaiser,  after  entrenching  his  forces 
on  the  French  Front,  sent  all  the  troops  he  could 
dispose  of  against  Calais.  He  felt  so  sure  of  suc- 
cess that  he  followed  the  operations  in  person, 
ready  to  enter  as  a  conqueror  into  the  city  he 
expected  to  capture.  He  had  acted  in  the  same 
way  two  months  before  at  Nancy;  and  having 
failed  in  that  effort,  he  was  eager  for  revenge. 

The  French,  British,  and  Belgian  armies  took 
care  to  transform  his  cherished  revenge  into  a 
pitiful  defeat. 

It  was  then  that  the  German  Command  com- 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  3 

mitted  the  mistake  which  will  cause  Germany  to 
lose  the  war. 

Leaving  the  Western  Front,  giving  to  the 
French  and  British  armies  time  to  reorganize, 
arm,  and  gather  strength,  the  Germans,  having 
lost  all  hope  of  achieving  the  dreamed-of  victories 
in  the  West,  hurled  their  legions  upon  Russia, 
which  they  knew  was  insufficiently  prepared,  and 
began  that  campaign  which  was  to  result  in  their 
capture  of  Poland  and  the  Baltic  provinces,  and 
the  recovery  of  Galicia. 

The  consequences  of  the  adoption  of  this  new 
plan  were  to  be  seen  at  once. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  summer  of  191 5,  in 
Artois,  the  French  and  British  commenced  to 
strike  blows  which  proved  that  the  strongest 
system  of  field  fortifications  can  be  taken. 

In  September,  1915,  General  Pétain,  in  Cham- 
pagne, inflicted  a  terrible  defeat  upon  the  Ger- 
mans. This  operation,  carried  out  simultaneously 
with  one  in  Artois,  cost  them  thirty  thousand 
prisoners,  one  hundred  and  fifty  guns,  heavy 
casualties,  and — which  is  even  of  greater  im- 
portance— obliged  them  to  abandon  highly  valued 
and  strongly  fortified  positions. 

In  the  beginning  of  19 16,  having  fulfilled  their 


4  MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

program  in  Russia,  the  German  General  Staff 
resolved  to  finish  with  the  Western  Front,  and 
attacked  Verdun  with  such  enormous  forces  of 
artillery  and  infantry  as  had  never  before  been 
known. 

Everywhere  in  Germany  the  announcement 
was  made  that  the  assault  and  capture  of  Verdun 
would  bring  the  war  to  an  end. 

Every  one  knows  how  vastly  they  were  deceived. 
The  French,  taken  by  surprise  and  shaken  at  first, 
rallied  rapidly.  During  five  months  they  con- 
tested the  ground  inch  by  inch  with  a  tenacity  and 
heroism  that  stamps  the  defence  of  Verdun  as 
the  most  sublime  miHtary  feat  recorded  by  His- 
tory. The  Germans  did  not  take  the  fortress- 
city,  but  sacrificed  in  their  attempt  the  very  flower 
of  their  armies. 

Verdun  had  not  exhausted  all  the  strength  of 
the  French  armies.  On  the  first  day  of  June, 
191 6,  on  the  Somme,  General  Foch  attacked 
the  Germans  so  furiously  that  they  had  to  sus- 
pend entirely  their  offensive  against  Verdun. 

On  July  1st,  the  British  Army,  which  had  been 
developing  to  its  final  form  and  efficiency,  took 
its  place  on  the  left  of  the  positions  of  General 
Foch,  and  from  that  time  on  the  Germans  were 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  5 

forced  to  transfer  most  of  their  effectives  to  the 
Somme  and  the  Aisne  in  order  to  oppose  the 
Franco-British  advance. 

The  fight  begun  in  these  regions  in  the  summer 
of  191 6  has  continued  until  now  with  scarcely 
any  interruption.  Slowly  but  surely  the  Franco- 
British  have  driven  the  Germans  from  all  the 
positions  they  considered  impregnable.  They 
will  continue  by  this  method  to  push  them  back 
into  Germany. 

The  French  armies  on  the  left  and  on  the 
centre  undertook  in  the  spring  of  191 7  some  very 
large  operations  on  the  Aisne  and  in  Champagne, 
which  have  given  them  possession  of  dominating 
positions,  such  as  the  ''Chemin  des  Dames" 
on  the  Aisne,  and  the  hills  of  "Cormillet,"  "Te- 
ton," "Monhaut,  "  and  "  Mont-sans-nom  "  in 
Champagne,  which  will  be  of  great  value  for 
future  offensives.  The  capture  of  those  hills, 
which  the  Germans  had  proclaimed  impregnable^ 
followed  naturally  upon  the  successes  gained  in 
191 5  by  the  Army  of  General  Pétain,  and  were 
completed  by  numerous  smaller  operations  too 
long  to  enumerate  here. 

On  the  Aisne  the  advance  of  the  French  has 
not   been   delayed   by   the   famous   Hindenburg 


6  MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

retreat.  From  the  very  beginning  the  Germans 
have  accustomed  us  to  the  most  astounding  bluffs, 
intended  more  to  blind  their  compatriots  than  to 
frighten  their  adversaries,  but  the  famous  letter 
in  which  the  Kaiser  complimented  Hindenburg  on 
his  "masterly  retreat"  {retraite  géniale)  is  cer- 
tainly the  most  stupendous  bluff  on  record. 

Let  us.  Allies,  pray  God  that  the  old  Prussian 
Marshal  may  often  be  afflicted  with  such  masterly 
ideas!     These  should  certainly  take  us  to  Berlin. 

For  the  purpose  of  recapturing  the  Chemin 
des  Dames,  the  Germans  have  recommenced  on 
the  Aisne  a  series  of  those  reiterated  attacks  in 
mass-formation  which  had  cost  them  so  dear  at 
Verdun  in  191 6,  and  which  are  now  no  less  costly 
and  unsuccessful. 

The  Military  Situation  in  October,  191 7 

Two  great  facts  dominate  the  situation  to-day. 

1st.  The  great  success  won  at  Verdun  in  August, 
191 7,  by  the  French,  who  in  two  days  retook  the 
positions  that  had  cost  the  Germans  fiYe  months 
of  ceaseless  assault  and  enormous  losses  in  men 
and  material.  It  is  indeed  a  most  remarkable 
success,    considering   that   the    German    General 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  7 

Staff,  in  the  defence  of  the  ground  so  hardly  won, 
employed  every  means  known  to  military  science. 

The  last  battle  of  Verdun  evidences  the  su- 
periority that  the  French  artillery  has  gained  over 
the  German  artillery. 

2d.  The  recent  victories  of  the  British  Army 
and  those  of  the  French  Army  under  General 
Anthoine  in  Flanders.  Both  French  and  British 
have  made  continuous  progress  despite  most  un- 
favorable weather  conditions — fog,  rain,  and  deep 
mud.  The  lines  of  communication  of  the  Germans 
with  the  Belgian  coast  are  threatened,  and  the 
occupation  of  the  Belgian  coast  by  the  Allies  will 
put  an  end  to  the  hopes  Germany  has  based  upon 
her  submarine  warfare. 

The  significant  feature  of  these  latest  French 
and  British  victories  is  the  fact  that  the  German 
armies  now  find  it  impossible  to  react  in  time — 
or,  in  other  words,  to  check  an  assault  by  launch- 
ing prompt  counter-attacks. 

The  difficulty  that  the  two  Crown  Princes 
experience  in  finding  immediately  and  on  the  mo- 
ment troops  sufficient  for  energetic  attack,  proves  : 

1st.  That  notwithstanding  the  withdrawal 
of  various  contingents  from  the  Russian  Front, 
they  are  short  of  reserves  ; 


8  MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

2d.  That  the  quality  and  the  morale  of  their 
troops  have  declined,  which  is  also  evidenced  by 
the  large  number  and  inferior  fighting- value  of  the 
prisoners  taken. 

These  are  signs  which  foreshadow  not  only 
the  final  victory,  which  is  not  doubtful,  but  even 
a  more  rapid  termination  of  the  war  than  could 
have  been  anticipated  six  months  ago. 

While  the  approaching  entry  of  the  American 
armies  into  the  fighting  lines  will  be,  from  the 
start,  of  great  importance  for  the  military  situa- 
tion, the  participation  of  the  United  States  in  the 
war  has  already  produced  in  Germany  a  moral 
effect  that  the  German  authorities  are  vainly 
trying  to  conceal.  The  number  of  the  adversaries 
of  the  military  power  increases  every  day,  and  even 
Prussian  brutality  is  powerless  to  prevent  the 
diffusion  of  the  idea  that  the  leaders  of  the  Empire 
have  terribly  blundered  in  turning  the  whole 
world  against  Germany. 

Germany  suffers  much,  and  her  sufferings  can 
but  increase,  owing  to  the  insufficiency  of  the 
harvest  in  Europe. 

Let  us  remember  the  prediction  of  a  man  who 
knows  Germany  well,  the  former  Representative 
from  Alsace  in  the  Reichstag,   Father  Weterlé. 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  9 

''After  her  defeat,"  he  said  in  191 5,  "Germany 
will  astonish  the  world  by  her  cowardice." 
May  his  prediction  prove  true  ! 

We  will  now  consider  the  general  principles 
of  the  French  military  organization,  which  are 
based  upon  experience  dearly  bought  during  the 
past  three  years  of  war. 

The  American  armies  will  be  constituted  upon 
a  similar  plan. 


CHAPTER  I 

WAR  PRINCIPLES 

(For  19 1 7) 

1.  The  rules  of  strategy  and  tactics  have  not  been  modified. 

The  mode  of  fighting  alone  is  different. 

2.  Violation  of  the  laws  of  warfare.     Influence  of  science. 

3.  Fighting     units.     The     Army.     The     Army     Corps.     The 

Division.    The  Command.    The  Staff. 

I.  Strategy  and  tactics  are  unchanged.  Strategy 
is  the  art  of  manœuvring  large  armies  over  a  great 
extent  of  country. 

Tactics  is  the  art  of  handling  the  troops  on  the 
battlefield. 

One  might  be  inclined  to  believe  that,  in  the 
present  war  and  since  the  victory  of  the  Marne, 
the  general  rules  of  strategy  and  tactics  have 
been  modified.  Not  at  all.  The  ways  of  fighting 
and  the  armament  only  have  undergone  a  trans- 
formation. 

The  opposing  lines  have  buried  themselves  in 

mazes  of  entrenchment.    On  both  sides  old  methods 

10 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  ii 

of  warfare  and  weapons  forsaken  or  forgotten  for 
centuries  have  again  been  gradually  resorted  to. 
The  ''  Minenwerfers,  "  the  trench  guns,  are  nothing 
but  the  old-fashioned  mortar  much  improved  upon. 
The  jet  of  liquid  fire  driven  by  compressed  air, 
finds  its  prototypes  in  the  Greek  fire  of  Constanti- 
nople and  the  hand-thrown  combustibles — boiling 
oil  and  burning  pitch — of  the  Middle  Ages. 

Strategy.  The  rules  of  strategy  remain  im- 
mutable. They  still  consist  in  attacking  the  enemy 
on  one  of  his  wings;  in  attempting  to  outflank 
him  on  one  side  ;  in  trying  to  cut  his  line  in  two 
by  a  blow  in  the  centre;  in  organizing  a  system 
of  transportation  so  that  the  necessary  forces 
may  be  quickly  assembled  at  the  points  which  are 
to  be  attacked  or  protected;  in  taking  advantage 
of  a  superiority  due  to  the  possession  of  well- 
organized  interior  lines.  Such  are  the  ancient 
basic  principles,  that,  in  various  combinations, 
have  been  applied  by  contending  armies  since  the 
dawn  of  military  science. 

Examples.  When  the  Germans  attacked  on 
the  Yser  front,  their  purpose  was  twofold:  ist. 
To  outflank  the  left  wing  of  the  Franco-Anglo- 
Belgian  Army;  2d.     To  force  their  way  towards 


12         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

Calais  and  Dunkirk  so  as  to  prevent  England 
from  using  those  harbours  for  the  concentration  of 
her  armies  in  France. 

After  her  failure  on  the  Yser  front,  Germany- 
made  use  of  her  superiority  in  interior  lines, 
composed  of  the  railway  lines  existing  before  the 
war,  supplemented  by  new  ones  built  as  they  were 
needed  for  military  operations.  Owing  to  her 
central  geographical  position,  Germany  is  able 
at  all  times  to  dispatch  forces  from  the  heart  of 
her  Empire  to  the  various  fronts;  from  Russia  to 
the  French  Front,  and  vice  versa.  To  these 
interior  lines  is  due  the  facility  with  which  she  has 
quickly  concentrated  large  masses  of  troops  at 
any  desired  point,  notably  on  the  Roumanian 
front  at  the  end  of  1916. 

When  she  had  firmly  consolidated  her  Western 
Front  she  rapidly  collected  all  her  available  forces 
on  the  Eastern  Front  in  an  effort  to  crush  the 
Russians. 

When,  in  February,  1916,  the  Germans  launched 
the  gigantic  attack  against  Verdun,  it  was  with  a 
twofold  strategic  purpose:  1st.  To  pierce  the 
French  line  between  right  wing  and  centre  and 
resume  the  march  on  Paris.  2d.  In  case  of  a 
partial    success,    to    strengthen    themselves    by 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  13 

the  occupation  of  Verdun,  with  a  view  to  pre- 
venting the  French  armies  from  reaching  the 
right  bank  of  the  Meuse,  while  at  the  same  time 
guarding  their  own  left  wing  and  their  communi- 
cations with  Metz,  should  circumstances  ever 
force  them  to  withdraw  behind  the  Meuse. 

During  the  autumn  of  191 5  the  French  attempted 
to  avail  themselves  of  the  comparative  weakness 
of  the  Germans  due  to  their  campaign  against 
Russia.  A  favourable  issue  would  have  taken 
them  to  Vouziers-Rethel,  and  very  possibly  have 
caused  all  the  German  lines  to  be  withdrawn  from 
around  Rheims  and  Soissons. 

We  might  vary  these  examples.  Quite  recently, 
the  British  troops  have  resumed  the  attack  planned 
in  191 5  by  the  French  in  Artois.  They  will 
gradually  free  the  North  of  France  and  Flanders. 

Tactics.  Let  us  now  consider  tactical  opera- 
tions as  they  are  conducted  on  the  battlefield. 
The  formidable  field  entrenchments  constructed 
by  the  Germans  have  compelled  both  combatants 
to  transform  their  artillery  and  to  change  the 
armament  of  their  infantry. 

The  manner  in  which  the  different  arms  are 
employed  on  the  battlefield  has  changed  but  little. 


14         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

The  field  artillery  has  been  enormously  devel- 
oped and  it  has  been  necessary  to  constantly 
increase  the  power  of  the  cannons  and  howitzers. 
We  shall  later  on  discuss  this  subject  more  fully. 

The  definition  of  tactics  as  given  by  General 
Pétain,  the  French  Generalissimo,  in  the  course 
of  his  lectures  at  the  '* Ecole  de  Guerre"  has  not 
been  modified  by  the  creation  of  these  improved 
weapons.  He  said:  "The  Artillery  conquers  the 
positions,  the  Infantry  occupies  them." 

We  will  take  for  example  a  quite  recent  military 
feat  which  strikingly  establishes  the  distinction 
between  the  strategical  and  the  tactical  operations. 

On  the  22d  day  of  last  October  (19 17),  the 
French  Army  in  the  North,  east  of  Soissons, 
scored  one  of  the  most  important  successes  of  the 
year.  This  operation,  carried  out  on  a  nine-mile 
front,  was  essentially  tactical.  It  had  for  object 
the  capture  of  very  important  positions  forming 
a  salient  in  the  French  lines,  which  furnished  the 
Germans  with  facilities  for  an  offensive  return  to 
Soissons.  The  capture  by  the  French  of  Vaudesson- 
Allemant  and  the  Malmaison  -fort  eliminated  the 
salient,  opened  the  road  to  Laon,  and  exposed  the 
German  lines  on  the  Ailette  to  an  enfilading  fire. 

This  tactical  operation  was  evidently  a  part 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 


15 


of  a  vast  strategical  plan  matured  by  the  French 
and  British  Commanders-in-Chief.  The  general 
purpose  of  these  operations  aims  at  forcing  the 
Germans  to  abandon  the  North  of  Belgium  and 


BATTLE  FIELD   OF  THE   FRENCH   OFFENSIVE   OF 
THE   22ci   OCTOBER,    I917. 

to  retreat  in  France.  All  the  tactical  operations 
being  carried  on  in  Flanders,  on  the  Aisne,  in 
Champagne  and  Lorraine,  are  parts  of  this  single 
plan  and  have  the  same  object  in  view. 

The  rapid  campaign  just  conducted  by  Marshal 
von  Mackensen  against  the  Italians  in  the  Julian 
Alps,  Hke  that  he  led  in  1916  in  the  Dobrutcha  and 


i6         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

Roumania,  are  evidences  that  the  old  principles  of 
war,  and  especially  those  practised  by  Napoleon, 
are  still  fully  adhered  to  by  the  German  armies. 

2.  Violation  of  the  laws  of  warfare.  Influence 
of  science.  We  must  acknowledge  that,  although 
the  Germans  had  hoped  in  19 14  for  a  quick  victory 
gained  by  a  few  overwhelming  blows,  they  had 
also,  during  their  forty-four  years  military  pre- 
paration, provided  for  the  possibility  of  a  check, 
and  had  equipped  themselves  with  a  mighty 
artillery  which  enabled  them  to  hold  the  Western 
Front  while  fighting  against  Russia. 

France  had  to  make  great  efforts  to  complete 
her  armament  in  191 5.  Germany  had  already 
accomplished  this  in  a  great  measure  before  the 
war  commenced. 

It  was  reserved  for  German  science,  if  not  to 
render  war  more  bloody  (the  weapons  used  in 
1 914  sufficiently  fulfilled  this  purpose),  to  violate 
all  the  laws  of  warfare  enacted  by  all  the  Govern- 
ments, even  by  the  German  Government  itself. 

German  science  has  given  birth  to  gigantic 
cannon  which  no  law  forbids  (we  shall  speak  of 
these  further  on),  but  German  science  will  bear, 
in  the  judgment  of  History,  the  responsibility  of 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  17 

having  added  to  the  horrors  of  war  an  unprece- 
dented ferocity  and  savagery  by  the  introduction 
of  asphy:xiating  gases,  tear-producing  gases,  and 
burning  Hquids. 

But  we  may  add  that  Germany  in  her  turn 
already  suffers  greatly  herself  from  her  inventions  ; 
the  Allies  having  been  compelled  to  adopt  and  use 
similar  and  often  much  improved  weapons. 

3.  Fighting  units.  The  fighting  units  are  com- 
posed of  a  variable  number  of  tactical  units.  The 
tactical  unit  is  the  Division,  the  composition  of 
which  will  hereafter  be  described.  It  includes 
infantry,  cavalry,  artillery,  and  engineers.  It 
ought  to  possess  also,  and  we  hope  it  will  soon,  a 
special  service  of  aviation. 

A  group  of  two  or  three  and  sometimes  four 
Divisions  constitutes  an  Army  Corps.  The  union 
of  three,  four,  or  five  Army  Corps  forms  an  Army. 
In  this  war,  two  or  three  armies  placed  under  one 
Command  form  an  Army  Group.  Four  or  five  of 
these  Army  Groups  exist  on  the  French  Front. 
The  general  organization  of  the  British  differs 
but  little  from  that  of  the  French  armies.  What- 
ever difference  there  may  be  exists  rather  in  the 
organization  of  the  rear  than  in  that  of  the  front. 


i8  MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

The  British  occupying  a  much  shorter  front,  dis- 
pose of  a  proportionately  larger  number  of  men. 
Though  the  bulk  of  their  forces  have  been  but  a 
short  time  in  France,  they  have  received  from  their 
women  workers  very  intelligent  and  valuable 
assistance,  and,  having  at  their  disposal  larger 
appropriations  of  money,  have  been  able  to  do 
much  more  than  France  towards  perfecting  the 
organization  at  the  rear. 

The  Army  Corps  and  the  Division  must  be 
organized  so  as  to  be  entirely  and  under  all 
circumstances  self-sufficient.  They  may,  how- 
ever, rely  upon  any  reserve  forces  that  the  sur- 
rounding armies  may  place  at  their  disposal, 
according  to  the  work  assigned  to  them. 

A  Glance  at  the  Normal  Composition  of  a 

Division 

The  real  fighting  unit  is  the  Division.  We 
purposely  do  not  call  it  a  Division  of  infantry. 
The  Division  forms  a  whole  by  itself.  It  is  com- 
posed of  all  the  different  arms  in  the  proportions 
that  have  been  deemed  necessary  to  the  efficiency 
of  the  whole  body. 

Infantry.  Besides  its  Staff,  which  is  the  voice 
of  the  Command,  a  Division  normally  includes 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  19 

two  brigades  of  infantry  of  two  regiments  each. 
The  necessities  of  the  present  war  have  compelled 
the  belligerents  to  reduce  to  three  regiments  many 
of  their  Divisions,  and  only  the  crack  Divisions 
selected  for  attack  have  been  kept  up  to  four 
regiments. 

Artillery.  Each  Division  includes,  under  the 
command  of  a  colonel:  ist.  One  regiment  of 
field  artillery  with  three  groups,  each  of  three 
batteries  each  of  four  75  mm.  cannon; 

2d.  One  regiment  of  heavy  artillery  with  one 
group  of  155  mm.  quick-firing  cannon; 

3d.  One  battery  of  trench  guns,  the  number 
and  the  size  of  whicl^  vary. 

Engineers.  A  French  Division  includes  one 
half  battalion  of  sappers  and  miners,  which  is  not 
siifïicient;  two  battalions  at  least  ought  to  be 
attached  to  it.  The  rapidity  and  solidity  with 
which  the  German  entrenchments  are  constructed 
is  due  to  the  great  number  of  engineer  battalions 
which  our  enemy  possesses. 

Cavalry.  A  Division  also  includes  two  squad- 
rons of  cavalry.  In  the  trenches  they  are  dis- 
mounted and  used  as  connection-agents  (agents  de 
liaison).  Their  duties  will  be  considered  at 
another  point. 


20         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

Aviators.  A  Division  ought  to  possess  its 
own  aviation  corps;  planes  for  reconnoitring, 
planes  for  directing  the  fire  of  artillery  and  the 
movements  of  infantry,  and  swift  battle-planes 
without  the  protection  of  which  all  other  flying- 
machines  are  exposed  to  great  dangers. 

We  cannot  insist  enough  on  the  necessity  for 
the  American  Army  to  be  imcompromising  con- 
cerning the  perfect  organization  of  its  aviation. 
Reasons  which  we  lack  space  to  discuss  have  so 
far  prevented  the  French  section  of  aviation  from 
having  the  complete  general  organization  it  ought 
to  have. 

Supply.  All  the  services  for  the  supply  of 
munitions,  and  for  the  repair  and  renewal  of 
material,  are  centralized  in  a  divisional  Park.  To 
the  supply  of  munitions  we  shall  devote  a  special 
chapter. 

The  supply  of  provisions  is  entrusted  in  a  Divi- 
sion to  a  sub-commissary  of  stores.  The  Commis- 
sariat Department  is  part  of  the  general  service 
at  the  Army  base,  and  its  study  would  lead  us 
beyond  the  limits  assigned  to  this  exposé. 

Medical  Department.  Every  Division  has 
its  own  medical  department.  On  this  point,  too, 
we  shall  abstain  from  entering  into  details.     Let 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY         21 

us  however  remark  that  the  medical  service  is 
still  susceptible  of  much  improvement.  In  spite 
of  continuous  improvements  in  its  organization, 
in  spite  of  the  generous  assistance  of  our  Allies,  of 
neutral  countries,  and  particularly  of  our  Ameri- 
can friends,  the  recent  engagements  have  proven  : 

1st.  The  insufficiency  of  the  means  at  hand 
for  rapidly  collecting  the  wounded  on  the  battle- 
field; 

2d.  The  insufficiency,  near  the  battlefield,  of 
large  field  hospitals  for  the  operations  that  cannot 
be  delayed  ; 

3d.  The  lack  of  special  hospitals  just  out  of 
range  of  the  enemy^s  guns,  where  the  severely 
wounded  (grands  blessés),  and  particularly  the 
abdominal  cases,  can  remain  as  long  as  necessary. 
It  is  generally  acknowledged  that  those  who  have 
been  wounded  in  the  abdomen  require  immediate 
surgical  aid,  and  cannot  be  removed  to  a  distance 
without  undue  risk.  Such  dangerously  injured 
men  should  therefore  be  provided  with  "Rest 
hospitals,'*  where  they  can  remain  until  able  to 
be  transported  to  the  base. 

The  transportation  of  the  wounded  should  be 
the  object  of  a  very  close  study.  The  trains  for 
the  transfer  of  the  grave  cases  should  be  further 


22         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

improved,  their  speed  increased,  and  their  appoint- 
ments so  arranged  as  to  allow  the  wounds  to  be 
dressed  during  the  trip.  Many  cases  of  gangrene 
would  thus  be  avoided. 

This  is  said  without  prejudice  to  the  wonderful 
improvements  which  have  been  made  during  the 
last  three  years.  The  devoted  service  rendered 
to  France  by  her  military  Medical  Corps  cannot 
be  too  highly  praised. 

American  army  surgeons,  who  have  benefited 
by  the  vast  experience  and  wonderful  skill  of 
Dr.  Alexis  Carrel  at  the  War  Demonstration 
Hospital  in  New  York,  will  be  able  to  do  more  for 
the  relief  of  suffering  and  the  saving  of  life  than 
their  ablest  French  confrères  could  accomplish 
three  years  ago. 

The  Command.  The  characteristic  qualities 
of  a  "Chief"  in  the  present  war  must  be: 

1st.  A  very  great  physical  endurance  to  ren- 
der possible  a  great  activity.  The  General  com- 
manding a  Division  must  actually  see  with  his 
own  eyes  every  detail  of  the  enemy's  positions. 
He  must  acquaint  himself  with  the  nature  of  the 
ground  occupied  by  his  adversary  as  well  as  with 
the  strength  of  the  latter' s  defences.  Such  inspec- 
tions will  often  take  him  to  the  trenches,  where 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY         23 

his  presence  will  keep  up  the  spirits  of  his  men 
better  than  any  exhortation  written  at  a  distance. 

2d.  The  Chief  must  take  in  the  situation  at  a 
glance.  He  must  be  composed,  and  a  man  of 
prompt  decision.  Only  on  a  thorough  knowledge 
of  all  the  facts  will  he  base  his  final  dispositions  for 
a  fight.  ¥/e  are  of  opinion  that,  especially  in  the 
present  war,  when  a  decision  has  been  taken  or 
an  order  given,  it  is  always  advisable  not  to  modify 
these  except  in  details  of  execution  which  cannot 
interfere  with  the  operation  as  a  whole. 

3d.  During  the  battle,  the  Division  General 
should  establish  his  post  of  command  at  a  spot 
whence  he  may,  if  possible,  see  the  ground  where 
his  troops  are  engaged.  He  should,  in  any  case, 
be  where  he  can  keep  in  touch  as  long  as  possible 
with  the  generals  or  colonels  of  the  infantry  under 
his  command,  and  with  his  artillery  and  his 
information  section. 

4th.  The  Chief  of  any  unit  in  war  time  is  re- 
sponsible for  the  physical  and  moral  condition 
of  his  troops.  He  will  keep  their  spirit  at  a  high 
level  if  he  proves  to  be  as  strict  with  himself  as 
with  his  subordinates.  In  all  circumstances,  he 
should  treat  them  with  justice  and  kindness,  but 
should  be  pitiless  to  bad  soldiers. 


24         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

He  should  by  frequent  personal  inspections 
make  sure  that  his  troops  have  good  food,  shoes, 
and  clothing,  and  that  their  small  arms  and  artillery 
are  perfectly  kept,  whatever  the  weather  may  be. 

Some  commanders  of  infantry  Divisions,  during 
the  present  war,  have  neglected  to  take  as  good 
care  of  their  artillery  as  of  their  infantry.  This 
is  a  mistake  to  be  avoided.  There  are  no  more 
infantry  Divisions.  Our  Divisions  are  composed 
of  all  arms,  each  having  a  special  utility,  and  all 
must,  without  any  discrimination,  receive  the 
care  and  supervision  of  their  Chief. 

The  Staffs.  The  unit  commanders  need  the 
assistance  of  officers  thoroughly  imbued  with  their 
thoughts,  able  to  express  and  transmit  them 
faithfully. 

Chief  of  Staff.  In  every  unit  we  have  a  general 
or  superior  officer,  called  ''Chief  of  Staff."  In 
a  Division  taken  as  a  unit,  this  officer  is  entrusted 
with  the  direction  of  all  the  divisional  services 
and  the  services  at  headquarters.  He  is  responsi- 
ble to  his  commander  for  the  perfect  working 
of  all  these  services,  and  also  for  the  wording 
and  prompt  transmission  of  all  orders. 

While  the  task  of  inspecting  the  troops  (espe- 
cially the  fighting  troops)  rests  with  the  General, 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  25 

the  Chief  of  Staff  should  more  particularly  in- 
spect the  non-combatant  services  and  personnel, 
namely,  the  Health,  Supply,  Treasury,  and  Post 
Office  Departments. 

Staff-Officers.  It  would  be  a  great  mistake  to 
divide  the  staff-officers  otherwise  than  into  two 
very  distinct  classes: 

1st.  Staff -Officers  proper,  who  are  the  direct 
assistants  of  the  Chief; 

2d.  Office  Staff,  entrusted  with  all  the  clerical 
work,  except  that  concerning  the  preparation  and 
conduct  of  the  operations,  and  the  report  thereon. 

The  latter  need  not  possess  military  science. 
They  can  efficiently  fulfil  their  duties  if,  as  civil- 
ians, they  have  been  trained  to  prepare  written 
reports,  and  they  need  not  possess  the  physical 
endurance  necessary  to  the  staff-officers  proper. 

To  be  efficient,  a  staff -officer  needs  to  possess 
military  science,  judgment,  tact,  physical  strength, 
great  activity,  bravery,  and  self-abnegation. 

By  adhering  to  the  above  classification,  the 
American  Army  will  have  no  trouble  in  forming 
excellent  staffs.  In  fact,  it  will  not  have  to  tri- 
umph over  a  routine  that  three  years  of  war  has 
not  entirely  eliminated  from  our  old  European 
armies.     Too  often  we  injudiciously  employ  for 


26  MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

tasks  unfamiliar  or  unsuited  to  them  officers 
capable  of  rendering  much  greater  services  else- 
where. 

The  staff-officer  will  be  efficient  if  he  performs 
the  following  briefly  stated  duties  : 

The  staff-officer  must  complete  by  a  minute 
reconnoitring  the  inspections  previously  made 
by  the  General  himself.  He  should  never  hesitate 
to  go  to  the  very  first  lines,  and  it  will  be  often 
necessary  for  him  to  go  under  the  protection  of 
patrols  of  infantry,  and  ascertain  in  person  to 
what  extent  the  first  lines  of  the  enemy  have  been 
destroyed,  how  much  damage  has  been  done  to 
the  wire  entanglements  and  defences,  etc. 

The  staff-officer  must  be  a  perfectly  trained 
aerial  observer.  He  should  also  be  competent 
to  detect  on  the  different  photographs  furnished 
by  the  aviators  the  least  damage  done  to  the 
enemy's  works  by  the  successive  projectiles. 
This  task,  which  must  be  accomplished  most 
conscientiously,  requires  excellent  eyesight. 

We  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that,  in  the  present 
war,  it  would  be  criminal  insanity  to  deliver  an 
attack  without  being  sure  that  the  enemy's  wire 
defences  have  been  sufficiently  damaged;  at  least 
to  such  an  extent  as  will  allow  the  infantry  to  pass 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  27 

through  them.  A  staff-officer  should  not  at  this 
most  important  juncture  trust  imphcitly  to  the 
information  furnished  him  in  reports  from  the 
first  Hnes  or  found  in  the  photographs  taken  by 
the  aviation,  but  he  ought  to  go  and  see  for  himself 
and  report  minutely  to  his  Chief. 

These  are  dangerous  missions:  hence  the  need 
of  having  staff -officers  in  reserve.  It  has  been 
repeatedly  proved  that  officers  who  have  not 
been  trained  at  the  Ecole  d'Etat  Major  (staff 
school),  but  are  experienced  and  efficient  men, 
quickly  become  excellent  substitute  staff -officers. 

Their  principal  duties  may  be  summed  up  as 
follows  : 

Keep  their  Chief  informed  before,  during,  and 
after  an  operation. 

Their  office  work  ought  to  be  limited  to  the 
writing  of  orders  and  reports  concerning  the 
operations.  This  is  easy  of  accomplishment  when 
the  commander  has  a  comprehensive  grasp  of  the 
situation,  and  gives  his  staff  clear  and  concise 
orders,  which  they  have  only  to  put  into  effect 
in  due  form. 

The  staff-officer  must  also  act  as  an  intelligence 
officer.  As  close  to  the  General's  headquarters 
as  possible,  a  staff-officer  must  establish  a  centre 


28         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

of  information,  where  he  will  keep  a  force  of  men 
and  all  the  equipment  that  will  enable  him  to  keep 
in  constant  communication  with  his  General, 
with  the  infantry,  the  artillery,  the  captive 
balloons,  all  the  services  of  the  aviation,  etc. 
When  a  reconnoitring  aviator  returns  with  some 
important  information,  unless  he  has  been  able 
to  communicate  it  by  wireless,  he  lands  as  near  as 
possible  to  the  intelligence  bureau,  gives  to  the 
staff-officer  in  charge  an  account  of  what  he  has 
seen,  and  flies  off.  The  staff-officer  transmits 
immediately  to  the  proper  quarter  the  information 
he  has  just  received,  and  it  is  his  duty  in  all 
important  cases  to  make  sure  that  his  message 
has  reached  its  proper  destination.  If  telephonic 
communication  has  been  interrupted  by  any  acci- 
dent of  battle,  he  must  despatch  some  of  the 
estafettes,  dispatch-runners,  or  carrier-pigeons  at 
his  disposal. 


CHAPTER  II 

AVIATION 

1.  Its  military  beginnings.     Its  increasing  importance. 

2.  Its  use  and  scope. 

3.  Different  kinds  of  aircraft.    Battle-planes.    Bombing-planes. 

Observation-  or  scout-planes.  Employment  of  scout- 
planes  for  the  direction  of  artillery-fire  and  the  movements 
of  infantry.     Aviation  during  a  battle. 

4.  Hydroplanes. 

5.  Balloons,  Zeppelins. 

I.  Its  military  beginnings,  its  increasing  im- 
portance. At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  Germany 
alone  possessed  a  military  flying  corps.  She  was 
the  only  nation  who  desired  war.  She  was  the 
only  one  prepared,  in  this  as  in  other  respects. 
Her  foresight  was  duly  rewarded. 

Though  still  few,  her  aviators  found  themselves 
the  masters  of  the  air.  They  made  themselves 
very  useful  to  the  German  Command  by  ob- 
servations that  enabled  them  to  locate  the  prin- 
cipal  French   forces.     They  rendered  also  great 

services  to  their  artillery  during  the  actual  fight- 

29 


30  MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

ing.  A  German  machine,  while  climisily  flying 
some  3000  feet  above  the  French  batteries,  would 
send  up  a  rocket,  and  a  few  minutes  afterwards 
150  mm.  shells  would  begin  to  fall  on  the  spot 
thus  indicated. 

If,  at  the  time,  the  Germans  had  been  as  expert 
as  they  are  now  in  pointing  their  guns,  these 
air-directed  bombardments  would  have  had  more 
efficacious  results,  but  even  as  it  was,  they  in- 
variably produced  a  deplorable  impression  on 
the  morale  of  the  troops  who  felt  themselves 
at  the  mercy  of  a  shell-fire  which  the  French 
artillery  could  not  return  for  want  of  howitzers. 

Aviation  had  developed  itself  mostly  among  the 
civilians  in  France.  Overnight,  as  it  were,  our 
civilians  became  military  aviators.  They  showed 
great  bravery  and  a  few  at  once  proved  themselves 
remarkable.  Their  machines,  though  speedy,  as 
speed  was  reckoned  in  those  days,  were  in  many 
ways  inadequate  for  the  purposes  of  war,  but 
they  were  none  the  less  extremely  effective. 

Since  19 14,  all  the  belligerents  have,  with  more 
or  less  success,  considerably  developed  the  scope 
of  their  aviation. 

In  France  there  was  too  much  indecision  as  to 
what  types  should  be  adopted. 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY         31 

The  production  of  standardized  machines  en- 
countered serious  difficulties.  Construction  was 
slow.  Factories  either  lacked  machinery  entirely 
or  were  insufficiently  supplied  with  it. 

Till  the  autumn  of  19 15,  Germany  retained  the 
supremacy  in  the  air.  From  that  time  on  the 
situation  gradually  altered  in  favor  of  France,  and 
since  the  arrival  of  a  large  contingent  of  British 
machines,  the  Allies  have  maintained  a  marked 
superiority  on  the  Western  Front.  When  the 
American  air-corps  has  added  its  strength  to  the 
French  the  end  of  the  German  aviation  will, be 
close  at  hand. 

It  is  well  nevertheless  to  note  that  the  Ger- 
mans, fearing  the  advent  of  the  American  airmen, 
are  now  making  a  powerful  effort  to  double  the 
number  of  their  planes;  and,  aided  by  a  careful 
study  of  the  Allies'  machines  which  have  fallen 
in  their  lines,  are  busy  constructing  more  and 
more  formidable  examples.  The  Allies,  in  the 
meantime,  are  daily  improving  their  own,  and  the 
Americans  have  lately  had  the  occasion  to  see  that 
Italy,  one  of  the  most  recent  aviation  recruits, 
has  nearly  reached  perfection  in  aircraft  con- 
struction. 

In  order  to  render  promptly  the  anticipated 


32  MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

aid,  the  United  States  should,  at  the  beginning 
at  least,  adopt  thoroughly  tested  types  of  aircraft, 
of  easy  control  in  the  air;  and  should  construct 
several  standardized  motors. 

After  trial  on  the  French  front  some  types  may 
have  to  be  modified,  but  only  after  the  American 
aviation  corps  has  made  sure  that,  in  any  event, 
it  will  have  a  sufficient  number  of  aircraft  in 
France  while  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  new 
models. 

Airplane  construction  has  been  hitherto,  and 
will  continue  to  be,  constantly  progressive.  An 
improvement  much  needed  is  a  device  for  the 
protection  of  the  gasoline  tank,  which  on  most  of 
the  existing  types  is  too  vulnerable  and  too  fre- 
quently set  on  fire.  Very  often  the  Germans 
aim  at  the  tanks  rather  than  at  the  pilot,  as  the 
former  are  easier  to  hit  and  the  result  is  the  same. 

2.  Use  and  scope  of  aviation.  Our  opinion 
is  that  during  the  present  war  no  real  success  can 
be  obtained  without  the  help  of  numerous  and 
daring  aviators.  During  the  days  preceding 
an  attack  (in  the  trench  war)  or  in  order  to  hide 
the  movements  of  the  troops  (in  the  open  field) 
it  is  of  the  utmost  necessity  to  maintain  the  su- 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY         33 

premacy  in  the  air.  The  enemy's  aviation  must  be 
entirely  bHnded.  Not  one  enemy  machine  must 
pass  over  the  Hnes.  The  captive  balloons  must  be 
destroyed.  In  brief,  the  aviation  must  be  power- 
ful enough  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  having 
any  knowledge  of  our  preparations,  and  above  all 
from  ascertaining  the  exact  point  whence  the 
main  attack  will  be  launched. 

Besides  the  work  it  will  have  to  do  on  the  front 
(with  which  we  will  deal  hereafter)  the  aviation 
of  bombardment  will,  during  the  period  of  pre- 
paration, have  to  make  numerous  raids  on  the 
enemy's  rear,  hurl  destruction  upon  the  aero- 
dromes, and  into  the  camps  of  the  staff  and  re- 
serves, blow  up  the  important  ammunition  and 
food  stores,  attack  the  trains,  destroy  the  railway 
lines,  especially  at  the  junctions,  set  the  stations 
on  fire,  and  attack  all  detachments  and  convoys 
on  the  roads. 

Briefly,  the  aviation  should,  during  the  pre- 
paration for  an  attack  supplement  at  the  rear 
the  disorder  created  at  the  front  by  a  prolonged 
bombardment.  If  these  desiderata  are  complied 
with  by  sufficiently  numerous  and  powerful  air- 
craft, the  enemy  will  find  themselves  in  evident 
inferiority  at  the  moment  of  attack. 


34         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

3.  Different  kinds  of  air-craft.  There  are 
several  kinds  of  airplanes  : 

Battle-Planes.  The  importance  of  the  fight- 
ing aviation  far  exceeds  that  of  the  other  kinds, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  whatever  their  mission, 
the  latter  cannot  keep  the  air  either  on  the  front 
or  during  the  raids  back  of  the  enemy  lines  unless 
they  are  protected  against  the  attacks  of  the 
opponent's  aircraft  by  a  sufficient  number  of 
lighter,  swifter,  and  more  easily  manoeuvred 
battle-planes.  The  organization  of  the  fighting 
aviation  ought,  therefore,  to  claim  the  principal 
and  most  careful  consideration  of  the  commanding 
officer  in  charge  of  all  the  different  services  of  the 
flying  corps. 

Fighting  machines  must  be  very  numerous,  and 
piloted  by  cool,  competent  aviators,  masters  of 
their  machines  and  possessing  what,  in  France, 
our  soldiers  call  ''Cran";  i.  e.,  Pluck. 

At  the  present  moment  there  is  an  obvious 
tendency  to  abandon  monoplanes  in  favour  of 
small,  very  handy  biplanes  flying  220  kilometres 
an  hour.  Our  renowned  *'aces,  "  such  as  the  late 
Captain  Guynemer  and  so  many  others,  have, 
until  now,  fought  single-handed,  piloting  and 
shooting  at  the  same  time.     We  are  returning  to 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY         35 

the  idea  of  placing  two  men  on  these  fighting 
machines. 

Some  of  these  are  aheady  fitted  with  two 
very  light  and  extremely  accurate  machine-guns, 
the  front  one  being  fixed  so  as  to  shoot  through 
the  screw.  This  result  has  been  obtained  by  the 
use  of  a  device  so  marvellously  accin^ate  that  the 
ball  at  its  exit  from  the  barrel  of  the  gun  never 
hits  the  blades  of  the  screw  speeding  at  more 
than  one  thousand  five  hundred  revolutions  a 
minute. 

For  a  long  time,  our  French  aviators  operated 
separately,  but  the  Germans  having  taken  the 
habit  of  flying  in  groups,  our  aviators,  in  most 
cases,  fly  now  in  squadrillas  so  as  to  be  able  to  help 
one  another. 

The  battle-plane  aviators  fly  at  great  heights, 
hiding  themselves  behind  the  clouds,  and,  when 
they  see  an  enemy  machine  below  them,  they  drop 
on  it  with  all  speed  and  attempt,  while  keeping 
above  it,  to  shoot  it  down. 

When  they  are  attacked,  they  try  to  rise  and 
gain  the  advantage  of  position.  Their  tactics, 
in  brief,  consist  in  getting  as  much  as  possible  out 
of  an  enemy's  range,  and  in  attaining  such  a  posi- 
tion as  will  enable  them  to  reach  him. 


36         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

Some  of  these  fights  last  ten,  some  fifteen 
minutes. 

When  the  weather  allows  flights,  there  ought 
always  to  be  several  battle-planes  in  the  air  to 
protect  the  other  kinds  of  airplanes. 

One  must  lay  down  as  a  rule,  and  we  here 
repeat  the  opinion  expressed  by  famous  aviators, 
that  every  attack,  whether  by  a  single  machine 
or  by  a  squadrilla,  must  always  be  carried  out 
with  the  utmost  vigour.  The  Germans  seem, 
indeed,  to  have  received  orders  to  fly  away  when- 
ever they  feel  themselves  inferior. 

An  important  function  of  the  battle-planes  is  to 
escort  and  protect  the  scouting  or  raiding  squad- 
rons during  their  operations,  so  as  to  allow  the 
latter  to  fulfil  their  mission  without  having  to 
guard  against  any  possible  attack  of  the  enemy. 

During  these  expeditions  the  battle-plane  is  to 
the  other  airplanes  what  the  destroyers  are  to  the 
ships  they  convoy.  In  order  that  they  may  afford 
efficient  protection  to  the  ships,  the  destroyers 
must  be  very  fast  and  manageable;  likewise  the 
chasing  airplanes  must  of  necessity  be  more 
rapid  and  manageable  than  those  they  are  sent 
to  protect. 

Bombing-Planes.     The  number  of  machines 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  37 

composing  a  squadrilla  of  bombardment  varies. 
Several  squadrillas  often  start  together  to  accom- 
plish a  mission,  forming  an  aerial  army.  The 
machines  thus  detailed  must  be  able  to  carry  a 
heavy  load  of  ammunition,  also  a  provision  of 
gasoline  sufficient  to  allow  them  to  remain  a  long 
time  in  the  air. 

To  reaHze  the  progress  made  in  the  construction 
of  such  machines  one  has  but  to  remember  that, 
on  the  15th  of  last  October,  an  Italian  airplane 
carrying  a  great  weight  in  addition  to  its  supply 
of  gasoline,  covered  the  distance  from  Turin  to  the 
English  coast  in  ten  hours. 

The  Italians  have  now  at  Washington  a  machine 
carrying  twelve  persons.  All  the  Powers  are 
building  large  airplanes  intended  to  make  bom- 
bardments more  and  more  deadly. 

At  first,  ordinary  bombs  were  dropped  from  air- 
planes, but  they  are  now  supplied  with  special 
bombs  filled  with  the  most  powerful  explosives 
known  (winged  torpedoes),  and  also  incendiary 
and  asphyxiating  projectiles.  Special  devices  have 
been  constructed  which  increase  the  accuracy  of 
the  aim,  when  dropping  bombs. 

These  bombing-planes  are  armed  with  quick- 
firing  guns,  but  are  less  handy  and  manageable 


38         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

than  the  battle-plane,  whose  protection,  therefore, 
they  require. 

We  are  confident  that  our  American  friends  will 
develop  to  the  extreme  limit  their  aviation  of 
bombardment,  and  will  train  a  great  nimiber  of 
their  aviators  for  long-distance  flights  by  night 
or  day.  Very  many  of  the  most  important 
military  establishments  in  western  Germany  are 
within  reach  of  our  blows.  Up  to  now  the  in- 
sufficiency of  our  ■  material  has  been  the  sole 
reason  of  the  failure  of  our  aviation  to  attempt 
the  destruction  of  her  plants  at  Essen,  Cologne, 
Manheim,  Metz,  etc.  Certain  expeditions  have 
proved  that  all  these  places  are  within  the  reach 
of  fairly  good  machines  piloted  by  well-trained 
aviators. 

What  would  become  of  the  Essen  works  the 
day  that  1200  or  1500  airplanes  attacked  them 
in  groups  of  30  or  40,  following  each  other  at  ten- 
minute  intervals;  some  bombarding  the  works 
with  high-power  torpedoes,  others  with  incendiary 
bombs,  others  with  suffocating  projectiles,  utterly 
demoralizing  the  workmen  and  spreading  terror 
in  their  midst? 

Certainly  there  would  be  losses,  for  the  Germans 
have  surrounded  their  works  with  numerous  anti- 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  39 

aircraft  guns,  but  would  the  more  or  less  complete 
destruction  of  the  Essen  works  be  too  dearly 
bought  by  the  loss  of  a  number  of  machines? 
Moreover  we  do  not  believe  that  a  raid  on  their 
big  plants,  if  well  prepared  and  well  carried  out, 
would  be  very  costly. 

The  use  of  aviation  to  destroy  the  enemy^s 
munition  plants  will,  in  our  opinion,  greatly 
hasten  the  end  of  the  war,  and  spare  a  large  num- 
ber of  lives. 

If  the  war  lasts,  the  long-distance  aviation  will 
have  to  be  employed  very  extensively  during  the 
summer  to  set  fire  indiscriminately  to  the  harvest 
in  the  enemy's  country,  and  even  in  the  territory 
which  they  occupy  as  invaders,  since  there  is  no 
reason  to  spare  the  invaded  sections  as  long  as  the 
natives  are  not  allowed  to  have  their  share  of 
the  crops.  Furthermore,  devices  will  have  to  be 
invented  to  facilitate  this  work  of  destruction. 

It  is  materially  impossible  to  give  the  bombing- 
machines  a  speed  equal  to  that  of  the  battle-planes. 
Great  importance  however  must  be  attached  to 
the  choice  of  motors  and  to  obtaining  the  greatest 
speed  possible. 

All  these  machines  have  two  propellers  and 
some  are  provided  with  three  motors. 


40         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

The  first  bombing  expeditions  were  undertaken 
during  the  first  months  of  the  war.  From  the 
very  beginning,  the  Germans  reaHzed  that  air- 
planes could  go  far  and  strike  dangerous  blows. 
Paris  was  bombarded  as  early  as  September,  1914. 
In  time,  and  as  the  machines  were  improved,  the 
bombardments  became  more  disastrous.  In  the 
course  of  the  first  half  of  191 5,  British  aviators 
dropped  bombs  on  Friedrichshaven,  the  Zeppelin 
station  on  the  Lake  of  Constance  ;  French  aviators 
attacked  Stuttgart  and  Carlsruhe;  and  since  the 
beginning  of  191 7,  the  Germans  have  multiplied 
their  raids  on  London  and  the  coasts  of  England. 

We  believe  that  bombing  aviation,  for  purely 
military  purposes,  will  assume  an  ever-increasing 
importance  in  the  war. 

Observation  or  Scout-Planes.  On  the  French 
Front  the  old  types  of  reconnoitring  machines  are 
being  replaced  as  quickly  as  possible.  They  were 
too  slow  and  not  easy  to  control  in  case  of  an 
attack. 

The  services  rendered  by  the  reconnoitring 
airplanes  are  of  the  greatest  importance.  Their 
observations  supply  the  Command  with  accurate 
information  concerning  everything  that  is  taking 
place  within  the  enemy's  lines;  the  condition  of 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY         41 

his  front;  the  movements  of  troops  in  his  rear; 
thus  enabling  the  Chief  to  foresee  his  intentions 
and  foil  his  plans. 

In  addition  to  reports  of  what  they  observe 
during  their  flights,  the  pilots  obtain  aerial  photo- 
graphs. This  very  important  adjunct  of  our 
modern  armies  has  been  considerably  improved. 

Photos  taken  at  an  altitude  of  2500  and  3000 
metres  (8000  to  10,000  feet)  reproduce  so  accu- 
rately the  configuration  of  the  land  with  every 
object  on  it,  that  trained  officers  are  able  to  observe 
in  them  the  smallest  changes  that  have  been  made. 
With  this  object  in  view  they  compare  together 
several  photos  of  the  same  place  taken  at  different 
dates. 

We  include  in  our  volume  some  aerial  photo- 
graphs of  the  German  lines  in  the  Aisne  sector 
taken  at  the  end  of  December,  191 6,  in  January, 
1917,  and  in  April  and  May,  191 7.  The  first 
show  merely  the  enemy's  works  before  the  French 
bombardment.  The  pictures  taken  in  April  of  the 
same  ground  give  an  excellent  idea  of  the  pro- 
gressive effect  of  the  French  artillery,  and  the 
last  photographs,  taken  during  the  attacks  of 
the  5th  and  6th  of  May,  show  the  final  result  of 
the  tremendous  shell-fire.    In  order  to  compare  the 


42         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

changes  effected  from  time  to  time,  it  is  necessary 
to  use  a  magnifying-glass,  and  to  note  successively 
each  observation  on  a  large-scale  map  called 
a  "directing  map."  This  minute,  painstaking 
method  alone  will  enable  the  Staff  to  form  an 
idea  of  the  effect  of  the  artillery,  and  the  progres- 
sive demolition  of  the  works  and  trenches  of  the 
enemy.  Later  on  we  will  see  that  the  observations 
reported  by  the  reconnoitring  aviation  influence  in 
a  great  measure  the  dispositions  taken  for  attack. 

The  British  attach,  and  rightly  so,  such  im- 
portance to  a  strictly  accurate  record  of  the 
effects  of  their  fire,  that  they  are  not  satisfied 
with  the  usual  charts,  but  construct  for  their 
principal  staffs  large-scale  relief-maps  including 
both  their  own  and  the  German  lines,  works,  and 
batteries,  as  revealed  to  them  by  photographs 
taken  from  airplanes  and  captive  balloons.  Officers 
of  the  General  Staff  are  specially  entrusted  with 
the  duty  of  recording  on  this  relief -map  all  damage 
and  destruction  as  fast  as  it  is  reported.  When 
the  order  of  attack  is  given,  the  British  chiefs, 
knowing  as  far  as  it  is  possible  what  works  they 
will  find  destroyed,  and  what  points  will  offer  a 
more  or  less  stubborn  resistance,  make  their  dis- 
positions accordingly. 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  43 

No  attack  is  possible  if  the  Command  is  not 
daily  informed  by  the  photographic  section. 
Even  after  a  continuous  bombardment  it  is  more 
prudent  to  defer  an  attack  if  during  the  preceding 
days  the  weather  has  been  so  bad  as  to  prevent 
the  use  of  the  aerial  cameras. 

Use  of  Scout-Planes  to  Direct  Artillery 
Fire.  Special  and  sufficiently  numerous  squad- 
rillas  must  be  reserved  for  the  exclusive  use 
of  the  artillery,  and  more  particularly  for  that 
of  the  heavy  artillery  in  order  to  supply  them  with 
the  proper  range. 

At  times,  captive  balloons  can  help  the  heavy 
artillery  in  this  respect,  the  gunners  preferring 
them  to  airplanes;  but  these  balloons  are  not 
always  sufficiently  numerous  and  cannot  always 
see  far  enough. 

The  guiding  airplane  informs  the  batteries 
to  which  it  is  assigned  of  the  effect  of  their  shell- 
firer  by  means  of  wireless  telegraphy,  which  has 
the  advantage  of  not  being  interrupted  by  the 
terrific  noise  of  the  bombardment,  whereas  tele- 
phonic communication  with  a  captive  balloon  is 
impossible  without  the  use  of  special  ''hearing 
masks." 

Different  kinds  of  rockets  can  also  be  employed 


44         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

for  indicating  the  range  under  certain  circum- 
stances. 

Use  of  Scout-Planes  to  Direct  the  Move- 
ments OF  Infantry.  The  squadrillas  of  a  Divi- 
sion are  provided  with  devices  for  guiding  the 
movements  of  infantry. 

Their  duties  are  manifold.  At  all  times  they 
are  kept  hovering  over  the  first  lines  to  watch  the 
enemy  and  give  warning  of  all  unusual  moves. 

During  an  assault  their  principal  duty  is  to 
secure  the  indispensable  unity  of  action  between 
the  infantry  and  the  field  artillery.  As  we  will 
explain  further  on,  every  attack  made  by  the 
infantry  is  screened  by  a  terrific  barrage  fire  that 
advances  about  one  hundred  yards  ahead  of  the 
first  wave.  In  order  that  such  a  barrage  may 
continue  to  be  properly  effective  it  must  progress 
at  the  same  speed  as  the  infantry. 

For  this  purpose  scout-planes  are  equipped  with 
a  special  rocket,  that  signals,  ''Increase  the 
range."  Each  rocket  sent  calls  for  an  increase 
of  one  hundred  metres  in  the  range. 

During  the  fight  the  duties  of  the  aviator  as 
watchdog  of  the  infantry  do  not  cease.  He  has 
to  observe  the  slightest  moves  of  the  enemy,  and 
he  is  usually  able  to  warn  his  commanders  of  the 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  45 

preparation  of  counter-attacks,  of  their  direction, 
and  of  their  strength. 

The  services  rendered  by  the  guiding  aviation 
to  the  artillery  and  infantry  are  obviously  of 
capital  importance.  Its  mission,  if  properly 
executed,  is  extremely  hard  and  laborious,  hence 
the  necessity,  in  the  future,  of  increasing  the 
number  and  efficiency  of  these  squadrillas  as 
much  as  possible.  In  order  that  they  may  operate 
successfully  they  must  be  closely  protected  by 
powerful  battle-planes,  unless  the  latter  have 
already  cleared  the  region  of  enemy  machines 
and  left  them  the  mastery  of  the  air. 

Aviation  during  Battles.  Since  the  battle 
of  the  Somme,  the  British  and  French  aviation 
has  taken,  day  by  day,  a  more  and  more  direct 
part  in  the  actual  fighting.  The  Germans, 
whose  aircraft  were  originally  employed  only  for 
scouting  purposes,  were  not  slow  in  imitating 
them. 

During  all  the  recent  Franco-British  offensives, 
machines  of  all  types  were  seen  flying  down  as 
low  as  one  hundred  and  even  fifty  yards  above 
the  enemy's  terrain,  raking  the  reserve  lines  with 
machine-gun  fire,  shooting  down  the  gunners 
of   exposed    batteries,    surprising    reinforcements 


46         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

on  the  march  or  coming  up  in  troop  trains,  and 
spreading  disorder  everywhere. 

In  Artois,  a  moving  train  attacked  by  three 
British  machines  was  wrecked  with  great  loss  to 
its  crowded  freight  of  infantry. 

It  is  a  pleasure  for  a  Frenchman  to  pay  to 
the  British  aviators  the  tribute  well  earned  by 
their  valour  and  enterprise.  Sportsmen  that  they 
are,  the  English  from  the  very  first  have  taken  to 
aviation  as  a  sport,  and  have  given  themselves 
to  it  heart  and  soul.  The  results  they  have 
achieved  are  wonderful.  They  might  perhaps 
have  accomplished  feats  equally  brilliant  with 
smaller  losses;  nevertheless  we  cannot  but  admire 
the  high  courage  of  their  young  men,  who,  scorning 
death,  have  bent  all  their  energies  to  achieve 
success. 

The  preceding  brief  summary  of  the  uses  of 
aviation  in  the  present  war  justifies  what  we 
wrote  at  the  beginning,  viz.,  the  side  that  has 
the  uncontested  supremacy  in  the  air,  the  side 
that  has  done  away  with  the  adversary's  aviation, 
will  be  very  near  the  final  victory. 

But  in  order  to  safely  and  rapidly  reach  this 
result,  the  Americans  should,  in  the  organization 
of   their   flying   corps,    consent,    at   least   in  the 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  47 

beginning,  to  make  a  sacrifice  of  their  pride  as 
inventors. 

It  wiU  be  absolutely  necessary  for  them  to 
commence  the  fight  in  the  air  with  none  but  planes 
already  successfully  tested  at  the  front  in  the 
various  branches  of  the  aerial  service.  It  matters 
little  what  types  they  select  from  among  the  best 
now  in  use  by  the  French,  British,  Italians,  and 
even  by  the  Germans;  the  important  point  is  the 
achievement  of  swift  and  sure  results,  and  these 
can  be  obtained  only  with  such  aircraft  as  have 
proved  their  worth  in  actual  warfare. 

Otherwise,  the  Americans  would  expose  them- 
selves, at  the  start,  to  the  useless  loss  of  numerous 
planes,  and  the  sacrifice  of  many  precious  lives. 
They  would  delay  for  several  months  the  perfec- 
tion of  an  arm  which  is  expected  to  give  prompt 
and  decisive  results  on  the  Western  Front,  and 
thus  cause  as  great  a  disappointment  to  the 
American  as  to  the  Allied  Armies. 

The  adoption  of  such  a  policy  would  not,  how- 
ever, prevent  the  American  engineers  from  im- 
proving progressively  upon  their  original  aircraft. 
During  the  last  three  years  airplanes  have  been 
continually  modified  and  improved.  Still  greater 
improvements  may  be  expected  in  the  future, 


48         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

and  in  this  line  a  vast  field  remains  open  to  the 
American  genius. 

4.  Hydroplanes.  A  brief  mention  should  be 
made  of  hydroplanes,  or  sea-planes,  which,  although 
usually  equipped  only  with  the  pontoons  that 
enable  them  to  alight  upon  the  water,  are  equally 
fitted  for  a  landing  on  terra  firma  by  the  super- 
addition  of  wheels.  Most  of  the  British  attacks 
upon  the  German  airdromes,  encampments,  and 
fortified  lines  on  or  near  the  Belgian  coast  have 
been  made  from  hydroplanes.  These  machines 
have  proved  of  great  value  for  patrolling  the  coast 
against  submarines.  The  aviators  can  see  the 
submarines  at  a  certain  depth  under  water,  and 
following  in  pursuit,  they  attack  them  by  dropping 
special  bombs,  which,  like  those  used  by  destroyers 
when  passing  over  a  submarine,  are  so  constructed 
as  to  explode  at  a  certain  depth  by  water  pressure 
even  if  they  do  not  strike  their  target.  The  force 
of  the  explosion  is  sufficient  within  a  radius  of 
many  metres  to  disjoint  the  plates  of  the  sub- 
marine. 

5.  Balloons — Zeppelins.  At  the  outset  of  the 
war  the  Germans  had  a  marked  superiority  in 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY         49 

dirigible  balloons.  They  had  then  already  com- 
pleted their  particular  type  of  rigid  dirigible  bal- 
loon, the  Zeppelin,  which  they  have  since  improved 
and  multiplied  to  the  full  extent  of  their  ability. 
Only  at  sea  have  they  used  them  for  strictly  mili- 
tary purposes,  observing  very  advantageously  by 
their  means  the  British  fleet  and  flotillas.  In  the 
fighting  on  the  Western  Front  they  have  used 
their  Zeppelins  but  once,  in  the  course  of  their 
attempt  upon  Verdun,  when  an  effort  was  made  to 
destroy  the  Paris- Verdun  railroad  track.  Two 
days  before  the  attack  they  dispatched  a  couple 
of  the  great  airships  on  this  errand,  but  one  was 
brought  down  and  the  other  was  driven  away 
before  they  could  accomplish  their  mission. 

All  the  other  Zeppelin  expeditions  on  the 
Western  Front  have  been  made  not  against  com- 
batants but  against  towns.  While  they  have 
caused  a  great  many  casualties  among  the  civilian 
population  in  the  Allied  countries,  a  large  number 
of  them  have  been  shot  down. 

France  has  used  for  distant  expeditions  a 
few  non-rigid  dirigibles  and  has  lost  several  of 
them. 

England,  for  the  protection  of  the  Irish  sea  and 
the  Channel,  uses  some  very  swift  little  dirigibles 
4 


50         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

which  are  very  easily  handled  and  form  an  excel- 
lent submarine  patrol,  but  as  fighting  units  they 
are  worthless  and  are  obliged  to  flee  from  hostile 
airplanes. 


CHAPTER  III 

TRENCH  ORGANIZATION 

1.  General  remarks. 

2.  General  plan  of  an  intrenchment  system.     Trenches.     First 

and  second  lines.     Trenches  of  attack.     Artillery.     Wires. 

3.  Mines  and  counter-mines. 

4.  Special  railway  troops.     Transportation  by  roads. 

5.  General  remarks  on  transportation. 

6.  Camouflage. 

I.  General  Remarks.  When  her  dream  of  a 
short  war  which  was  to  reaHze  all  her  aims  of 
conquest  was  dissipated,  Germany  resorted  to  a 
policy  of  occupation  in  the  hope  of  either  main- 
taining her  hold  upon  the  territory  she  had  seized, 
or  else  of  eventually  using  it  as  an  asset  in  negotia- 
tions for  peace.  At  the  end  of  19 14  she  occupied 
nearly  the  whole  area  of  seven  French  Depart- 
ments, three  or  four  of  which  are  among  the 
richest  agricultural  and  industrial  districts  of 
France. 

To  attain  her  ends,  Germany  intrenched  her 
armies  on  the  nearest  front  that  she  had  time  to 

5Î 


52         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

occupy,  one  of  several  defensive  lines  which  she 
had  selected  long  before.  Her  spies,  in  time  of 
peace,  had  furnished  her  with  accurate  knowledge 
of  all  the  important  positions. 

Thus,  when  the  German  armies  of  the  first 
line  were  beaten  on  the  Marne,  and  fell  back  in 
disorder,  they  found,  at  a  distance  of  three  or 
four  days'  march,  beyond  Soissons,  on  the  frontier 
of  Lorraine,  an  unbroken  line  of  intrenchments 
already  organized  by  the  second-line  troops  while 
they  were  operating  their  enforced  retreat. 

The  French  pursuing  armies  had  not,  in  Septem- 
ber, 1 9 14,  the  material  means  of  assaulting  the 
enemy's  intrenchments.  They  had  just  fought  a 
series  of  battles  which  had  considerably  lessened 
their  effective  forces.  Their  regiments  had  to  be 
officered  anew.  They  had  no  alternative  but  to 
intrench  themselves,  on  positions  as  little  dis- 
advantageous as  possible,  in  front  of  the  enemy. 
Thus  all  along  a  line  extending  from  the  North 
Sea,  at  Nieuport,  to  the  frontier  of  Switzerland, 
began  the  formidable  conflict  which  is  still 
raging. 

The  distance  between  the  two  hostile  fronts 
varies  from  30  or  40'  metres  to  1200  or  1500 
metres  at  most. 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  53 

After  big  attacks,  prepared  by  long  bombard- 
ments, the  first  lines  cease  to  exist,  and  very 
often  both  of  the  hostile  fronts  are  merged  into 
one  another.  The  most  advanced  small  outposts 
have  no  other  shelter  than  that  of  shell-craters, 
and  it  is  by  means  of  grenades  thrown  from  one 
crater  to  another,  and  with  whatever  earthworks 
can  be  improvised  with  the  tools  on  hand,  that 
attempts  to  rectify  the  fronts  are  made. 

Both  parties,  most  of  the  time,  have  three 
successive  lines  of  organized  defence,  and  some- 
times more. 

It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  while  the  Ger- 
mans have  adhered  to  the  three-line  principle  in 
the  sectors  where  they  believe  themselves  but 
slightly  threatened,  on  the  fronts  where  they  are 
heavily  pressed  by  the  Allied  Armies,  they  have 
organized,  as  their  advanced  lines  weakened  or 
were  forced,  a  series  of  very  strong  positions,  one 
behind  the  other.  It  is  impossible  to  be  precise 
as  to  the  number  of  these  lines.  According  to  the 
reports  of  the  aviators,  several  complete  systems 
of  defences  exist  between  the  positions  they  are 
now  defending  and  the  Meuse. 

It  is  interesting  to  remark  that  the  multiplica- 
tion of  large-calibre  artillery  has  caused  changes 


54         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

to  be  made  by  both  belligerents  in  the  construction 
of  shelters  and  intrenchments. 

During  the  winter  of  1914-1915,  no  serious 
bombardments  took  place  before  April.  Both 
sides  organized  themselves  on  their  positions, 
excavating  shallow  shelters  which  were  braced 
with  wooden  beams  and  roofed  with  two  or  three 
layers  of  logs,  over  which  earth  was  more  or 
less  thickly  packed.  Such  shelters  resisted  well 
enough  150  mm.  shells. 

But,  in  1 91 7,  during  the  operations  in  Artois 
and  Champagne,  the  adoption  of  larger  calibres, 
and  the  use  of  torpedoes  fired  by  trench  machines, 
compelled  the  belligerents  to  bury  themselves 
more  deeply  in  the  ground,  wherever  the  soil 
permitted,  and  to  build  more  solid  shelters.  When 
water  interfered  with  deep  excavations,  the 
shelters  were  covered  in  with  very  strong  T-shaped 
iron  railway  ties,  or  with  several  layers  of  steel 
rails;  but  these  proved  insufficient,  and  the  Ger- 
mans were  the  first  to  construct  those  bombproofs 
of  reinforced  concrete  which  the  British  for  the 
first  time  encountered  on  the  Somme.  The 
concrete  blocks  are  very  large  and  the  steel  re- 
inforcing bars  extremely  strong.  Such  works 
certainly  impede  and  delay  the  operations  of  the 


-s 

2  s 

C(J  o 

2  " 

I  ^ 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  55 

enemy,  especially  when  they  are  extensively 
employed,  but  events  have  proved  that,  given 
time,  they  can  always  be  destroyed  by  gun-fire. 
The  French  have  constructed  similar  works  only 
at  points  of  capital  importance.  They  prefer  the 
old  wooden  shelters,  well  reinforced  with  earth. 

At  all  the  inhabited  places  in  their  lines,  and  at 
points  of  natural  strength,  the  Germans  have 
organized  independent  centres  of  resistance.  They 
have  transformed  whole  villages  into  fortresses. 
Mention  need  only  be  made  of  the  labyrinth  of 
Carency-Thiepval,  Beaumont-Hamel,  the  tunnels 
of  Cornillet,  of  Hill  304,  of  Mort-Homme,  etc. 

In  every  one  of  those  places  a  surprising  number 
of  concrete  constructions  and  superimposed  sub- 
terranean galleries  were  discovered.  In  them 
the  enemy  had  collected  reserve  troops,  food,  and 
munitions.  Such  shelters,  no  doubt,  afforded  the 
Germans  great  protection,  and  in  order  to  destroy 
them,  it  was  necessary  to  have  recourse  to  more 
and  more  powerful  methods. 

An  officer  of  the  8ist  Regiment  of  Infantry 
which  captured  Mort-Homme  writes  as  follows: 
"...  and  on  the  hill  where  the  8ist  Regiment  is 
encamped,  what  an  accumulation  of  defensive 
agencies!    Wire,  tunnels,  trenches,  observatories, 


56         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

shelters  of  every  description,  machine-gun  posts, 
light  cannon,  nothing  is  lacking.  To  these  ordi- 
nary means  of  defence,  other  extraordinary  ones 
had  been  added,  consisting  of  three  immense 
and  very  deep  subterranean  systems  (82  steps  led 
down  to  one  and  the  length  of  another  exceeded 
one  kilometre)  provided  with  ventilators,  Decau- 
ville  narrow-gauge  railways,  electricity,  posts 
of  command  and  relief,  rooms  for  the  men,  and 
stores  for  food,  arms,  munitions,  and  material. 
All  these  extraordinary  fortifications  could  not 
resist  the  impetuous  assault  of  our  troops,  which 
had  been  preceded  by  a  six-day  bombardm'ent  so 
intense  that  the  entire  first  line  was  enveloped  in  a 
thick  cloud  of  smoke  about  two  hundred  metres 
high,  and  the  ground  shook  all  the  time." 

In  fact,  no  absolutely  impregnable  shelter  has 
yet  been  devised,  and  the  story  of  fortification  is 
but  a  repetition  of  the  story  of  defensive  naval 
armament.  The  thicker  the  plates  of  the  dread- 
noughts, the  more  powerful  the  guns  are  made, 
and  the  guns  have  the  last  word. 

Moreover,  it  has  been  by  no  means  demon- 
strated that  the  German  intrenchments,  which 
have  cost  enormous  sums,  and  an  amount  of 
human  labour  that  the  Allies  would  have  been 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY         57 

unable  to  furnish,  have  to  any  extent  reduced 
the  enemy's  losses.  On  the  contrary,  it  appears 
that  the  temporary  protection  afforded  by  such 
works  is  more  than  offset  by  the  great  losses  in 
men  and  material  which  is  the  result  of  their 
final  destruction. 

The  official  reports  which  reach  us,  just  before 
going  to  press,  of  the  French  victory  of  the  23d- 
25th  of  October,  19 17,  on  the  Aisne,  prove  that, 
in  the  captured  salient  (which  the  Germans  had 
considered  of  capital  importance),  they  had  ac- 
cumulated means  of  defence  more  considerable 
and  powerful  than  at  any  point  hitherto  con- 
quered. 

At  the  inhabited  points,  they  had  converted 
all  the  cellars  of  the  houses  into  bombproof  s . 
They  had  bored  tunnels  of  communication,  some 
of  which  were  a  mile  long.  Everywhere  they  had 
built  formidable  concrete  dugouts  connected  by 
covered  passages  loopholed  for  machine-guns, 
and  had  even  mounted  heavy  pieces  of  artillery 
in  their  first  lines.  The  whole  position  was 
considered  so  impregnable  that  they  had  stored 
in  its  subterranean  spaces  a  very  large  quantity 
of  winter  supplies.  The  topography  of  the  re- 
gion was  unusually  favourable  to  the  construe- 


58  MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

tion  of  defensive  works,  and  a  number  of  natural 
grottoes  had  been  turned  to  good  account. 

In  a  few  days  a  powerful  artillery  had  enabled 
a  heroic  infantry  (fighting  under  the  eye  of  the 
American  General  Pershing)  to  overcome  the  re- 
sistance of  an  enemy  defending  his  ground  with  a 
force  of  about  nine  divisions.  This  operation 
justifies  once  more  our  assertion  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  construct  works  that  are  absolutely 
impregnable  to  gun-fire. 

To  give  an  idea  of  the  morale  of  the  French,  we 
can  do  no  better  than  to  cite  a  passage  from  a 
letter,  written  at  the  Front  on  October  6th,  which 
we  have  just  received  from  a  young  artillery  officer. 
''Watch  the  communiqués  that  will  be  issued  on 
or  about  the  20th  day  of  October.  We  are  prepar- 
ing for  the  Boches  a  song  and  dance  that  they  will 
not  forget." 

2.     General  plan  of  an  intrenchment  system. 

The  description  we  give  hereafter  of  the  organ- 
ization of  the  lines  is,  of  course,  like  the  following 
diagram,  purely  explanatory  and  illustrative. 

It  is  intended  to  set  forth  the  principles  govern- 
ing trench-construction  and  to  give  a  general  idea 
of  a  system  of  field  fortifications.    Such  a  system  is 


O       ^- 

H_,  OS 

^    I 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  59 

subject  to  the  exigencies  of  local  topography,  and 
it  is  therefore  impossible  to  state  exact  measure- 
ments and  distances  for  the  broad  outlines  of  the 
plan. 

Thus  one  could  formulate  no  law  to  fix  the  dis- 
tance which  should  separate  the  different  lines  of 
an  intrenched  position;  and  even  with  regard  to 
the  breadth  of  the  interval  between  two  trenches 
of  the  same  line,  one  can  scarcely  be  more  precise  ; 
since,  however  essential  it  may  be  in  theory  to 
make  it  broad  enough  to  prevent  a  single  shell 
from  doing  damage  to  both  trenches,  in  practice 
the  configuration  of  the  ground  does  not  always 
permit  of  such  a  precaution. 

The  plotting-out  of  the  trenches  is  of  very  great 
importance.  They  must  be  made  in  such  a 
manner  that  they  will  not  be  exposed  to  an  enfilad- 
ing fire  of  the  enemy's  guns,  and  will  be  strong 
enough  to  oppose  the  greatest  resistance  to  attack. 

Too  long  and  too  straight  lines  are  generally 
avoided.  The  usual  custom  is  to  reproduce  the 
ground  plan  of  a  bastion,  with  alternating  sali- 
ents and  re-entrants,  a  disposition  which  permits 
flank  firing  across  the  front  of  the  trench  (Fig.  i). 

The  re-entrants  are  frequently  additionally 
fortified  so  as  to  render  them  insurmountable  to 


60         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

assault,  so  that  the  defenders  need  occupy  the 
salients  only.  Advanced  trenches  exposed  to  in- 
tense bombardment  can  thus  be  defended  with  a 
smaller  number  of  men. 

The  inside  of  the  trenches  is  provided  at  short 
intervals  with  pare-éclats,  or  shell-screens,  consist- 


F/C.  f 


ing  of  buttresses  of  earth  supported  by  dayonnages, 
or  wattle-work,  which  are  intended  to  limit  as 
much  as  possible  the  radius  of  action  of  a  bursting 
shell  to  a  single  section  of  trench  (Fig.  2). 

The  trenches  are  of  different  dimensions  ;  never- 
theless, when  time  is  not  limited  for  their  con- 
struction. Fig.  3  can  be  considered  as  representing 
the  most  generally  adopted  type.  The  earth - 
thrown  up  in  front,  either  loose  or  filled  into  sand- 
bags, forms  the  parapet. 

As  the  action  of  the  weather,  especially  rain, 
tends  to  cave  in  the  sides  of  the  trenches,  they 
have  to  be  upheld  with  wooden  props,  or  with 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 


6i 


wire  nets,  supported  at  three  or  four  metre  in- 
tervals by  wooden  or  iron  posts. 


PARE'CCLAT 


ABRl 
MASQUE^ 


no.  z 


In  the  very  damp  regions  small  drains  {rigoles) 
and  cesspools  have  to  be  dug  to  carry  off  the 


BANQUETTE. 

Fig,  3 


water,  and  the  trenches  themselves  must  be  pro- 
vided with  open   "boardwalk"   flooring.     When 


62 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 


not  pressed  by  time  and  scarcity  of  material, 
especially  in  winter,  all  possible  means  should 
be  adopted  to  prevent  the  men  from  standing  too 
long  in  water.  Dampness,  more  than  cold,  is 
responsible  for  frostbitten  limbs. 


^^ CRENEAU 

^r--^  ,    ^   .  •^    ,  "^^ — ~^      _t      r^        s  "•    ^       S' 


M  .  ^  _  >  ^       >.      ^       >      1  ^^      \     T 


^ 


V:^- 


\i^dO.  4- 


In  the  parapets  of  trenches  that  are  expected  to 
last  some  time,  loopholes  are  made  by  inserting 
pieces  of  sheet-steel  with  openings  to  allow  the 
passage  of  a  gun  barrel.  Each  opening  closes 
with  a  small  door  which  remains  shut  except  when 
the  loophole  is  in  use  (Fig.  4). 

When  neither  time  nor  material  is  lacking,  the 
machine-gun  shelters  (Fig.  5)  in  the  trenches 
are  installed  within  steel  cupolas,  which  are  either 
stationary  or  revolving.     The  mechanism  of  the 


•S     2 


-    I 
o 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  63 

latter  is,  however,  complicated,  and  too  delicate 
for  use  in  the  first  lines.  These  cupolas  are  also 
much  used  for  observation  posts,  and,  as  we  shall 
see  later,  they  are  kept  as  much  as  possible  con- 
cealed from  the  sight  of  the  enemy  by  camouflage. 


FiG,  5 


The  first  line  comprises  three  positions  or 
trenches.  That  nearest  to  the  enemy  is  the 
advanced  trench,  and  at  a  short  distance  behind 
it  are  the  support  trenches.  Only  a  few  men  are 
now  posted  as  sentries  in  the  advanced  trenches. 
In  front  of  these  trenches,  *' listening"  or  ** watch" 
posts  are  hidden  in  the  ground .  Between  these  posts 
and  the  advanced  trenches  barbed  wire  entangle- 
ments are  stretched,  in  number  and  width  propor- 
tionate to  the  dangers  threatening  the  position. 


64         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

In  the  support  trenches  are  the  dugouts  shelter- 
ing the  men  against  the  fire  of  the  artillery. 
Many  communication  trenches  or  boyaux  connect 
them  with  the  advanced  trenches,  facilitating  the 
rapid  occupation  of  the  latter  in  case  of  need. 
In  the  advanced  trenches  are  built  shelters  for 
the  machine-guns.  Rifle-fire  is  directed  through 
loopholes  protected  by  the  steel  plates  above 
mentioned  (Fig.  4)  which  are  bullet-proof  at 
fifty  yards. 

At  some  distance  to  the  rear  of  the  support 
trenches  and  overlooking  them,  the  first-line 
system  is  reinforced  by  a  line  of  "centres  of 
resistance,"  which  is  punctuated  with  block- 
houses protected  by  thick  wire  entanglements. 
Well  sheltered  machine-guns,  a  certain  nimiber 
of  which  sweep  the  communication-ways  leading 
to  the  front,  compose  their  main  armament. 
This  blockhouse  line  is  connected  by  many  com- 
munication-ways with  the  trenches  in  front  of  it. 

These  centres  of  resistance  are  intended  to 
check  the  advance  of  the  enemy,  when  they  succeed 
in  breaking  into  the  three  anterior  lines,  and  to 
give  the  reserves  time  for  counter-attacking. 

Between  the  blockhouses  and  the  second-line 
system  a  fortified  line  is  frequently   organized 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  65 

which  is  called  the  "protecting  line  of  the  artillery." 
This  is  intended  to  repel  the  advance  of  the 
enemy  infantry,  if  they  gain  possession  of  the 
first-line  system,  before  they  reach  the  field  batter- 
ies, or  to  retard  it  long  enough  to  allow  the  batteries 
to  fall  back.  This  line  is  held  by  the  troops  of  the 
sector  which  do  not  belong  to  the  fighting  contin- 
gent. 

The  distance  from  the  first-line  system  of 
trenches  to  the  second-line  system  varies  according 
to  the  configuration  of  the  ground.  These  second 
lines  should,  when  possible,  overlook  the  first 
lines,  so  as  to  hold  them  under  their  fire.  The 
same  rules  prevail  in  the  location  of  the  third 
lines.  In  the  sectors  which  seem  to  particularly 
interest  the  enemy,  very  strong  ** check  positions" 
are  prepared  in  the  rear. 

The  troops  occupying  the  second  and  third 
lines  should  be  protected  against  bombardment 
as  much  as  possible.  It  is  therefore  in  these 
trenches  or  very  near  them  that  shelters  capable 
of  withstanding  heavy  gun-fire  should  be  con- 
structed. 

We  say  *'in  or  near"  advisedly,  for  it  is  im- 
portant to  hide  the  shelters  as  much  as  possible 

from  the  enemy,  and,  to  effect  this,  it  is  no  in- 
5 


66         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

convenience  to  build  them  a  little  in  the  rear  of 
the  trench-lines,  if  the  desired  result  can  thus  be 
obtained.  Often  it  will  be  necessary  to  do  this 
merely  for  the  purpose  of  getting  more  favourable 
ground  on  which  to  erect  the  shelter. 

The  main  point  to  emphasize  is  that  these 
shelters  should  be  connected  by  means  of  com- 
munication-ways permitting  quick  passage  from 
the  shelters  to  the  trench-lines. 

In  all  three  lines,  when  the  ground  is  suitable, 
observation  posts  are  located,  but  however  well 
they  may  be  concealed,  the  enemy  is  not  long  in 
discovering  them,  and  in  the  first  line  it  is  generally 
with  the  aid  of  different  kinds  of  periscopes  that 
the  observations  are  made. 

Communication  Lines.  All  the  trenches  are 
connected  by  communication  trenches  or  boyaux^ 
which  conceal  from  the  enemy  the  movements 
of  troops.  These  are  mere  ditches;  about  two 
yards  deep,  the  earth  from  which  is  thrown  out 
to  the  left  and  right,  or  on  one  side  only.  They 
follow  a  zigzag  line  so  as  not  to  be  exposed  to 
enfilading  fire,  or,  when  straight,  are  protected  at 
intervals  by  earth  screens  {pare-éclats). 

The  depth  or  breadth  of  these  "ditches'* 
depends  on  the  use  to  be  made  of  them.     For 


Diagram  of  Campaign  Intrenchments. 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  67 

instance,  those  intended  for  carrying  out  the 
wounded  must  be  deep  and  wide. 

To  preclude  obstruction  during  attack,  and  to 
provide  free  and  quick  passage  for  reserves  rush- 
ing up  from  the  rear,  communication  trenches 
should  be  very  numerous.  Some  should  be  desig- 
nated for  forward  and  some  for  rearward  move- 
ment. Each  one  should  bear  a  name  or  a  number 
and  at  its  extremities  arrows  should  indicate  the 
direction  of  the  circulation.  Thus  confusion  will 
be  avoided. 

Trenches  of  Attack.  When  the  opposing 
lines  are  sufficiently  far  from  one  another,  it  is 
impossible  to  launch  an  attack  without  having 
brought  the  infantry  within  striking  distance. 

For  this  purpose  a  sufficient  number  of  boyaux 
are  dug  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy,  starting 
from  the  advanced  trenches,  passing  under  the 
wire  entanglements,  and  connecting  together 
with  a  cross-trench  when  at  the  required  dis- 
tance. This  is  the  "trench  of  attack"  and  at 
the  proper  time,  steps  are  made  in  it  to  facil- 
itate the  egress  of  the  troops  at  the  moment  of 
assault. 

This  work  is  done  at  night,  and  preferably, 
when  possible,  by  troops  which  are  not  to  take 


68         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

part  in  the  attack.  The  men  proceed  to  this 
work  under  cover  and  patrol  guard. 

Artillery.  The  artillery,  according  to  its 
size,  is  placed  between  the  lines  or  behind  them. 
Field  batteries  are  pushed  forward  up  to  the 
"artillery  protecting  line"  and  placed  in  position 
to  shell,  at  any  time,  certain  designated  portions 
of  the  enemy's  front.  They  are  either  buried 
in  the  ground  or  sheltered  under  casemates,  when 
the  latter  can  be  concealed  from  the  enemy. 

The  trench-guns  are,  generally,  on  account  of 
their  small  range,  placed  in  the  first-line  support 
trenches. 

The  heavy  artillery,  farthest  back  of  all,  is 
drawn  up  in  echelons  according  to  its  size  and  the 
part  assigned  to  each  part  of  it. 

Wire  Entanglements.  The  width  of  the 
wire  entanglements  varies  considerably.  Well- 
strung  wire  prevents  any  attack,  and  none  can  be 
atternpted  until  the  entanglements  are  destroyed. 
In  front  of  their  new  lines  on  the  Aisne,  where  the 
Germans  are  simply  holding  the  ground,  and  have 
given  up  all  notion  of  advance,  they  have  stretched 
eight  or  nine  successive  rows  of  wire,  each  row 
being  fifty  metres  wide. 

Wherever   defence  only  is  contemplated,   the 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY         69 

protection  of  wire  is  essential,  but  it  will  be  well 
to  bear  in  mind  that  too  many  entanglements 
may  prove  inconvenient  at  the  time  of  an  attack. 
We  have  seen  that  in  such  cases,  the  difficulty  is 
solved  by  digging  communication  trenches  under 
the  wires. 

3.  Mines  and  counter-mines.  Since  both 
parties  dug  themselves  in,  much  use  has  been 
made  of  mines  and  counter-mines,  especially  in 
1 91 5  and  a  part  of  191 6. 

The  aim  of  the  mine  is  to  throw  the  enemy 
into  sudden  consternation  and  disorder,  while 
destroying  an  advanced  trench,  or  work.  The 
French  considered  the  mine  as  a  weapon  with 
which  it  would  be  possible  to  remedy  at  certain 
points  the  defects  of  their  line. 

They  caused  heavy  losses  to  both  parties,  but 
are  not  so  much  used  now  for  the  very  good  reason 
that,  where  the  fronts  have  undergone  no  change 
since  1914,  the  soil  has  been  so  greatly  disturbed 
that  it  would  be  absolutely  impossible  to  make 
the  necessary  excavations.  We  shall  simply  re- 
call that  in  June,  191 7,  the  British,  prior  to  their 
attack  on  Messines,  set  off  twenty  mines,  each 
containing   twenty-three  thousand  kilograms  of 


70         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

explosive,  and  as  the  Germans  were  not  aware  of 
their  construction,  the  effect  of  the  explosions  was 
terrible,  producing  huge  craters,  seventy  metres 
deep  and  several  hundred  metres  in  circumference. 

Mines  are  dug  by  hand  or  electric  drills.  The 
latter  have  the  disadvantage  of  making  too  much 
noise.  Greatly  improved  systems  of  "listening 
posts**  permit  the  enemy's  operations  to  be  de- 
tected and  opposed,  and  in  all  cases,  excepting 
at  Messines,  where  the  British  bored  their  gal- 
leries at  more  than  fifty  metres  underground, 
mine-digging  was  carried  on  under  great  difficulties. 

The  best  means  to  neutralize  the  danger  of  a 
mine  whose  construction  is  discovered,  is  to  reach 
it  as  quickly  as  possible  by  excavating  a  * 'counter- 
mine," and  blow  it  up  before  the  enemy  has  a 
chance  to  set  it  off.  The  success  of  such  a  counter- 
mine is  termed  a  camouflet  inflicted  on  the  enemy. 

In  our  opinion,  mines  and  counter-mines  will  play 
a  less  and  less  important  part  in  the  present  war, 
but  it  will  nevertheless  be  necessary  for  our  armies 
to  be  provided  with  the  means  of  operating  them 
whenever  the  Command  may  deem  them  advisable. 

4.  Special  railway  troops. — ^Transportation  by 
roads.     Since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  France  has 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  71 

been  lacking  in  special  technical  corps,  especially 
for  the  railways.  Her  ante-bellum  system  was 
insufficient  to  cope  with  the  rapid  development  of 
the  military  operations,  and  the  reorganization 
rendered  necessary  by  trench- warfare  along  an  ex- 
tensive front. 

A  large  proportion  of  the  railroad  employees 
was  at  first  mobilized  to  assist  and  reinforce  the 
railway  troops.  Then,  after  a  few  months,  a 
large  number  of  these  men  had  to  be  sent  back  to 
their  former  civilian  duties,  in  order  to  assure  the 
economical  life  of  the  country. 

While  the  transport  of  troops  alone  requires  a 
daily  extension  of  our  road  and  railway  systems, 
and  constant  attention  to  repair- work  in  the  fight- 
ing zones,  the  industrial  efforts  of  the  nation  to 
equip  and  arm  the  millions  of  combatants  also 
necessitates  an  enormous  railroad  activity.  As 
the  lack  of  workmen  prevents  locomotives  and 
carriages  from  being  repaired,  and  the  supply  of 
rolling-stock  shipped  from  America  is  not  sufficient, 
it  is  as  much  as  the  French  can  do  to  keep  their 
railroad  tracks -in  good  condition. 

It  should  be  noted  that  owing  to  the  intense 
and  forced  use  of  her  interior  lines  to  which  we 
have  already  referred,  the  railways  of  Germany 


^2         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

are  in  still  worse  condition  than  those  of  France. 
For  want  of  oil  and  grease  a  large  portion  of  their 
rolling-stock  cannot  be  used. 

To  make  up  the  deficiency  in  technical  troops, 
France  has  had  to  have  recourse  to  her  "territorial 
units,  "  composed  of  men  unfit  for  the  Front  and 
generally  more  than  forty-five  years  old,  who, 
exhausted  by  three  years  of  war,  are  unable  to  do 
much  work. 

This  short  résumé  of  the  conditions  prevailing 
on  the  rear  of  the  French  Front  will  enable  the 
Americans  to  comprehend  the  necessity  for  or- 
ganizing on  a  very  extensive  scale  a  special  railroad 
transportation  corps.  Without  interfering  with 
traffic  on  the  principal  roads  of  the  United  States, 
it  should  be  possible  to  create  railway  regiments 
officered  by  civil  engineers,  with  separate  units 
for  track-construction,  operation  of  trains,  and 
repair  of  rolling-stock. 

The  engineer  regiments  should  likewise  be  enabled 
to  build  rapidly  field-barracks  of  all  kinds  in  the 
zones  devastated  and  abandoned  by  the  Germans. 

They  should,  moreover,  be  entrusted  with  the 
erection  of  hospital  and  ambulance  buildings,  and 
their  removal  and  reconstruction  whenever  new 
ground  is  wrested  from  the  enemy. 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  73 

Transportation  by  Road.  Except  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  the  lines,  where  horses  are 
still  used  by  the  regiments  for  transportation 
between  the  camps  and  cantonments  and  the  bases 
of  supply,  all  the  conveyance  of  men  and  material, 
which  is  not  made  by  rail,  is  done  by  motor-cars, 
in  daily  increasing  numbers. 

Not  only  have  the  railways  from  the  rear 
to  the  front  been  increased  in  number,  but  also 
the  communication  lines  running  parallel  with 
the  front.  Their  capacity,  however,  being  in- 
adequate for  moving  large  units  quickly  from 
one  part  of  the  Front  to  another,  motor-cars 
should  be  on  hand  in  number  sufficient  for 
the  rapid  transportation  of  an  entire  army 
corps. 

There  should  be  a  permanent  service  of  motor- 
cars between  the  front  lines  and  the  rear,  to 
assume  the  task  of  taking  fresh  troops  to  the  line 
and  exhausted  troops  to  the  camping-grounds. 
They  can  be  used  also,  and  with  great  efficiency, 
when  circumstances  at  the  Front  require  the 
prompt  advance  of  reserves  from  the  various 
bases. 

We  shall  see  later  how  motor-cars  are  used  for 
the  supply  of  food  or  ammunition.     Many  more 


74         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

cars  are  needed  for  the  hospitals,  ambulances,  and 
the  carrying  of  the  wounded. 

The  consumption  of  gasoline,  notwithstanding 
the  suppression  of  the  abuses  which  were  for  a 
long  time  prevalent  on  the  Anglo-French  Front, 
remains  considerable.  France  is  supplied  with  it 
exclusively  by  the  United  States  and  Mexico. 

5.     General   remarks  on  transportation.    The 

question  of  supplies  of  all  sorts  will  be  one  of  the 
difficulties  connected  with  the  organization  of 
the  American  Armies  on  French  soil.  The  United 
States  will  not  merely  have  to  convey  troops  from 
one  continent  to  the  other,  but  also  to  ship  all 
that  is  necessary  for  the  subsistence  of  her  armies, 
their  upkeep,  their  armament,  their  artillery,  etc., 
just  as  if  they  were  expected  to  land  in  a  desert 
country  where  the  barest  necessaries  of  life  would 
be  lacking. 

The  American  Government  and  the  General- 
in-Chief  have  from  the  start  been  aware  of  the 
difficulties  awaiting  them,  and,  immediately  after 
the  landing  of  the  first  troops,  very  important 
works  were  begun  for  the  improvement  of  the 
French  ports  of  landing  and  for  the  duplication  of 
French  railroads,  wherever  needed.     This  work  is 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  75 

being  actively  carried  out  under  the  direction  of 
American  engineers. 

6.  Camouflage.  Everything  pertaining  to  the 
equipment  and  employment  of  troops  must  be  hid- 
den, so  far  as  possible,  from  the  sight  of  enemy 
aviators,  and  the  various  devices  resorted  to  for 
this  purpose  are  termed  "Camouflage"  (disguise). 

Artillery,  transportation  parks,  ammunition 
dumps,  camps,  roads  of  communication,  etc.,  are 
masked  in  many  ways,  on  the  general  principle 
of  causing  the  object  to  be  concealed  to  blend 
with  the  tint  of  the  soil  or  the  foliage,  or  to  melt 
into  the  landscape  and  avoid  the  eye.  Coverings 
of  brushwood  or  straw  represent  the  simpler,  and 
framework  supporting  artificial  greenery  or  painted 
canvas,  the  more  ambitious  forms  of  camouflage. 
Objects  irregularly  blotched  with  paint  of  different 
colours  are  practically  invisible  at  a  certain  dis- 
tance— a  device  borrowed  from  the  "protective 
colouring"  of  the  animal  kingdom. 

Batteries  of  dummy  guns  are  often  used  in  this, 
as  in  former  wars,  to  deceive  the  enemy. 

It  is  highly  important  to  have  good  points  of 
observation  within  the  first  lines,  whence  the 
enemy's  defences  may  be  searched  with  powerful 


76         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

field-glasses.  To  meet  this  need,  artificial  trees, 
rocks,  etc.,  have  been  provided  when  nature 
failed  to  supply  them. 

The  camouflage  of  the  French  army  has  been 
entrusted  to  a  special  corps  of  professional  artists, 
which  has  proved  a  most  useful  unit,  since  it  is 
necessary  that  the  work  done  should  deceive  not 
only  the  human  eye,  but  the  sensitive  plate  of  the 
camera. 


CHAPTER  IV 

COMPOSITION  AND  USE  OF  THE  ARTILLERY 

1.  Retrospective  view.     General  considerations. 

2.  Different  sorts  of  artillery  :  Artillery  of   an  Army;  Artillery 

of    an    Army   Corps;    Artillery    of    a    Division;  Trench 
artillery  "Tanks,"  or  artillery  of  assault. 

3.  Mission  and  use  of  the  artillery  diiring  a  battle. 

4.  Anti-aircraft  artillery. 

5.  Advance  or  withdrawal  of  the  batteries. 

6.  Conclusion. 

I.  Retrospective  view.  General  considerations. 
In  the  French  army  long  before  the  war,  several 
clear-headed  and  well-informed  men  had  foreseen 
the  necessity  of  having  a  large,  heavy  field-artillery, 
similar  to  that  of  Germany. 

To  recall  General  Pétain's  motto:  ''The  artil- 
lery conquers  the  positions,  the  infantry  occupies 
them  " — this  simple  axiomatic  statement  obviously 
compels  the  inference  that  an  army  shall  possess 
an  artillery  able  to  bombard  efficiently  every 
species  of  fortification. 

-  77 


78         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

Unfortunately  few  people  in  the  Government 
or  parliamentary  spheres  could  be  brought  to 
consider  the  possibility  of  a  war;  so  this  question 
of  a  heavy  artillery,  although  continually  agitated 
in  those  circles,  remained  unsolved. 

In  1 9 14,  the  immense  majority  of  the  French 
nation,  including  not  only  the  politicians  but  also 
a  great  many  army  officers,  scoffed  at  the  possibility 
of  a  war  with  Germany.  The  Moroccan  imbroglio, 
the  war  in  the  Balkans,  and  the  Austrian  policy 
of  conquest  were  not  sufficient  w^arning  for  them. 
That  France's  military  preparation  was  entirely 
inadequate,  and  that  this  was  due  solely  to  the 
lethargy  of  the  national  mind,  is  generally  ad- 
mitted to-day.!  ^During  the  first  year  of  the  war, 
not  only  were  we  hopelessly  outclassed  in  heavy 
artillery,  but  I  at  Lille,  Maubeuge,  and  La  Fère 
the  Germans  captured  a  goodly  number  of  our 
heavy  guns  with  their  munitions,  and  turned 
them  against  us.  Fortunately  we  are  able  to 
assert  that  they  used  them  with  very  little 
advantage  to  themselves. 

Only  a  few  heavy-artillery  regiments  existed 
before  the  war.  Their  armament  included  few 
quick-firing  155  mm.  Rimailho  guns,  which,  though 
rapid  in  action,  were  too  short  in  range.     Other 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  79 

batteries  were  armed  with  120  and  155  mm.  siege 
guns;  good  types,  but  too  small  in  calibre,  and 
too  slow  in  action.  Moreover  all  these  guns  were 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  armies  which,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  conflict,  considered  them  as  a 
reserve  stock  and  kept  them  too  far  from  the 
battle-fields  of  August  and  September,  1914. 

The  impossibility  of  following  up  the  victory 
of  the  Marne  gradually  opened  the  eyes  of  the 
Government  to  the  need  of  a  very  large,  heavy 
artillery,  but  this  necessity  was  frankly  admitted 
only  in  the  autumn  of  191 5,  and  then  largely 
imder  the  influence  of  the  example  given  by  our 
British  Allies.  They  had  much  more  quickly 
comprehended  that  no  victory  would  be  possible 
unless  supremacy  in  artillery  was  achieved,  and, 
with  their  usual  cold  determination,  had  turned 
all  the  resources  at  their  disposal  to  the  manu- 
facture of  every  kind  of  gun,  and  mountains  of 
ammunition. 

France  followed  the  example. 

The  progress  made  enabled  us  first  to  hold 
our  own  against  the  German  artillery,  then  to 
equal  it,  and  finally  to  surpass  it. 

Considering  the  limited  means  left  to  France 
by  the  invasion,  considering  the  seizure  by  the 


8o         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

enemy  of  her  Lorraine  iron  deposits,  and  of  her 
richest  coal  mines,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that 
the  effort  made  from  191 5  to  191 7  was  gigantic. 

2.  Different  sorts  of  artillery.  We  shall  divide 
the  artillery  into  three  parts:  the  artillery  of  an 
army,  of  an  army  corps,  and  of  a  division. 

Artillery  of  an  Army.  This  includes  heavy 
artillery  of  all  sizes.  The  army  unit  alone  pos- 
sesses guns  of  greater  calibre  than  155  mm. 
The  composition  of  the  heavy  artillery  in  an  army 
varies  considerably,  the  number  of  different  types 
of  cannon  allotted  to  any  one  arm  depending  upon 
circumstances  and  on  the  work  which  it  is  expected 
to  do.  According  to  local  needs,  therefore,  the  Gen- 
eralissimo orders  the  heavy  artillery  to  be  trans- 
ferred from  one  army  group  to  another.  Similarly, 
the  Chief  of  a  group  of  armies  can,  as  he  sees  fit, 
order  such  transfers  of  guns  within  his  command. 

We  find  in  the  armies  howitzers  and  mortars  of 
the  following  sizes:  220,  270,  280,  305,  370, 
400  mm.  (in  inches:  8,  10,  11,  12,  14^^,  and  15^). 
Soon  we  shall  have  520  mm.  guns  (20^  inches). 
There  are  also  field  guns  of  120  and  155  mm.  short 
and  155  mm.  long  (5  and  6  inches)  and  naval 
guns  of  19,  100,  240,  274,  305,  and  340  mm. 


i 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  8i 

The  artillery  of  an  army  is  under  the  command 
of  a  General. 

The  field  batteries  of  120-155  mm.  are  composed 
of  four  pieces;  howitzer  batteries  and  naval 
batteries  of  100  and  190  mm.  are  nearly  alwa3^s  of 
two  pieces.  The  largest  mortars,  and  the  heaviest 
naval  guns  mounted  on  railroad  trucks,  operate 
singly,  and  each  gun  is  accompanied  by  several 
trucks  carrying  its  material  and  munitions. 

Artillery  of  an  Army  Corps.  The  artillery 
of  an  army  corps  is  under  the  command  of  a 
Colonel.  It  includes  two  groups  of  75  mm.  field 
guns,  two  groups  of  105  (4  inch),  or  of  120  (5  inch), 
and  one  group  of  155  (6  inch),  quick-firing.  This 
artillery  is  reinforced,  in  case  of  need,  by  the 
heavy  artillery  which  the  army  can  dispose  of. 
The  Colonel  commanding  the  artillery  assumes 
the  command  of  all  batteries,  of  whatever  size, 
momentarily  put  at  the  disposal  of  his  army  corps. 
He  is  most  specially  intrusted  with  the  selection 
of  the  ground  on  which  to  place  the  batteries,  and 
it  is  he  who  has  to  specify  the  part  each  of  them 
shall  take  in  the  action.  The  divisional  batteries 
of  the  army  corps  are  also  under  his  command, 
at  least  during  the  preparation  for  the  attacks. 
It  is  absolutely  indispensable  that  each  battery 


82         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

shoiild  be  assigned  its  objective,  and  shotdd  be 
positively  forbidden  to  scatter  its  projectiles 
promiscuously.  Thus  costly  waste  is  avoided, 
and  a  definite  purpose  accomplished. 

While  getting  ready  for  their  first  great  attack 
in  the  Somme  sector,  the  British,  during  an  artillery 
preparation  of  several  days'  duration  that  exceeded 
in  intensity  any  previously  known,  fired  a  vast 
number  of  projectiles.  At  the  time  of  the  assault, 
the  British  infantry  displayed  an  indomitable 
courage,  and  captured  several  important  positions, 
but,  for  the  want  of  a  proper  concentration  of  the 
fire  of  their  artillery  on  the  points  to  be  destroyed, 
their  heavy  losses  in  men  were  too  big  a  price 
to  pay  for  the  gains  they  made.  The  British 
artillery  has  since  modified  its  methods,  and, 
assisted  by  an  unexcelled  servi  ce.  of  aviation,  it 
has,  over  all  its  Front,  impressed  the  Germans 
with  the  power  and  accuracy  of  its  guns. 

Artillery  of  a  Division.  At  present,  di- 
visional artillery  includes  three  groups  of  75  mm. 
(each  group  composed  of  three  batteries  of  four 
guns),  one  group  of  three  batteries  of  four  quick- 
firiiig  155  mm.,  and  one  battery  of  trench-guns, 
the  number  and  size  of  which  are  variable.  This 
artillery  is  under  the  command  of  a  Colonel. 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  83 

Further  on  we  shall  speak  of  the  difficulty 
experienced  in  advancing  the  heavy  guns  through 
the  country  devastated  by  the  Germans  in  March, 
191 7.  The  75  mm.  field  artillery,  only,  was  able 
to  advance  quickly  enough.  Guns  of  105  mm. 
should  have  been  able  to  follow  the  troops  every- 
where and  give  them  help  until  the  arrival  of  the 
heavier  pieces. 

In  position,  and  at  the  time  of  active  operations, 
the  artillery  of  a  division  is  reinforced  by  the 
artillery  of  the  army  corps  and  that  of  the  army. 

The  longest  range  of  field  guns  is  8500  metres. 

The  range  of  the  howitzers  varies  between 
10,000  and  14,000  metres. 

Heavy  guns  have  a  much  greater  range.  The 
380  we  shall  soon  be  turning  out  will  send  a  shell 
containing  150  kilograms  of  explosive  to  a  distance 
of  38  kilometres. 

Trench  Artillery.  This  artillery  includes 
special  mortars,  firing  at  a  high  angle  projectiles 
containing  powerful  explosives;  their  longest 
range  is  not  over  two  miles.  They  are  principally 
used  for  the  destruction  of  wire  entanglements, 
first-line  trenches,  and  dugouts.  Their  size  varies 
from  58  to  340  mm. 

The  projectiles  are  provided  with  blades  which 


84         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

maintain  their  direction  through  the  air,  as  the 
guns  firing  them  are  not  rifled.  They  are  really 
aerial  torpedoes,  and  are  tremendously  destructive 
to  trenches  and  defences  of  every  sort. 

The  armies  have  a  big  reserve  of  trench  guns 
distributed  along  the  Front  according  to  cir- 
cumstances. These  batteries  are  generally  placed 
in  the  first-line  support  trenches. 

Small-sized  mortars  operated  by  compressed 
air  are  now  also  used.  Their  range  is  limited,  but 
for  short  distances  they  are  very  reliable  and 
powerful  weapons. 

By  reason  of  the  great  difficulties  they  experi- 
enced in  getting  heavy  artillery  up  into  the  moun- 
tains the  Italians  have  adopted  trench  mortars 
which  fire  very  large  projectiles  to  a  consider- 
able distance,  and  they  have  succeeded  in  con- 
structing some  examples  which  will  throw  heavy 
torpedoes  three  and  four  kilometres. 

"Tanks"  (Artillery  of  Assault).  Tanks 
were  first  used  by  the  British,  to  whom  they  have 
rendered  very  valuable  service.  They  have  not 
only  been  of  great  assistance  to  their  infantry, 
but  have  also  produced  a  very  depressing  effect 
on  the  enemy's  morale. 

Their  somewhat  too  great  weight  caused  many 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  85 

to  stick  in  the  muddy  and  unfavourable  ground 
over  which  they  had  to  operate.  We  believe  that 
the  original  model  has  not  been  abandoned,  but 
that  lighter  ones  have  lately  been  built. 

The  French  made  use  of  tanks  for  the  first  time 
in  their  attack  on  the  Aisne  on  the  15th  of  April, 
1917.  Their  machines  were  not  absolutely  perfect 
then,  and,  owing  perhaps  to  faulty  tactics,  their 
success  was  not  equal  to  expectation,  but,  in  the 
attack  of  May  5th,  they  were  better  handled  and 
proved  valuable  in  the  action.  The  French  tanks 
have  since  been  improved,  and  now  thoroughly 
fulfil  their  purpose. 

It  is  important  to  note  that  the  Germans,  who  for 
a  long  time  did  not  favour  the  adoption  of  tanks, 
probably  because  the  management  of  these  mon- 
sters require  of  their  crews  qualities  not  always 
found  among  the  Boches,  have  recently  con- 
structed some.  Of  course  they  are  of  "Kolossal" 
proportions.  We  do  not  know  as  yet  exactly 
what  results  they  have  obtained. 

Quite  recent  reports  reveal  that  in  the  attack 
of  the  28th  of  October,  north-east  of  Soissons,  the 
French  used  tanks  far  lighter  than  those  first  em- 
ployed. Last  spring's  experience  has  caused  them 
to  be  handled  in  a  much  more  efficient  manner, 


S6         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

and  the  first  reports  show  that  these  machines, 
by  destroying  numerous  machine-gun  shelters 
that  had  escaped  the  fire  of  the  artillery,  have 
greatly  facilitated  the  forward  march  of  the  troops. 

It  seems  to  us  that  the  proper  tactics  for  tanks 
should  not  be  to  advance  ahead  of  the  infantry 
waves  and  thus,  without  benefiting  them,  hinder 
the  barrage  fire  of  their  own  artillery,  but  should 
consist  in  following  slightly  behind  the  first  waves 
in  order  to  complete  the  destruction  of  the  numer- 
ous nests  of  German  machine-guns  which  the  ar- 
tillery has  not  always  succeeded  in  silencing,  to 
overthrow  obstacles,  and  flatten  the  incompletely 
destroyed  v/ire. 

In  brief,  the  mission  of  the  tanks  should  be  to 
support  the  infantry  and  clear  the  way  for  its 
forward  progress. 

3.     Mission  and  use  of  the  artillery  in  the  fight. 

The  mission  of  the  field  artillery  in  the  prepara- 
tion for  an  offensive  consists  in  tearing  up  the 
first-line  trenches,  the  passages  of  communication, 
and  the  wire  entanglements,  and  in  locating  and 
silencing  the  machine-guns  through  the  loopholes 
of  their  shelters. 

Unless  the  field  artillery  is  directed  with  most 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY         87 

particular  care,  it  is  liable  to  expose  its  infantry 
to  heavy  losses,  which  are  not  only  regrettable 
in  themselves  but  affect  considerably  the  morale 
of  the  troops. 

For  the  very  reason  that  the  75  mm.  gun  is  a 
weapon  of  great  precision,  its  accuracy  is  disturbed 
by  very  slight  causes,  such  as  atmospheric  per- 
turbations, and  the  quality  and  condition  of  the 
different  powders.  The  officers  commanding  the 
batteries,  immediately  upon  their  arrival  in  new 
regions,  prepare  firing-tables  based  on  the  local 
conditions  of  the  atmosphere  and  temperature, 
to  guide  the  firing  at  the  different  hours  of  the 
day.  They  correct  also  the  errors  resulting  from 
the  different  propulsive  qualities  of  the  various 
powders.  As  a  rule  all  the  projectiles  belonging 
to  the  same  lot  give  similar  results. 

Directly  it  is  in  position,  the  field  artillery  cal- 
culates the  distance  that  separates  it  from  the 
various  points  on  which  it  may  have  to  fire.  It 
complies  with  all  the  requests  of  the  infantry, 
when  informed  of  dangerous  moves  of  the  enemy; 
executing  rapid  barrages  on  the  signalled  objec- 
tives. By  barrages,  at  about  one  hundred  metres 
ahead  of  the  advance,  it  protects  the  assaulting 
waves   of   infantry.     It   increases   the   range   in 


SB         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

proportion  as  the  advance  moves  on.  The  groups 
of  105  mm.  may  be  advantageously  used  in 
order  to  reinforce  the  action  of  the  75  mm.  field 
artillery. 

Since  it  has  been  possible  to  increase  the  pro- 
portion of  155  mm.  quick-firing  guns,  batteries  of 
this  calibre  have  often  been  brought  in  to  reinforce 
the  barrages  kept  up  by  the  75  mm.  guns.  In 
the  recent  operations  on  the  Anglo-French  front 
this  combination  has  often  been  used  on  a  large 
scale,  and  with  disastrous  effect  whenever  fire 
was  opened  in  time  on  troops  assembled  for  the 
purpose  of  counter-attack. 

Heavy  artillery  has  a  twofold  part  to  play. 
It  is  an  artillery  for  destruction  and  an  artillery 
for  counterfiring  ;  it  executes  also  neutralizing 
fire.  It  is  guided  by  the  information  furnished 
by  scouting  airplanes  and  captive  balloons. 

Destructive  fire  is  executed  against  important 
dugouts,  blockhouses,  shelters  for  machine-guns, 
and  everything  on  the  enemy*s  front  that  can 
check  the  advance  of  the  infantry. 

Counterfiring,  guided  by  the  same  agencies,  is 
executed  in  order  to  put  enemy  batteries  out  of 
action.  It  is  certain,  indeed,  that  the  one  of  the 
two  adversaries  that  succeeds  in  silencing  the  op- 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY         89 

posing  artillery  can  more  easily  collect  his  forces, 
and,  at  the  time  of  launching  an  attack  or  resist- 
ing a  counter-attack,  the  task  of  the  infantry 
will  be  made  easier  of  accomplishment. 

At  the  time  of  the  preparation  of  the  attacks, 
the  fire  of  the  various  artilleries  continues  for 
seven  and  even  eight  days  with  unabating  or  even 
(if  necessary)  increasing  intensity. 

Neutralization  fire  is  made  with  asphyxiating 
shells.  When  the  enemy's  batteries  have  been 
well  pounded  by  destructive  fire,  the  quickest 
way  to  put  them  completely  out  of  action  is  to 
exhaust  the  gunners  by  neutralization  fire  and 
thus  prevent  them  from  serving  the  guns.  Even 
with  gas-proof  masks  the  men  very  soon  become 
exhausted  on  account  of  the  difficulty  they  have 
in  breathing  through  them.  With  this  end  in 
view,  a  bombardment  with  asphyxiating  shells  is 
kept  up  for  several  hours. 

For  instance,  at  the  time  of  the  attack,  near 
Craonne,  on  the  5th  of  May,  191 7,  one  of  our 
French  army  corps  was  faced  by  about  one 
hundred  and  eighty  German  batteries  of  all  sizes. 
Our  destructive  fire  had  terribly  damaged  those 
batteries;  but  the  Germans,  being  undisturbed 
on  their  Eastern  Front,  could  bring  up  fresh  bat- 


90         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

teries  at  every  moment,  and  were  still  able  to 
oppose  our  advance  towards  the  tableland  of 
Craonne. 

On  the  whole  length  of  our  Front  our  artillery 
fired  with  asphyxiating  shells,  and  a  few  hours 
afterwards,  with  the  exception  of  four  or  five,  all 
the  German  batteries  had  ceased  firing. 

The  importance  of  the  use  of  asphyxiating  shells 
may  be  very  great. 

Recently  in  Champagne  an  asphyxiating  shell 
of  large  size  penetrated  through  a  hole  made  by 
previous  heavy  shell  fire  into  a  concreted  German 
tunnel  and  exploded.  This  tunnel,  which  shel- 
tered an  important  garrison,  comprising  two 
companies  and  many  machine-guns,  had  already 
suffered  heavily.  Its  exits  were  obstructed,  but 
it  was  still  holding  out. 

All  but  one  man  were  suffocated,  surprised  by 
the  gas  before  they  had  time  to  put  on  their  masks. 
A  French  surgeon,  peering  through  the  hole  made 
by  the  shell  and  seeing  no  sign  of  life,  crept  into 
the  corpse-filled  gallery,  and,  after  a  brief  recon- 
noissance,  signalled  to  the  nearest  French  troops 
that  they  could  occupy  it. 

It  is  not  unusual  to  see,  during  the  big  attacks, 
the   various   artilleries   established   in   eight   and 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  91 

even  more  rows,  occupying  all  the  available  van- 
tage ground. 

The  occupation  of  Hill  304  in  August,  191 7,  is  a 
striking  example  of  the  results  of  a  thorough  co- 
ordination of  the  different  elements  for  the  pre- 
paration of  the  attack  and  the  capture  of  the 
position. 

Commencing  with  the  systematic  destruction 
of  the  enemy's  defences  by  several  days'  continu- 
ous bombardment,  accompanied  by  a  most  careful 
location  of  his  batteries,  with  the  help  of  all 
possible  means  of  investigation  (such  as  wireless 
telegraphy,  photography,  location  of  the  guns 
by  light  and  sound,  interception  of  code  signals, 
interrogation  of  prisoners,  etc.),  the  guns  of  our 
counter-batteries,  having  duly  apportioned  these 
various  objectives,  succeeded  on  the  morning  of 
the  24th  in  neutralizing  the  fire  of  the  German 
artillery,  and  exhausting  the  defenders  of  Hill  304. 

At  the  time  of  the  attack  our  battle-planes,  by 
driving  the  enemy's  aircraft  far  beyond  their  lines, 
allowed  our  scout-planes  to  direct  accurately  the 
fire  of  our  75  mm.  guns,  and  permitted  the  air- 
craft accompanying  the  assaulting  waves  of 
infantry  to  fly  close  to  the  ground  and  attack 
the  enemy  in  their  very  trenches. 


92  MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

To  such  a  co-ordination  of  all  our  efforts  is  due 
the  seizure,  with  a  minimum  loss  to  our  troops, 
of  most  important  positions. 

The  Germans  have  a  way  of  attempting  to 
regain  lost  ground  by  counter-attacks  in  mass- 
formation,  which  has  cost  them  terrible  losses. 
Field  artillery  has  a  capital  part  to  play  in  the 
repulse  of  these  attacks,  which  are  usually  broken 
up  by  the  rapidity  and  power  of  the  barrages. 
The  guns  of  75  mm.  are  assisted  by  the  groups  of 
105  and  by  the  destruction  groups  of  155,  and 
also  by  counter-battery  or  neutralization  fire 
from  the  heavy  artillery,  according  to  the  neces- 
sities of  the  moment. 

4,  Anti=aircraft  artillery.  Airplanes  are  the 
most  reliable  and  effective  weapons  against  air- 
planes and  Zeppelins,  but  it  is  impossible  to  com- 
mand at  all  times  a  sufficient  number  of  machines 
to  prevent  the  enemy's  incursions. 

Behind  the  lines  have  been  placed  special  sec- 
tions of  anti-aircraft  guns  of  different  sizes  (75, 
47,  and  37  mm.)  mounted  on  special  carriages  that 
allow  vertical  fire.  Without  entering  into  details, 
we  may  say  that  the  fire  of  these  guns  has  been 
rendered  so  accurate  that,  though  every  airplane 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  93 

thus  attacked  may  not  be  destroyed,  projectiles 
shower  so  close  around  them  that  they  are  forced 
to  fly  away  at  all  speed.  A  certain  number  of 
aircraft  are  brought  down  by  these  guns  every 
month. 

One  of  these  sections  hit  and  brought  down  a 
Zeppelin  near  Verdun  in  February,  191 6;  another 
shot  down,  near  Compiègne,  in  the  spring  of 
191 7,  a  large  Zeppelin  on  its  way  back  from  Eng- 
land. Quite  recently  ûve  Zeppelins  returning 
from  a  raid  on  London  were  brought  down  in 
France  by  airplanes  and  anti-aircraft  cannon. 
We  mention  these  well-known  events  as  indicating 
the  unquestionable  superiority  of  the  airplane 
over  the  dirigible,  which,  we  repeat,  has  been  of 
real  military  service  only  at  sea.  They  also 
demonstrate  that  by  increasing  the  number  of 
anti-aircraft  sections  both  behind  the  front  and 
in  proximity  to  the  whole  enemy  line,  the  raids 
on  open  towns  can  be  rendered  impossible. 

The  Germans  have  recently  invented  a  new 
gun,  probably  a  mortar,  which  projects  with 
great  accuracy  and  to  a  high  altitude  a  big  cluster 
of  whirling  balls  of  fire,  each  having  a  potential 
diameter  of  five  or  six  feet  of  fire.  The  whole 
cluster  has  an  apparent  radius  about  as  great 


94  MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

as  the  spread  of  an  airplane  from  tip  to  tip.  These 
new  projectiles,  known  as  "flaming  onions,'*  have 
been  used  principally  on  the  British  Front,  and  do 
not  appear  to  have  done  much  actual  damage,  but 
should  a  great  number  of  them  be  discharged 
at  large,  slow-moving  planes,  they  might  become 
dangerous. 

Armoured  Motor-cars.  On  some  armoured 
motor-cars  small  cannon  are  used;  on  others, 
machine-guns  are  placed.  They  are  intended  to 
throw  the  enemy  lines  into  confusion  at  certain 
points.  Their  action  must  be  swift,  sudden,  and 
brief.  Their  mobility  enables  them  to  dodge  the 
fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery.  These  cars  can  be 
much  more  useful  in  open  field  operations  than  in 
trench  warfare.  They  will  be  especially  useful 
as  a  help  to  cavalry  when  the  latter  can  once 
more  be  used. 

Every  regiment  of  infantry  is  now  provided  with 
a  section  of  three  37  mm.  guns  which  being  light, 
easy  to  move,  and  very  accurate  are  employed 
principally,  either  all  together  or  in  the  proportion 
of  one  to  each  battalion,  against  machine-guns. 
They  have  been  greatly  appreciated  by  the  regi- 
ment commanders;  a  large  nimaber  will  probably 
be  distributed  as  soon  as  they  can  be  manufactured. 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY  95 

5.     Advance  or  withdrawal  of  the  artillery.  One 

of  the  most  interesting  questions  for  an  army  in 
the  making,  such  as  the  American  Army,  is  that 
of  the  rapid  moving  of  the  heavy  artillery,  at  a 
given  moment. 

We  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  this  problem  is 
far  from  being  entirely  solved  on  the  Western 
Front,  and  that  its  study  and  organization  will 
be  a  very  hard  task  for  the  engineers  entrusted 
with  its  solution. 

American  engineers  will  have  to  go  to  the 
Western  Front  and  see  for  themselves  all  the 
difficulties  to  be  surmounted. 

Advance.  During  the  spring  of  191 7,  the 
French  Army  had  to  pursue  on  a  large  front  an 
enemy  who  had  not  only  devastated  the  country 
behind  them  to  a  depth  of  from  30  to  35  kilo- 
metres, but  had  also  accumulated  in  this  wilder- 
ness all  the  obstacles  their  fertile  imagination 
could  suggest. 

The  75  mm.  field  artillery  alone,  at  the  cost  of 
great  efforts  and  tremendous  loss  of  horses, 
managed  to  overtake,  though  somewhat  late,  the 
advance  of  our  infantry,  which  had  succeeded  in 
going  forward  everywhere. 

The  sections  for  the  supply  of  munitions  fol- 


96  MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

lowed  their  batteries,  but  more  slowly;  and  some 
batteries,  which  at  the  cost  of  great  and  continuous 
efforts,  had  come  into  position,  had  no  munitions. 

The  only  way  to  guard  against  such  delays,  in 
the  future,  will  be  to  keep  in  reserve  complemen- 
tary teams  of  horses,  to  replace  those  that  are 
killed,  or  to  help  the  batteries  and  their  ammuni- 
tion sections  through  the  worst  passages. 

We  have  not  the  right  to  give  here  in  detail 
the  difficulties  encountered  in  the  advance  of  the 
heavy  artillery.  We  were  informed  of  them  by  a 
confidential  note  from  the  High  Command. 

However,  while  this  confidential  note  sets  forth 
in  detail  all  the  difficulties  encountered,  it  makes 
no  recommendation  whatever  as  to  what  should 
be  done  on  such  occasions  in  the  future. 

There  is  absolutely  no  doubt  that  wherever 
the  Germans  retreat,  they  will  endeavour  to  ac- 
cumulate obstacles  behind  them  as  they  did  on  the 
Somme  and  the  Aisne.  The  question  of  the 
advance  of  the  different  artilleries  must  therefore 
be  very  carefully  considered.  Means  must  be 
found  to  ensure  it,  while  keeping  within  the 
immediate  reach  of  each  battery  the  requisite 
munition  supply. 

America,  however  great  her  participation  in  the 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY         97 

war,  will  never  be  able  to  mobilize  more  than  a 
small  part  of  her  immense  population.  Unlike 
France,  she  will  not  be  forced  to  suspend  the 
activities  of  ordinary  industrial  and  commercial 
life.  Assisted  by  technicians,  she  will  succeed 
in  training  all  the  special  troops  required  and  in 
supplying  them  fully  with  material.  She  will 
even  be  able  to  lend  some  of  them  to  France,  who, 
having  mobilized  all  her  fencible  men  for  service 
at  the  front  or  rear,  experiences  great  difficulty  in 
recruiting  the  technical  troops  she  needs. 

The  problem  of  the  rapid  advance  of  the  artillery 
is  to  be  solved  by  increasing  the  road-making 
facilities.  Whatever  the  difficulties  encountered 
and  the  obstacles  created  by  the  enemy,  we  must 
be  able  to  make,  with  the  least  possible  loss  of 
time,  large  and  solid  roads  in  sufficient  number, 
and  to  repair  or  build  entirely  new  lines  of  railroads 
of  all  gauges. 

Withdrawal.  We  must  always  foresee  the 
possibility  of  a  defeat,  prepare  everything  to 
lessen  it,  and  leave  as  few  guns  as  possible  in 
the  hands  of  the  enemy.  This  problem  is  easier 
to  solve  than  that  of  an  advance  towards  the 
enemy,  and  in  order  to  be  able  to  withdraw  the 
various  artilleries  rapidly,   it  will  be  sufficient. 


98         MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

when  preparing  the  attack,  to  have  foreseen  the 
number  of  roads  and  tracks  necessary  to  remove 
the  batteries  from  the  front. 

These  roads  and  railway  Hnes  have  to  be  con- 
stantly kept  in  order  by  special  gangs,  and  the 
holes  made  by  shells  must  be  immediately  filled  up. 

In  fact  we  shall  see  that  the  perfect  repair  of 
all  these  ways  of  communication  is  intimately 
connected  with  the  supply  of  munitions. 

6.  Conclusion.  From  the  mere  general  out- 
lines we  have  just  given  concerning  the  use  and 
mission  of  the  artillery,  we  may  draw  the  follow- 
ing conclusion: 

Till  the  end  of  the  war  it  will  be  necessary  to 
constantly  increase  the  manufacture  of  guns  of  all 
sizes,  especially  those  of  the  largest  calibres,  and 
to  accumulate  a  reserve  of  ammunition  far  beyond 
the  actual  needs.  The  adversary  that  will  have 
succeeded  in  silencing  the  opposing  artillery  will 
be  sure  of  victory,  and  will  obtain  it  without  the 
enormous  losses  in  human  life  that  all  combatants 
have  sustained  since  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

These  losses,  it  may  be  remarked  in  passing, 
have  been  considerably  reduced  of  late  by  the 
employment  of  more  scientific  methods  of  fighting. 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY         99 

The  transference  of  heavy  artillery  from  one 
army  to  another,  according  to  local  needs,  has 
many  disadvantages.  Such  a  practice  prevents 
the  High  Command  from  deceiving  the  adversary 
as  to  the  real  point  of  attack.  If  the  artillery 
preparation  could  be  maintained  with  equal  in- 
tensity for  equal  periods  of  time  on  the  Fronts  of 
several  armies,  the  enemy  could  not  possibly 
foresee  which  of  the  armies  would  strike  the 
principal  blow,  and  would  be  much  embarrassed 
as  to  the  disposition  of  their  reserves. 

It  will  never  be  possible  on  a  600  kilometre 
front  to  accumulate  a  sufficient  number  of  guns 
literally  to  accomplish  this,  but  by  constantly 
turning  out  new  guns,  by  increasing  the  number 
of  batteries  and  of  large  artillery  concentrations 
on  many  points  distant  from  one  other,  the  enemy 
will  be  kept  guessing. 


CHAPTER  V 

MUNITION   SUPPLY 

1.  Sketch  of  the  raih-oad  organization. 

2.  Organization  of  the  munition  parks. 

3.  Divisional  parks.     Their  organization.     Their  management. 

4.  Importance  of  the  munition  supply. 

5.  Replacement  and  repair  of  guns. 

6.  Different  issues  of  ammunition. 

In  the  present  war  the  supply  of  munitions 
of  all  kinds  is  of  such  great  importance  that  we 
have  thought  proper  to  devote  a  special  chapter 
to  this  subject. 

I.  Sketch  of  the  railroad  organization.  Accord- 
ing to  instructions  from  General  Headquarters 
the  services  at  the  rear  forward  the  required 
ammunition  to  the  "distributing  stations"  of 
the  different  armies.  There  is  one  of  these  for 
each  army,  provided  with  the  necessary  sidings 
and  yards  where  all  the  men  and  materials  coming 
from  the  rear  are  sorted,  and  distributed  further 

ahead    throughout    the    "terminal    zone"    {zone 

100 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        loi 

d'étapes)  or  'Var  zone."  This  zone  extends 
from  the  distributing  station  to  the  front  of  the 
army  it  suppHes.  The  stations  within  the  zone 
at  the  rail-heads,  just  behind  the  front,  are  the 
"war  terminals"  {stations  tètes  d'étapes  de  guerre). 
From  this  brief  sketch  of  the  railroad  organiza- 
tion that  feeds  the  front,  we  pass  to  a  consideration 
of  the  war-freight  which  it  carries. 

2.     Organization  of  the  munition  parks.    At  the 

rear  of  every  army  there  is  a  '  *  Main  Artillery 
Park,  "  located  at  a  point  of  easy  communication 
with  the  distributing  station  and  the  front  beyond. 
Military  railways  connect  it  with  the  "Army- 
Park  Depots"  farther  on,  which  in  turn  are  simi- 
larly connected  with  the  "Army-Corps  Parks," 
and  the  latter  with  "Divisional  Parks."  The 
military  railways  thus  spread  out  fan-wise  from 
the  various  bases  to  the  front,  through  distribut- 
ing-point after  distributing-point. 

During  the  transportation  of  the  munitions 
from  the  interior  of  the  country  to  the  front,  the 
different  kinds  of  projectiles  are  never  mixed 
together.  There  are  munition  trains  for  heavy 
guns,  others  for  field  gtins. 

The  munitions  are  transported  by  rail  in  the 


102        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

following  way.  The  75  and  105  shells  travel  in 
wooden  cases,  from  which  they  are  removed 
only  to  be  placed  in  the  supply  wagons  that 
carry  them  directly  to  the  batteries. 

The  shells  for  the  big  guns  are  transported  in 
bulk.  They  are  filled  with  explosive,  but  the 
fulminate  is  not  attached. 

The  powder  lots  for  all  sizes  travel  in  copper 
cases,  to  guard  against  all  risks  of  accidental 
explosion.  The  distributing  station  sends  the 
ammunition  trains  to  the  Main  Parks,  where  they 
are  shunted  on  to  sidings. 

These  trains  are  afterwards  distributed  to  the 
advance  posts  of  the  Army  Parks,  where,  accord- 
ing to  circumstances,  they  are  unloaded  to  form 
reserves  of  munitions,  or  redistributed  to  the 
Army-Corps  Parks. 

Most  of  the  time,  when  the  parks  of  the  front 
are  demanding  fresh  supplies,  those  trains  are  not 
unloaded  at  the  Army  Parks,  but  sent  on  to  the 
Army-Corps  Parks. 

There,  the  ammunition  is  taken  off  the  cars, 
and  piled  in  assorted  stacks  separated  by  intervals 
of  fifty  metres  ;  stacks  of  cases  for  the  field  artillery, 
stacks  of  big  shells,  stacks  of  fulminate  cases, 
and  stacks  of  powder-bag  cases. 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        103 

The  Army-Corps  Parks  are  entrusted  with  the 
supply  of  the  Divisional  Parks,  with  which  they 
are  connected  by  small  railways  of  60-centimetre 
gauge. 

3.  Divisional  parks.  As  we  have  taken  the 
division  as  a  unit  and  examined  its  component 
parts,  we  shall  likewise  take  the  Divisional  Park 
as  a  type. 

It  has  complete  autonomy,  and  has  the  means 
of  distributing  munitions  for  the  artillery  and 
the  infantry  to  the  batteries  and  regiments  of  the 
division.  It  possesses,  too,  reserve  guns,  and 
has  the  equipment  necessary  for  repairing  wheels, 
wagons,  gun-carriages,  brakes,  motor-cars,  etc. 

Let  us  examine  the  part  taken  by  a  Divisional 
Park  in  the  preparation  of  an  action. 

As  it  is  continually  supplied  by  the  Army- 
Corps  Park,  its  duty  is  the  maintenance  of  a 
sufficient  reserve  for  the  batteries  and  regiments 
of  the  division.  The  reserve  should  be  complete 
when  a  battle  is  about  to  begin. 

Field  artillery  and  infantry  should  be  supplied 
with  munitions  by  wagon-trains.  In  fact,  as 
soon  as  the  soil  has  been  badly  ploughed  by 
shells,   only  horse-drawn   vehicles   can   circulate. 


104        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

The  frequent  necessity  of  planting  new  batteries 
has  been  the  cause  of  a  considerable  reduction 
in  the  number  of  the  wagon-trains.  They  have 
been  replaced  by  motor-cars  that  drive  as  near  the 
batteries  as  possible.  The  latter  then  send  their 
wagons  to  meet  the  motor-cars  and  bring  the 
shells  to  the  points  selected  by  the  officer  com- 
manding the  batteries. 

The  ammunition  for  the  heavy  artillery  is 
brought  on  railways  of  60-centimetre  gauge  to  the 
battery  supply-shelters,  whence  40-centimetre 
gauge  tracks,  equipped  with  small  hand-trucks 
specially  detailed  to  each  battery,  take  it  directly 
to  the  guns.  These  supply-shelters,  solid  enough 
to  resist  the  enemy's  shell-fire,  are  constructed 
by  each  battery  as  soon  as  it  has  completed  and 
occupied  its  allotted  emplacement. 

During  the  preparation  the  transportation  of 
supplies  offers  few  difficulties  so  long  as  the  fire 
of  the  enemy  is  not  very  severe.  As  soon  as  the 
ground  begins  to  be  torn  up,  construction-gangs 
must  be  simimoned  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  in 
repair  all  the  ways  of  communication.  Each 
battery  has  its  own  organized  reserve  of  munitions 
or  supply-shelter,  from  which  to  draw  the  neces- 
sary shells  during  the  first  days  of  the  operation. 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        105 

and  the  parks  endeavour  by  all  possible  means  to 
keep  on  feeding  these  reserves. 

Ammunition  for  the  trench-guns  is  conveyed  to 
the  entrance  of  the  trenches  by  similar  little  hand- 
operated  railways,  and  cartridges  and  grenades  for 
the  infantry  are  distributed  in  the  same  manner. 

It  is  advisable,  when  time  and  means  permit,  to 
operate  these  small  railways  of  40-centimetre 
gauge  in  the  trenches  themselves,  when  they  are 
sufficiently  wide  for  the  purpose.  The  small 
trucks,  pushed  by  men,  will  bring  the  torpedoes 
and  other  munitions  as  far  as  possible,  but  when 
the  narrowness  of  the  excavations  prevents  this, 
supplies  must  be  carried  by  hand  to  the  most 
advanced  lines.  This  work,  which  is  very  labori- 
ous, should  be  left,  whenever  possible,  to  men 
drawn  from  regiments  in  the  rear  which  are  not 
intended  to  take  part  in  the  impending  attack. 
For  the  last  year  North  African  burros  have 
been  used  for  carrying  the  munitions  through  the 
communication  trenches.  They  are  hardy  ani- 
mals, easy  to  drive,  and  they  save  the  troops  a 
great  deal  of  labour. 

4.  Importance  of  the  munition  supply.  To  give 
our  readers  an  idea  of  the  enormous  work  in- 


io6       MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

volved  in  munition  transportation,  we  append 
some  figures  obtained  from  a  field  battery  operat- 
ing in  the  first  lines  on  the  Aisne  in  March  and 
April,  1917. 

On  the  1 2  th  of  April  the  reserve  in  munitions 
of  that  four-gun  battery  was  2000  shells  per  gun  ; 
i.  e.,  8000.  From  the  15th  onward  the  battery  re- 
ceived 1500  shells  daily.  On  the  19th,  in  the  even- 
ing, there  remained  only  1700  shells.  The 
battery  had  therefore  fired  from  the  12th  to  the 
19th  about  3600  shells  per  gun.  This  is  a  normal 
figure,  and  explains  why  millions  of  shells  are 
fired  on  a  large  front  in  a  few  hours. 

Precautions.  The  enormous  quantity  of  pro- 
jectiles and  supplies  of  all  kinds  in  the  different 
parks  prevents  them  from  being  sheltered  or 
even  concealed,  and,  in  order  to  limit  the  accidents 
caused  by  explosions,  the  stacks  of  ammunition 
are  far  from  one  another.  In  an  effort  to  hide 
them  from  the  enemy  aviation,  painted  cloths, 
or  green  or  brown  coloured  grasses,  are  thrown 
over  them,  so  as  to  deceive  the  eye. 

For  some  reason  or  other  the  aviation  of  the 
enemy  has  not  caused  very  great  damage  to  our 
various  ammunition  stores.  The  damage,  as 
a  rule,  has  been  confined  to  the  explosion  of  the 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        107 

stacks  directly  hit,  although,  at  the  beginning 
of  the  operations  on  the  Somme,  a  German  aviator 
succeeded  in  destroying  completely  in  the  rear  of 
the  English  lines  a  large  park  of  all  sorts  and  sizes 
of  shells. 

The  Allies  also  have  often  caused  the  explosion 
of  German  munition  depots,  but  the  damage 
done,  to  all  appearances,  has  always  been  limited. 

5.  Replacing  the  guns.  We  have  just  seen 
that  some  field  guns  fire  as  many  as  3600  shots 
in  a  few  days.  This,  added  to  the  rapidity  of  the 
firing  (at  times  fifteen  shots  a  minute,  during 
barrages),  explains  the  rapid  wear  of  the  guns, 
whose  metal  becomes  decomposed  by  the  heat. 

In  spite  of  the  quality  of  the  steel,  the  guns 
wear  out  and  finally  burst.  It  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  replace  those  put  out  of  service  by 
wear,  or  by  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 

This  duty  rests  with  the  Divisional  Park,  which 
must  have  a  reserve  sufficient  for  all  needs.  The 
park  must  also  be  prepared  to  repair  all  the  guns 
which  are  not  so  badly  injured  as  to  require  ship- 
ment back  to  the  Army  Park. 

The  battery  to  whose  consumption  of  muni- 
tions we  have  previously  referred  had,  from  the 


io8        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

1 2th  to  the  19th  of  April,  to  make  the  following 
changes  : 

Two  guns  were  put  out  of  service  by  the  fire  of 
the  enemy; 

One  gun  exploded; 

Seven  guns  had  to  be  sent  to  the  parks  for 
repairs  to  their  mechanism  or  their  carriages, 
which  had  been  put  out  of  service. 

When  the  mechanism,  the  wheels,  or  a  part  of 
the  carriage  only  have  been  damaged,  repair  is 
rapidly  made,  but  when  the  guns  have  exploded 
or  have  been  smashed  by  the  enemy's  fire,  they 
have  to  be  recast. 

In  short,  a  battery  of  four  guns,  used  ten  guns 
in  seven  days;  but  it  should  be  noted  that  out  of 
these  ten  guns  only  three  were  entirely  put  out 
of  service  (two  of  the  carriages  could  be  used 
again)  and  two  of  the  guns  merely  needed  a  change 
of  tubes. 

Nevertheless,  these  figures  emphasize  the  need 
for  the  parks  to  keep  on  hand  a  large  stock  of 
reserve  guns  and  to  maintain  workshops  for  the 
immediate  repair  of  slightly  damaged  pieces. 

The  retubing  of  the  guns  is  a  work  that  can 
only  be  done  in  the  factories  of  the  army.  The 
interior  rifled  tube,  while  white-heated,  is  removed 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        109 

and  replaced  by  a  new  tube  which  is  re-riiled' 
The  gun  is  then  as  good  as  new,  but,  if  the  outside 
tube,  which  is  the  resisting  part  of  the  cannon,  has 
been  broken  by  projectiles,  the  gun  is  beyond  re- 
pairing and  has  to  be  sent  to  the  rear  to  be  recast. 

Under  the  most  severe  bombardment  the  re- 
placement of  the  guns,  thus  put  out  of  service,  did 
not  take  more  than  two  hours. 

The  study  of  the  above  details  will  show  the 
necessity,  in  case  intense  and  constant  firing  is 
needed,  of  accumulating  the  largest  possible  re- 
serve of  field  batteries  at  the  points  requiring  a 
great  effort.  When,  as  will  often  happen,  several 
batteries  are  temporarily  out  of  action,  the 
surrounding  batteries  will  have  to  intensify  their 
fire.  Barrage  fires,  almost  exclusively  the  work 
of  the  field  artillery,  must  be  rapid,  continuous, 
accurate,  and  concentrated. 

6.  Different  issues  of  ammunition.  In  order 
to  avoid  delay  in  the  aiming  and  firing,  it  is  indis- 
pensable to  see  that  the  ammunition  brought  to  the 
batteries,  of  all  sizes,  belongs,  as  much  as  possible, 
to  the  same  issue,  from  the  same  loading  factories. 
This  rule  is  strictly  adhered  to,  except  in  case  of 
material  impossibility. 


no       MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

In  France,  parks  generally  receive  lots  of  5000 
shells,  all  loaded  in  the  same  factory  and  with 
labels  enabling  the  gunners  to  ascertain  that  the 
projectiles  belong  to  the  same  lot  ;  loaded  at  a 
specified  date  and  at  a  specified  factory. 

After  a  few  trial  shots,  the  battery  commanders 
will  see  the  effects  of  a  given  lot  of  shells  and  point 
their  guns  accordingly. 

We  cannot  enter  here  into  the  details  of  artillery 
practice.  The  study  of  it  must  be  begun  in 
schools  under  the  direction  of  specialists;  practical 
application  must  be  made  in  the  camps.  This 
detailed  instruction  is  now  being  given  in  the 
camps  of  France  and  America  to  the  new  recruits 
by  Allied  officers,  who  all  have  acquired  at  the 
Front  a  large  experience  in  all  that  concerns  the 
artillery. 

Guns  play  a  preponderating  part  in  the  present 
war,  and  the  combatants  are  improving  them 
unceasingly. 

At  the  present  time,  the  French  field  artillery 
undoubtedly  stands  first  for  the  accuracy  and 
efficiency  of  its  guns  and  projectiles,  the  models 
of  which  have  been  adopted  by  the  United  States. 

The  French  and  English  heavy  artilleries  are 
now  decidedly  and  in  every  respect  superior  in 


MAKING  A  MODERN  x\RMY        m 

quality  to  the  German  and  are  more  cleverly 
handled. 

The  English  heavy  artillery,  at  all  times  seconded 
by  numerous  aviators  of  great  daring,  can  develop 
its  concentration  fires  to  a  very  great  degree  of 
intensity  and  efficiency,  and  we  can  assert  on 
personal  information  that  there  never  has  been 
on  any  front  during  this  war  such  a  formidable 
drumfire  as  that  executed  by  the  French  artillery 
between  the  i8th  and  22d  days  of  October,  191 7, 
north-east  of  Soissons. 

The  Germans,  who  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
were  rather  bad  gunners,  have  improved  their 
material  and  especially  their  firing  methods  by 
frankly  adopting  those  of  the  French  artillery. 
They  possess  a  heavy  artillery,  as  numerous  as 
powerful  and  varied,  and  when  they  succeed  in 
systematizing  their  fire,  its  effects  are  cruel. 

For  this  reason  we  shall  end  this  chapter  by  re- 
peating : 

Let  us  have  still  more  cannon,  still  more  ammuni- 
tion, and  still  more  airplanes  to  second  our  artillery. 


CHAPTER  VI 

INFANTRY 

1.  Arms  of  the  infantry:  the  rifle;  the  machine-gun;  the  ma- 

chine-gun rifle;  the  bayonet;  the  grenade;  the  trench  knife; 
the  automatic  pistol. 

2.  Instruction  of  troops.     Duties  of  officers.     "Shock-troops." 

3.  The  infantry  of  a  division:   the  front;    dispositions  taken; 

storming  troops;  occupying  troops;  offensive  or  defensive 
engagements;  preparation  of  attacks;  prolonged  engage- 
ments; posts  of  command;  signalling;  battalions  and  com- 
panies; subaltern  stafïs. 

4.  A  word  about  cavalry. 

I.  Arms  of  the  infantry.  This  war  has  com- 
pletely transformed  the  armament  and  conse- 
quently altered  the  fighting  methods  of  the 
infantry. 

Rifle.     In  19 14  the  French  soldier  was  armed 

with  the  rifle  of  the  1886  pattern,  not  remodelled; 

i.  e.,  a  repeating  gun  with  a  hand-filled  magazine. 

It  was  an  excellent  weapon  in  use  for  a  long  time, 

but  too  many  of  them  had  lost  their  accuracy 

through  wear.     Since  191 4  these  rifles  have  been 

112 


i 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        113 

replaced  by  others  of  the  same  model  fitted  with 
loading  clips. 

Machine-guns.  At  the  beginning,  the  number 
of  machine-guns  was  six  per  infantry  regiment. 
During  a  long  time  they  were  distributed  at  the 
rate  of  two  per  battalion  ;  then  it  was  decided 
to  form  them  into  a  battery  under  the  command 
of  the  Colonel. 

This  limit  of  six  machine-guns  per  regiment 
placed  France  in  a  very  great  inferiority  to  the 
Germans,  who  had  reserves  of  machine-gun 
companies  in  every  division. 

The  first  battles  showed  the  important  part 
played  by  the  machine-guns,  and  France  prepared 
to  turn  out  quantities  of  them.  For  a  long  time, 
however,  she  remained  in  a  state  of  inferiority  in 
this  respect,  by  reason  of  the  advances  in  equip- 
ment made  by  the  Germans,  and  also  because, 
out  of  the  three  different  models  adopted  and 
constructed,  two  were  not  strong  enough  to  stand 
trench  warfare.  These  models  gave  disappointing 
results,  but  the  evil  has  now  been  remedied. 

Each  machine-gun  company  is  now  provided 
with  sixteen  guns — a  number  which,  we  believe, 
has  been  adopted  for  the  machine-gun  company 
in  America.     As  France  now  possesses  excellent 


114        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

models,  the  United  States  troops,  who  already 
before  the  war  had  good  guns,  will  doubtless 
receive  an  efficient  equipment.  In  this  war,  it  is 
necessary  that  the  component  parts  of  a  machine- 
gun  and  its  ammunition  should  be  easy  of  trans- 
port. 

Notwithstanding  their  reduced  effectives,  the 
Germans  are  still  able  to  increase  the  number  of 
their  machine-gims,  and  they  contemplate  raising 
their  number  from  twenty-four  to  thirty-four  per 
company.  In  all  likelihood  the  Allies  will  very 
soon  have  to  strengthen  their  own  machine-gun 
batteries.  A  battery  can  seldom  fire  all  its  guns 
at  the  same  time  because  they  get  too  hot  after 
shooting  about  ûve  hundred  rounds,  and  because 
they  are  likely,  especially  when  operating  over 
muddy  ground,  to  get  jammed,  and  thus  remain 
out  of  service  until  the  gunners  can  put  them 
in  working  order. 

For  these  reasons  the  ante-bellum  regulations 
prescribed  that  machine-guns  should  work  in 
pairs,  so  that  one  would  always  be  ready  to  take 
up  the  fire,  if  the  other  should,  for  any  reason,  go 
^out  of  action. 

This  regulation  is  still  adhered  to,  but  only  so 
far  as  circumstances  permit.     In  cases  of  emer- 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        115 

gency,  for  instance,  when  an  attack  has  to  be 
repulsed,  the  simiiltaneous  use  of  all  the  guns 
becomes  necessary,  especially  against  an  enemy 
who  possesses  a  superior  number  of  similar  guns. 

Each  belligerent  has  captured  many  machine- 
guns  and  much  ammunition  from  the  enemy. 
Thus  France  has  complete  German  batteries,  and 
Germany  possesses  both  French  and  English 
batteries. 

The  principal  structural  difference  between 
the  German  and  French  machine-guns  consists 
in  the  mechanism  for  cooling  off  the  guns;  the 
Germans  use  for  this  purpose  water  circulation, 
and  the  French  air  circulation. 

To  avoid  serious  burns  resulting  from  contact 
with  the  barrels  of  the  guns,  the  gunners  wear 
gloves  covered  with  very  thick  steel  mail. 

We  have  seen  photographs  of  American  machine- 
gun  batteries  carried  on  motorcycles.  The  French 
no  longer  make  use  of  this  method,  and  although 
it  may  have  proven  excellent  in  Mexico,  it  is 
entirely  impracticable  on  the  French  Front. 

The  ground  for  a  long  distance  behind  the 
lines  of  defence  has  been  so  torn  up  and  rendered 
impassable  by  prolonged  bombardment  that 
motor  vehicles  cannot  get  through.    Horse-drawn 


Ii6        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

vehicles  can  approach  much  nearer  but  at  the 
entrance  of  the  communication  trenches  even 
pack  transport  has  to  be  abandoned,  and  from  this 
point  (in  default  of  such  recent  devices  as  narrow- 
gauge  hand-operated  tracks,  or  pack-donkeys) 
all  war  material  has  to  go  forward  to  the  advance 
lines  on  men's  backs.  In  case  of  an  advance 
beyond  the  front,  difficulties  would  be  doubled, 
since  the  devastated  ground  behind  the  enemy's 
lines  would  have  to  be  traversed. 

Pack  transport  therefore  is  best  suited  for 
machine-gun  batteries  and  their  supplies.  Where 
the  number  of  horses  or  mules  is  insufficient, 
light  vehicles,  each  drawn  by  a  single  animal, 
can  be  used;  especially  for  the  machine-gun  sec- 
tions which  are  to  occupy  more  or  less  permanent 
positions. 

In  order  to  counterbalance  her  losses,  Germany 
has  constantly  increased  the  ninnber  of  her 
machine-guns,  using  them  as  a  defensive  weapon 
to  check  the  advance  of  the  enemy,  and  to  enable 
herself  to  cling  to  her  positions  with  a  small  number 
of  men. 

Germany  does  not  hesitate  to  sacrifice  machine- 
guns  in  order  to  gain  time,  and  German  machine- 
gunners  were  often  found  in  their  shelters  chained 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        117 

to  their  guns,  and  so  obliged  to  serve  them  until 
killed  or  released  by  the  enemy. 

Machine-guns  and  grenades  are  certainly  the 
most  powerful  arms  against  assaulting  waves. 
Seldom  will  the  reconnoitring  airplanes  detect 
all  the  numerous  machine-gun  shelters.  Some  of 
them  always  remain  after  a  bombardment  to  show 
activity  at  the  time  of  the  infantry  attack. 

The  British  have  very  efficiently  used  their 
tanks  for  the  destruction  of  these  remaining 
machine-gun  posts.  The  French  have  com- 
menced to  use  them  advantageously.  The  Ameri- 
cans, entering  the  war  after  they  have  been 
perfected,  and  profiting  by  their  Allies*  experience, 
will  be  able,  on  their  arrival  at  the  front,  to  use 
well  designed  and  constructed  tanks  in  support 
of  their  infantry.  Tanks  will  become  more  and 
more  indispensable  weapons,  and  their  general 
use  will  save  the  infantry  heavy  losses  of  life. 
The  Germans  now  have  some. 

Machine-gun  Rifle.  A  new  weapon  was 
added  to  the  armament  of  the  infantry  in  191 6. 
It  is  the  machine-gun  rifle,  which  is  not  to  be 
confounded  with  the  automatic  rifle  (repeating 
rifle). 

Much    lighter    than  the  machine-gun,   carried 


ii8        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

and  served  by  one  man  only,  it  is  easily  moved 
about,  and,  when  well  used,  is  a  most  dangerous 
weapon. 

To  shoot,  the  man  lies  down  (behind  a  shelter 
if  possible)  and  lifts  the  butt-end  to  his  shoulder, 
the  fore-part  of  the  gun  resting  on  a  very  short  fork. 
Machine-gun  rifles  are  used  principally  against 
machine-guns. 

There  are  several  types  of  machine-gun  rifles. 
The  best  is  without  doubt  that  provided  with  a 
plate,  containing  twenty-five  cartridges,  which 
turns  on  a  vertical  axis  back  of  the  gun  and  fires 
the  twenty-five  cartridges.  Each  shot  causes  the 
plate  to  make  ^5  part  of  a  revolution  and  drop  a 
new  cartridge  in  the  barrel.  When  the  plate  is 
empty  it  is  immediately  removed  and  replaced  by 
another  that  has  been  previously  loaded. 

Experience  shows  that  machine-gun  rifles  give 
good  results  only  when  in  the  hands  of  cool  and 
clear-sighted  men,  well  acquainted  with  their 
manipulation,  but  that  they  are  not  as  good 
as  the  ordinary  rifles  in  the  hands  of  African 
troops. 

The  Bayonet.  All  the  infantry  use  the  bayo- 
net, a  weapon  which  has  maintained  its  full  im- 
portance in  the  present  war.     French  and  Russian 


<D         I 

•S      ^ 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        119 

soldiers  handle  the  bayonet  most  dangerously. 
The  Germans  are  not  so  proficient  in  its  use. 

The  men  must  be  given  a  very  detailed  and 
thorough  instruction  in  bayonet  practice,  but  as 
the  American  troops  are  in  possession  of  a  very 
complete  manual  on  this  subject  we  will  not  dwell 
upon  it. 

Grenades.  A  new  weapon  (or  rather  an  old 
one  that  has  been  revived)  that  plays  a  very  im- 
portant part  in  the  actions  of  the  infantry  is  the 
grenade.  Many  types  exist  but  they  can  be 
classified  either  as  offensive  or  defensive  grenades. 
The  former  kind  is  not  so  destructive  as  the  latter. 
They  are  lighter,  can  be  thrown  to  a  greater  dis- 
tance, and  are  used  to  prevent  the  enemy  from 
coming  out  of  their  dugouts  and  trenches  when  the 
assailants  reach  them.  The  defensive  grenades, 
which  are  extremely  destructive,  are  used  against 
attacking  or  counter-attacking  troops.  Some 
are  thrown  by  hand,  others  with  the  rifle.  Well 
trained  soldiers  can  throw  grenades  as  far  as  fifty 
and  fifty-five  metres. 

Rifle  grenades  are  thrown  by  the  propulsive 
power  of  the  ordinary  cartridge.  A  special 
contrivance  at  the  muzzle  of  the  gun  cocks  the 
grenade,   so  to  speak,   as  it  is  driven  from  the 


I20       MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

barrel  by  the  bullet,  so  that  it  will  explode  on 
hitting  the  ground.  It  reaches  farther  than  the 
hand  grenade. 

Recently  General  Pershing  rightly  laid  stress 
on  the  necessity  of  perfecting  the  marksmanship 
of  the  recruits.  To  this  accomplishment  and 
skill  in  the  use  of  the  bayonet,  which  gives  the 
soldier  self-reliance,  suppleness,  and  agility  (quali- 
ties that  the  Germans  do  not  easily  acquire)  ought 
to  be  added  a  thorough  training  in  the  throwing 
of  grenades,  a  sport  which  promptly  captivates 
those  who  practise  it.  Excellent  results  are  secured 
by  offering  prizes  for  grenade  practice,  both  for 
distance  and  marksmanship.  The  French  soldier 
is  contented  with  little,  and  the  mere  offer  of  a 
few  cigars  or  packages  of  cigarettes  to  the  best 
throwers  has  achieved  wonderful  performances  in 
this  line. 

We  believe  that  the  Germans  have  no  reason 
to  congratulate  themselves  on  having  been  the 
first  to  reintroduce  the  use  of  grenades  in  warfare, 
because  it  is  a  weapon  requiring  intelligence  and 
skill  in  its  handling.  Thrown  by  shrewd  quick 
Frenchmen,  or  by  sportsmen  like  the  British,  it  is 
much  more  dangerous  than  in  the  hands  of  thick- 
headed, passive  German  soldiers.     We  are  sure 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        121 

that  the  American  troops  will  use  the  grenade 
with  the  same  skill  as  their  Allies. 

Trench  Knives.  The  trench-fight  is  a  fight  to 
a  finish,  and  has  necessitated  the  adoption  of  a 
strong  knife.  In  the  hands  of  fierce  resolute  men 
it  is  a  terrible  weapon,  much  resorted  to  in  the 
confined  space  of  trenches,  tunnels,  and  dugouts 
where  bayonets  cannot  be  used.  The  African 
troops  are  very  fond  of  these  knives,  and  as  the 
Germans  are  well  aware  of  this  fact,  they  never 
surrender  to  African  troops,  and  the  fights  between 
these  combatants  always  smack  of  savagery. 

On  account  of  their  fear  of  knives  and  daggers 
the  Germans  have  pronounced  their  use  inhuman, 
and  have  shot  many  prisoners  on  whom  daggers 
were  found.  It  is  advisable,  then,  for  troops 
obliged  to  surrender  (and  the  bravest  troops  may 
have  to  do  so)  to  throw  their  daggers  away  in 
good  time. 

Automatic  Pistols.  Officers  and  non-com- 
missioned officers  only  have  automatics,  but  we 
would  like  to  see  them  issued  to  the  infantry, 
as  they  are  most  useful  in  hand-to-hand  fights , 

The  use  of  the  various  arms  above  named  has 
necessitated  the  division  of  the  company  into 
grenadiers,  machine-gunners,  and  light  infantry. 


122        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

The  last-named  fight  especially  with  the  ordinary 
rifles,  bayonets,  and  daggers. 

When  circumstances  permit,  it  would  be  advis- 
able to  teach  all  the  men  of  a  company  the  use  of 
all  the  arms,  one  after  the  other,  so  as  to  be  able  to 
re-establish  after  and  even  during  a  battle  the  ex- 
act proportion  of  specialists.  There  has  been  too 
great  a  tendency  to  neglect  rifle  practice.  Soldiers 
ought  to  lose  no  occasion  to  perfect  themselves 
in  the  use  of  the  rifle,  which  remains  the  principal 
arm  of  the  infantry.  Its  importance  will  be  even 
greater  in  open  warfare. 

2,  Instruction.  To  be  a  good  infantry  soldier  a 
man  ought  to  be  very  vigorous,  sufficiently  young, 
not  more  than  thirty-five,  well  fed  and  well  trained. 

The  individual  instruction  should  be  as  thorough 
as  possible,  and  perfected  before  the  man  is  sent 
to  the  front. 

The  theoretical  instruction  of  troops  must  be 
completed  before  they  can  be  given  the  defence  of 
a  sector,  and  it  is  only  in  the  lines  and  in  the  face 
of  the  enemy  that  they  can  acquire  the  practical 
experience.  The  more  thorough  their  knowledge 
of  theoretical  details  the  sooner  the  company  and 
battalion  will  become  good  fighting  units. 


> 
o 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        123 

The  spirit  of  initiative  should  be  specially 
encouraged  in  every  soldier,  as  in  the  present  war 
every  man  has  an  individual  part  to  play,  according 
to  his  duties,  his  rank,  and  his  weapons.  During 
the  actual  fighting  the  soldier  can  rely  but  little 
on  the  leadership  of  his  superiors,  who  are  merely 
expected  to  set  the  example,  and  who  are  frequently 
the  first  shot. 

Duties  of  the  Officers.  Before  ordering  their 
men  to  advance  and  while  still  in  the  trenches,  the 
officers,  assisted  by  their  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers, should,  whenever  time  and  circumstances  al- 
low, strive  to  explain  fully  to  every  man  what  are 
the  objectives  to  be  attained  and  what  means  are 
to  be  employed.     No  details  should  be  neglected. 

The  Major's  duties  will  be  to  designate  ver}^ 
clearly  the  fronts  assigned  to  each  of  his  companies, 
the  objectives  they  are  to  reach,  and  the  itineraries 
they  are  to  follow.  An  assault  is  usually  made  in 
several  waves,  so  the  order  of  departure,  the 
distance  to  be  maintained  between  the  successive 
waves,  the  place  to  station  the  reserves,  and,  if 
need  be,  the  instructions  relative  to  the  juncture 
and  reforming  of  the  elements  of  the  various 
companies,  form  so  many  points  that  must  be 
settled    beforehand    in    their    minutest    details. 


124        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

The  Major  will  have  to  decide  beforehand  how  the 
battalion  as  well  as  the  several  companies  will 
hold  the  objectives  after  capturing  them,  how  they 
will  organize  these  objectives  in  the  shortest  time 
possible,  and  how  they  will  resist  the  counter- 
attacks. The  officers  in  command  of  battalions 
and  companies  must  not  forget  that,  once  the 
action  has  commenced,  and  often  even  before  it  is 
begun,  all  communications  become  difficult  and 
frequently  impossible,  and  that  consequently 
all  possible  eventualities,  within  the  orders  re- 
ceived, must  have  been  thoroughly  studied  in 
advance.  So  it  is  indispensable  to  give  every 
man  minute  instructions. 

This  extract  from  a  letter  found  on  a  French 
captain  who  was  killed  on  the  Meuse  will  give  to 
young  and  inexperienced  officers  a  good  idea  of  the 
thoughts  that  must  absorb  the  mind  of  an  efficient 
commander. 

'*I  am  alone,"  he  wrote,  ''  in  this  underground 
shelter,  still  permeated  with  the  foul  atmosphere 
of  the  Germans,  where  the  evidences  of  a  disorderly 
flight,  biscuits,  bloody  rags,  stained  letters,  a 
biography  of  Hindenburg,  etc.,  lie  scattered  in 
every  direction.  I  am  alone  after  having  relieved 
the  company  that  made  the  attack.     I  am  alone 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        125 

without  counsel  if  I  hesitate,  without  help  if  I 
weaken,  in  this  captured  trench  which  is  half 
destroyed.  My  two  hundred  men  are  blindly 
piling  in,  ignorant  of  their  surroundings,  of  what  to 
do.  The  sight  of  them  restores  my  waning  energy. 
I  have  to  think  for  them,  and  put  everything  in 
order  before  daybreak.  I  consult  my  watch  :  it  is 
midnight." 

Here  is  a  Chief,  a  real  leader!  He  goes  out; 
until  dawn  he  inspects  his  sector,  he  sets  his  men 
at  work.  To  each  he  assigns  a  task  ;  he  stimulates 
them,  prevents  them  from  falling  asleep,  and  does 
not  spare  himself.  He  can  count  on  all  his 
subordinates  to  do  their  best,  and  at  the  break  of 
day,  if  the  bombardment  is  resumed,  if  the  counter- 
attack is  launched,  the  trench  will  be  ready;  the 
losses  will  be  lessened;  resistance  will  have  been 
made  possible.  It  is  by  such  methods,  by  the 
constant  co-operation  of  the  officer  and  his  men, 
that  the  army  performs  marvellous  feats.  It  is 
this  constant  co-operation,  this  comprehension  of 
duty  by  the  humblest  leader,  that  enabled  us  to 
hold  out  at  Verdun. 

The  most  difficult  missions  should  be  entrusted 
to  those  known  to  be  the  best  qualified  to  fulfil 
them. 


126        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

Once  the  signal  of  attack  is  given,  the  officers 
and  non-commissioned  officers  will  scarcely  have 
any  other  means  of  ensuring  obedience  to  their 
orders  than  by  setting  an  example  to  their  men. 

We  take  this  occasion  to  render  a  profound 
homage  to  inferior  ranking  officers  of  the  French 
armies.  They  indeed  are  and  shall  remain  the 
heroes  of  this  war.  They  have  fallen  on  the  field 
of  honour  since  August,  19 14,  not  by  thousands 
but  by  tens  of  thousands.  Never,  under  the  most 
critical  circumstances,  has  their  morale  weakened 
for  a  single  moment.  At  all  times,  men  equally 
as  brave  as  their  predecessors  have  been  found  to 
fill  the  places  of  those  who  had  so  heroically  (I 
was  going  to  say  so  cheerfully)  gone  down  to  death. 
By  the  sacrifice  of  their  lives  to  their  country,  they 
have  not  only  set  an  example  to  the  officers  of  their 
Allies,  but  have  also  given  the  latter  time  to  form 
and  train  themselves,  and  I  can  truthfully  say, 
to  equal  them.  The  bravery  displayed  by  the 
infantry  officers  of  the  English,  Italian,  and 
Russian  armies  is  on  a  par  with  that  of  the  French 
officers,  and  within  a  short  time,  the  American 
officers,  I  am  sure,  will  show  themselves  worthy 
of  the  same  verdict. 

Our  officers  have  always  and  from  the  very 


a 

. 

u 

s 

fc 

o 

0) 

fO 

^^ 

« 

(U 

IH 

> 

1 

o 

t- 

m 

M 

CJ 

l-l 

I-] 

â 

(H 

M-l 

o 

>. 

u 

-♦-> 

& 

3 

CO 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY         127 

first  day  of  the  war  invariably  marched  ahead  of 
their  men,  leading  them  straight  to  the  enemy. 
They  have  advanced  through  the  most  intense 
curtain-fire;  they  have  exposed  themselves  to  the 
fire  of  innumerable  machine-guns;  they  have  been 
the  targets  of  rifles  and  grenades.  Thousands 
have  been  killed;  not  one  has  hesitated,  not  one 
has  turned  back.  The  Allied  officers  have  ex- 
hibited the  same  daring,  the  same  bravery. 

But  what  about  the  German  officers?  Is  it 
possible  not  to  contrast  their  attitude  with  that 
of  our  own?  The  German  officers  endeavour  to 
keep  under  shelter  as  long  as  possible  their  precious 
persons,  so  greatly  superior,  in  their  own  estima- 
tion, to  those  of  their  men,  and  when  they  do 
muster  the  courage  to  come  out  into  the  open, 
they  are  content  to  follow  behind  their  troops,  with 
revolvers  in  their  hands  to  exact  obedience. 

We  wish  to  reproduce  here  two  or  three  citations 
taken  at  random  among  a  thousand  similar  ones 
published  in  the  Journal  Officiel  de  la  République 
Française,  the  official  organ  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment, to  give  a  vivid  illustration  of  the  way  that 
officers  ought  to  understand  their  duties  : 

On  September  i,  19 14,  Major  P arise t  de  la 
Baisse  said  to  his  chasseurs:     "I  give  you  my 


128        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

word  of  honour,  as  long  as  one  of  us  remains 
alive,  the  enemy  shall  not  pass."  In  spite  of 
heavy  losses,  though  nearly  surrounded,  he  extri- 
cated his  troops  and  maintained  the  fight.  The 
Pass  de  Mandray  he  defended  remains  French! 

Captain  Robert  Dubarle.  "A  living  example  of 
impassibility  under  fire,  contempt  of  danger, 
energy,  and  initiative." 

Captain  Mazarde — 1 1  th  Chasseurs.  '  '  A  splendid 
officer  already  cited  at  the  order  of  the  Division, 
of  the  Army  Corps,  and  of  the  Army.  From 
June  29th  to  July  14,  1 91 5,  he  exhibited  the 
bravery  of  a  hero.  While  leading  his  Chasseurs 
to  the  air  of  Sidi  Brahim  in  an  attack  upon  a  wood, 
he  was  stopped  by  wire  entanglements  at  50  metres 
from  its  edge.  He  maintained  the  line  of  attack 
for  36  hours,  face  to  face  with  the  enemy,  repulsed 
a  counter-attack,  and  riddled  the  line  of  the 
enemy  with  bullets  and  grenades.  He  withdrew 
only  when  ordered  to  do  so,  taking  all  his  wounded 
and  the  bodies  of  the  officers  killed.  He  was  shot, 
and  died  from  his  wounds." 

Captain  Pierre  Mercier — 67th  Battalion  of 
Chasseurs.  '  '  Entrusted  with  the  mission  of  defend- 
ing the  passage  of  a  bridge,  he  maintained  his 
company  under  an  intense  fire.     Outflanked  on 


w      o 

<     1 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        129 

both  right  and  left,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  charge 
an  enemy  very  superior  in  numbers,  and  fell 
mortally  wounded,  saying  to  his  men,  *'We  have 
done  our  duty." 

Space  does  not  allow  us  to  give  more  numerous 
citations,  but  we  think  that  it  would  benefit  the 
American  army  to  get  the  minutes  of  the  war,  to 
select  therefrom  the  most  brilliant  citations  of  the 
French  and  English  armies,  to  have  them  trans- 
lated and  widely  distributed  among  the  American 
troops.  Nothing  would  be  more  instructive  for 
the  officers,  nothing  could  better  rouse  their  fire, 
nothing  would  inspire  them  with  a  greater  desire 
to  emulate  their  comrades  in  the  Allied  armies. 
The  example  of  heroism  is  contagious  for  young 
men. 

Shock-troops  (Stosstruppen).  The  con- 
tinual failure  of  the  German  attacks  or  counter- 
attacks for  more  than  a  year  led  them  to  the 
creation  of  what  they  call  Stosstruppen.  The  new 
recruits  of  the  German  army  were  lacking  greatly 
in  quality — the  German  soldier  at  best  is  wanting 
in  initiative.  The  High  Command  therefore  re- 
sorted to  a  selection  of  the  best  elements  to  be 
found  in  some  of  their  divisions,  with  which  to 
form  battalions  or  companies  for  assault. 


130        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

The  promise  of  receiving  better  and  more 
abundant  food  than  that  given  to  the  other  troops 
(so  important  is  the  question  of  food  to  the  Ger- 
man soldier,  who  has  been  on  somewhat  short 
rations  since  191 6)  has  been  sufficient  to  bring 
forward  volunteers  for  these  companies. 

These  special  troops  are  exempted  from  work 
in  the  trenches,  and  are  brought  up  to  the  lines  only 
when  needed.  On  such  occasions  they  are  scat- 
tered all  over  the  attacking  front  for  the  purpose 
of  encouraging  by  their  example  the  elements  which 
are  not  so  well  organized. 

The  Germans,  who,  after  the  Russian  revolution, 
were  enabled  to  withdraw  the  best  elements  from 
their  divisions  on  their  Eastern  Front,  made,  in 
June  and  July,  191 7,  a  frequent  use  of  their 
Stosstruppen  in  counter-attacks  in  Artois,  and  in 
desperate  and  daily  attacks  on  the  Chemin  des 
Dames,  but  the  result  was  far  from  expectation. 

The  StosstruppeUy  obliged,  like  the  ordinary 
troops,  to  attack  in  too  serried  ranks,  offer  a 
splendid  target  to  artillery  and  machine-guns 
and,  nine  times  out  of  ten,  their  rush  is  stopped 
before  they  can  engage  in  a  hand-to-hand  fight. 

We  wonder  what  the  German  divisions  on  the 
Russian  Front  will  be  able  to  accomplish  without 


La  Bovelle 
Mays.  1917 — 10.30  A.M. 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        131 

their  best  and  strongest  elements  when  the  Russian 
Army  ralHes  and  re-enters  the  war  in  earnest. 

3.     Mission  and  use  of  the  infantry  in  a  division. 

We  have  stated  that  a  division  includes  three  or 
four  regiments.  We  will  now  dwell  on  the  dis- 
position of  a  division  comprising  two  brigades 
of  two  regiments  each.  It  seems  certain  that  this 
is  the  type  that  will  be  adopted  by  the  American 
Army,  which  possesses  a  sufficient  number  of  men 
for  this  normal  constitution  of  a  division. 

Front  of  a  divisiojt.  The  front  of  a  division  in 
trench  warfare  is  very  variable  in  extent.  The 
occupation  of  strong  intrenchments,  enabling 
the  reserves  to  be  sheltered  from  the  enemy* s  fire, 
allows  of  the  extension  of  the  front,  especially 
if  the  army  remains  on  the  defensive. 

As  soon  as  a  division  takes  the  offensive,  how- 
ever, its  front  is  reduced  to  such  proportions  as 
will  permit  of  energetic  effort.  The  front  of  a 
division  in  the  open  field  has  been  fixed  at  1800 
to  2000  metres.  The  operations  in  19 14  showed 
that  the  fronts  were  always  longer  than  this  and 
often  twice  as  long  and  such  will  perhaps  continue 
to  be  the  case  in  future  if  the  war  in  the  open 
is  resumed;  but,  so  long  as  the  war  remains  one 


132        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

of  intrenchments,  it  will  be  very  dangerous  not 
to  limit  the  fronts,  especially  at  the  time  of  an 
offensive.  This  is  an  acknowledged  truth,  and 
there  is  a  growing  tendency,  especially  in  the 
British  Army,  to  shorten  the  front  of  attack  of  a 
division. 

Dispositions.  The  most  logical  mode  of  dis- 
posing the  troops  in  a  division  on  the  battle- 
field will  always  consist  in  the  junction  of  the 
two  brigades  side  by  side,  and,  in  the  brigades, 
the  junction  of  the  regiments  side  by  side. 

The  division,  the  brigade,  the  regiment,  and 
even  the  battalion,  have  each  to  constitute  re- 
serves either  to  ensure  success  or  to  guard  against 
possible  failures  in  their  offensive.  In  this  war- 
fare of  position,  even  more  perhaps  than  in  one  of 
movement,  the  necessity  of  always  having  troops 
near  at  hand,  ready  to  repel  counter-attacks,  is 
imperative,  owing  to  the  fact  that  every  repulse 
is  followed  by  the  enemy's  occupation  of  a  part  of 
the  line  of  defence  which  would  have  to  be  retaken 
later  with  great  losses  should  the  enemy  be  given 
time  to  organize  themselves  therein. 

The  disposition  of  the  units  in  depth  enables  the 
Command,  when  the  lines  are  cleverly  constructed 
and  their  intercommunications  well  assured,  to 


North  of  La  Bovelle 

April  24, 1917 — 10  A.M. 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        133 

keep  only  a  few  men  in  the  severely  bombarded 
spots,  and  to  shelter  the  largest  part  of  the  troops 
where  they  cannot  be  injured,.^^ 

The  study  of  the  last  large  operations,  especially 
on  the  British  Front,  shows  that  the  experience 
and  training  gained  by  the  British  troops  in  the 
field,  and  the  cohesion  of  their  artillery  and  in- 
fantry, have  compelled  the  Germans  to  abandon 
their  method  of  distributing  their  forces  in  191 6 
and  to  adopt  a  quite  different  system  of  fighting. 
"^In  the  battle  of  the  Ypres-Menin  road  the  Ger- 
mans launched  three  divisions  on  a  very  narrow 
front,  with  three  battalions,  one  from  each  divi- 
sion, on  the  first  line^^-— 

Immediately  behind  each  leading  battalion  a 
second  was  placed  to  support  it.  The  other  two 
battalions  of  each  regiment  of  four  battalion-forma- 
tion, and  the  third  battalion  of  the  three  battalion- 
regiments,  were  held  in  reserve  in  depth  to  try 
and  check  the  English  advance  and  to  execute 
detailed  counter-attacks. 

Behind  these  divisions  of  attack,  special  troops, 
carefully  selected,  composed  a  general  reserve, 
waiting  in  very  solid  shelters  where  they  were 
protected  from  heavy-artillery  bombardment. 
These   reserves   were   used   when   the   first   line 


134        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

divisions  failed  to  check  the  enemy's  advance, 
or  when  there  was  a  chance  of  retaking  lost  ground 
by  violent  counter-attacks. 

The  natural  consequence  of  this  new  distribu- 
tion of  the  German  troops  is  that  to  counteract  it 
successfully  very  narrow  fronts  have  to  be  adopted. 
Forces  strong  enough  to  repel  the  enemy,  and 
permit  no  time  for  the  supporting  battalions  to 
engage  effectively,  have  to  be  placed  on  the  first 
line.  The  first  lines  are  to  be  backed  up  by  reserves 
strong  enough  to  oppose  the  enemy  reserves  with- 
out any  loss  of  time.  A  general  reserve  is  to  be 
kept  in  readiness  in  sufficient  force  to  hold  the 
conquered  positions  against  all  icounter-attacks 
which  may  be  launched  by  the  general  reserves 
of  the  Germans^ 

The  last  operations  of  October  show  that  these 
dispositions  are  now  in  force  in  all  the  armies. 

Defensive.  We  have  just  explained  the  dis- 
positions the  Germans  had  to  adopt  on  the  defen- 
sive, and  we  think  that  all  parties  will  perforce 
be  led  to  adopt  a  somewhat  similar  distribution. 

The  power  of  resistance  of  the  trench  lines  of  the 
Allies  being  far  inferior  to  that  of  the  German 
lines,  the  Allies  must,  to  guard  against  the  danger 
of  attack,  take  advantage  of  the  superiority  of 


La  Bovelle 

May  5,  1917 — 10.30  a.m. 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        135 

their  artillery.  They  must  dispose  their  forces  in 
depth,  in  such  a  way  as  to  ensure  the  repulse  of 
the  enemy  by  a  succession  of  assaults  that  will 
stagger  him  and  prevent  him  from  re-forming. 

It  is  impossible  to  give  hard  and  fast  rules  for 
the  distribution  of  forces  between  the  different 
lines  of  the  divisions,  regiments,  battalions,  and 
companies.  The  distribution  depends  entirely 
on  the  nature  of  the  operations,  and  is  left  for 
each  unit  to  carry  out  in  conformity  with  the 
orders  received.  When  sufficiently  detailed  in- 
struction has  been  given  to  a  unit  in  the  course  of 
its  training,  these  distributions  are  an  easy  matter 
to  decide  upon,  provided  the  officers  of  all  ranks 
perform  conscientiously  the  duties  we  have 
indicated  elsewhere. 

Assaulting  and  Occupation  Troops.  Ex- 
perience has  suggested  to  the  Allies  to  divide 
their  fighting  troops  into  army  corps  for  assault 
and  army  corps  for  occupation. 

Once  the  objectives  are  attained  and  strongly 
held,  the  assaulting  troops  are  replaced  by  the 
occupation  troops  that  arrive  fresh  on  the  ground. 
Their  task,  though  one  of  defence,  is  often  hard. 
They  have  to  remain  a  long  time  in  the  first 
lines,   exposed,   by  reason  of  the  new  German 


136        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

methods,  to  frequent  and  severe  bombardments, 
and  obliged  to  repel  numerous  counter-attacks. 

The  generals  commanding -in- chief  are  the 
exclusive  judges  of  the  part  the  different  army 
corps  will  have  to  play,  but,  in  our  opinion,  there 
is  one  principle  which  must  never  be  ignored  in 
war.  In  the  army,  as  well  as  in  the  battalion 
and  in  the  company,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Chief 
to  select  for  action,  irrespective  of  any  rotation 
of  service,  that  element  of  the  troops  under  his 
command  which  he  deems  the  one  most  likely  to 
achieve  the  desired  result. 

What  we  have  said  concerning  the  use  of  the 
artillery,  the  armament  of  the  infantry,  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  infantry  in  the  division  and  the 
trenches  of  attack,  will  enable  us  to  give  an  exact 
idea  of  the  physiognomy  of  an  offensive  action 
and  of  its  preparation. 

Offensive  Engagements.  Their  Prepara- 
tion. The  preparation  of  attacks  in  a  war  of 
position  is  a  long  one.  On  account  of  the  work 
it  necessitates  it  is  very  difficult  to  conceal  these 
preparations  on  the  front  from  the  opposing 
aviation,  and  also,  alas!  from  the  curiosity  of  the 
rear. 

An  attack  can  be  determined  upon  only  by  order 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        137 

of  the  General-in-Chief,  who  decides  where  and 
on  what  front  it  shall  be  made.  He  gives  his 
instructions  to  the  General  in  command  of  an 
army  group,  who,  according  to  circumstances, 
employs  one  or  several  of  his  armies  for  the 
operation.  Each  General  commanding  an  army 
prepares  an  order  of  operation  for  each  of  his 
army  corps,  and  so  on,  until  the  precise  instruc- 
tions reach  the  elements  of  the  first  line. 

The  preparation  then  commences.  It  consists 
in  establishing  on  the  terrain  under  the  protection 
of  the  batteries  : 

1st.  The  new  lines  of  the  infantry,  and,  if 
necessary,  the  communications  between  these 
lines; 

2d.     The  location  of  the  artillery  of  all  calibres  ; 

3d.     The  organization  of  the  posts  of  command  ; 

4th.  The  bringing  up  of  the  munitions  and 
material  of  all  kinds  ; 

5th.  The  construction,  at  the  rear  of  the  front 
of  attack,  of  railroads  and  ordinary  roads  in 
sufficient  number,  rather  in  excess  of  the  estimated 
needs  than  otherwise  ; 

6th.  The  organization  of  the  reserves  of  in- 
fantry. 

7th.     The  preparation  for  the  evacuation  of 


138        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

the  wounded,  and  the  installation  of  large  field 
hospitals,  as  close  as  possible  to  the  lines  ; 

8th.  The  organization  of  stations  of  evacua- 
tion ; 

9th.     The  organization  of  the  parks  ; 

loth.  The  organization  of  the  centres  of  supply, 
etc. 

This  enumeration,  from  which  we  have  omitted 
the  aviation,  by  reason  of  its  special  installations 
on  appropriate  grounds,  gives  a  sufficient  idea  of 
the  labour  required  in  preparing  an  offensive, 
which  takes  generally  several  weeks  to  accomplish. 

A  few  days  before  the  attack,  an  effort  is  made 
to  secure  the  mastery  of  the  air.  Destruction 
fire  is  then  directed  against  the  opposing  trenches. 
The  comparison  of  the  different  photographic 
plates  handed  daily  to  the  General  Staffs  enables 
the  Command  to  watch  the  progress  of  the  de- 
struction of  the  lines  and  positions  of  the  enemy. 
When  the  destruction  is  deemed  thorough  enough, 
the  order  is  given  to  attack,  at  given  points,  at  a 
given  hour  of  a  certain  day.  The  last  operation 
of  the  artillery,  called  "the  rolling  surprise  fire,** 
consists  in  subjecting  numerous  portions  of  the 
front  to  a  series  of  terrific  and  rapid  bombard- 
ments, which  leaves  the  enemy  in  doubt  as  to  the 


Trench  "  Battemburg  " 
May  4.  1917  — Noon 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        139 

points  against  which  the  attacks  of  infantry  are 
to  be  launched.  At  the  time  appointed  these 
attacks  commence.  The  field  artillery  covers  its 
infantry  by  barrages  as  intense  as  possible.  The 
first  assaulting  waves,  followed  by  those  of  the 
supporting  troops,  rush  to  the  objectives  selected, 
drive  off  the  enemy  by  all  means  at  their  disposal, 
occupy  and  organize  them.  If  necessary,  the 
reserves  come  in,  either  to  help  the  assaulting 
troops,  or  to  repulse  the  counter-attacks  of  the 
enemy,  if  any  occur. 

It  was  decided  some  time  ago  that  the  troops 
must  not,  yielding  to  their  ardour,  or  the  excite- 
ment of  a  too  easily  acquired  success,  go  beyond 
the  objectives  that  have  been  assigned  to  them. 
A  close  examination  of  the  defensive  dispositions 
of  the  Germans  which  we  have  described  reveals 
the  wisdom  of  this  precaution.  It  does  not  follow 
that  additional  objectives  cannot  be  taken  on  the 
same  day,  but  in  this  case  the  additional  advance 
will  be  made  by  a  fresh  attack  and  the  effort  will 
be  distributed  accordingly. 

Documents  found  on  Germans  in  Champagne, 
in  August,  furnish  the  following  details  of  an 
attack  they  had  prepared  north  of  the  Souain  Hill. 
A  similar  attack  had  been  rendered  impossible 


140        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

by  the  action  of  the  French  at  Verdun,  and  by  the 
destruction  of  the  gas  reservoirs  by  the  French 
artillery. 

Three  fresh  divisions  and  fifteen  companies  of 
stosstruppen  (shock-troops,  or  special  troops  of 
assault)  were  to  lead  the  attack  with  light  machine- 
guns,  minenwerfer,  signalmen,  miners,  sappers, 
gasmen,  grenadiers,  stretcher-bearers,  and  artillery 
patrols.  Twelve  ''booty-squads"  and  twelve 
"destruction-squads"  each  composed  of  an  officer 
and  thirty-two  men  were  to  follow  the  stosstruppen. 
Arrangements  had  been  made  with  a  view  to 
removing  the  captured  guns. 

They  had  prepared  for  a  formidable  discharge 
of  a  new  gas  by  a  six-company  regiment  of 
sappers. 

The  gas  attack  was  to  be  launched  for  a  quarter 
of  an  hour.  A  very  strong  artillery  preparation 
was  to  follow,» after  which  the  stosstruppen  were 
to  rush  forward. 

The  aviation  was  to  play  an  important  rôle,  and 
the  attack  was  to  be  made  with  the  aid  of  all  the 
means  of  liaison  known:  dispatch-runners,  tele- 
phonists, optical  signals,  carrier-pigeons,  luminous 
rockets,  and  wireless  telegraphy. 

Orders  had  been  given  to  bring  back  as  many 


O        0\ 

M 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        141 

French  gas- victims  as  possible,  with  a  view  to 
studying  the  effects  of  the  new  product. 

On  the  20th  of  November,  191 7,  the  third 
EngHsh  army,  by  a  successful  surprise  attack, 
penetrated  into  the  German  lines  to  a  great  depth 
and  on  a  large  front. 

This  operation,  prepared  in  the  greatest  secrecy, 
was  carried  out  without  the  usual  assistance  of  the 
artillery  or  barrages.  The  infantry  attacked 
under  the  protection  of  numerous  tanks  which 
destroyed  the  wire  entanglements  and  the  most 
important  obstacles. 

We  do  not  think  that  this  method  will  henceforth 
become  a  rule. 

Before  launching  this  attack,  the  British  Com- 
mander must  have  been  informed  by  his  aviation, 
or  by  some  other  means,  that  the  German  Front 
was  lacking  in  artillery  and  infantry  and  he  must 
very  cleverly  have  taken  advantage  of  this  mo- 
mentary situation. 

Must  we  conclude  that  the  rules  of  preparation 
of  attack,  as  stated  above,  will  not  be  applied 
hereafter?  It  is  very  doubtful,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  the  Germans  have  prepared  in  France 
too  many  lines  of  defence,  one  behind  the  other. 

This  English  victory,  however,  shows  that  the 


142        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

High  Command,  whenever  in  possession  of  in- 
formation warranting  the  hope  of  success,  will 
have  to  combine  regularly  prepared  attacks  with 
surprise  attacks  on  points  where  the  German 
effectives  happen  to  be  reduced. 

The  success  of  this  operation  on  the  Cambrai 
Front  proves  that,  however  strong  a  position 
may  be,  however  numerous  its  wire  defences,  it 
will  always  be  possible  to  take  it  when  not  pro- 
tected by  a  sufficient  force  of  artillery  and  infantry. 

Defensive  Engagements.  When  the  troops 
have  to  withstand  an  attack  on  their  lines,  they 
must  bear  in  mind  the  very  sound  principle  of  war 
that  a  passive  resistance  can  only  end  in  defeat. 
On  the  first  lines  all  the  elements  necessary  for 
as  long  a  resistance  as  possible  will  have  to  be 
accumulated.  The  infantry  will  then  have  occa- 
sion to  make  a  telling  use  of  rifles,  grenades,  rifle 
machine-guns,  and  machine-guns  in  as  great  a 
number  as  possible.  The  supporting  troops  and 
the  reserves  must  be  ready  to  counter-attack  the 
enemy  without  loss  of  time,  and  throw  him  out 
of  any  trenches  he  may  occupy  temporarily.  We 
have  often  seen  German  attacks  on  advanced 
trenches  repulsed  in  the  very  moment  of  success 
by  a  simple  bayonet  charge  made  by  the  troops 


M 

Ov 

M 


U 

o 


o 
Ri 

a 

(U 

0) 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        143 

of  the  first  lines.  To  the  field  artillery,  however, 
belongs  the  most  important  rôle  in  repulsing  the 
attacks  of  the  enemy,  and  the  ''communiqués" 
of  all  the  Allies  show  that  eight  out  of  every 
ten  attacks  are  repulsed  by  barrage-fire.  When 
the  aviators  can  report  in  time  exactly  where  the 
enemy  troops  are  being  massed  for  attack,  the 
trench  artillery  can  work  great  havoc  in  the  ranks 
of  those  usually  compact  formations. 

Prolonged  Engagements.  What  we  have 
just  said  refers  to  attacks  made  from  regularly 
organized  lines  which  have  not  been  entirely 
destroyed  by  shell-fire. 

On  a  ground  where  fighting  has  been  proceeding 
continuously,  the  trenches  are  entirely  destroyed, 
and  the  men  and  machine-guns  belonging  to  the 
first-line  troops  remain  with  no  other  shelter  than 
shell-craters,  which  are,  as  far  as  possible,  con- 
nected together  during  the  night  by  shallow 
trenches,  provided  this  work  is  not  prevented 
by  continuous  shell-fire.  The  communication 
trenches  with  the  rear  do  not  exist  any  more; 
and  connections  can  only  be  maintained  with  the 
utmost  difficulty;  by  what  means,  we  will  later 
explain. 

In  order  to  resume  the  attack  under  such  condi- 


144       MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

tions,  it  will  be  necessary  to  choose  the  exact 
moment  when  the  enemy  is  supposed  to  be  de- 
moraHzed  by  the  artillery,  and  to  rush  the  troops 
forward.  In  nearly  every  case,  the  assistance  of 
fresh  troops  or  of  troops  that  have  suffered  little 
will  be  needed. 

These  field  operations  are  difficult  and  require 
from  both  the  chiefs  and  the  soldiers  a  resolute 
will  to  conquer,  and  a  thorough  knowledge  of 
war  conditions. 

During  the  last  battles  on  the  Somme,  on  the 
Aisne,  and  at  Verdun,  advanced  infantry  fractions 
had  to  hold  out  for  several  days  in  shell-craters, 
not  connected  with  one  another,  and  often  filled 
with  water.  The  heavy  enemy  shell-fire  rendered 
every  move  impossible  and  stopped  the  arrival  of 
all  supplies.  The  adverse  lines  were  often  merged 
into  one  another  and  from  hole  to  hole  grenade 
fighting  was  kept  up.  It  was  nevertheless  under 
such  trying  conditions  that  our  troops  fought 
inch  by  inch  to  defend  the  French  lines  at  Verdun, 
and  their  heroic  resistance  enabled  the  Command 
to  prepare  new  positions,  to  redistribute  the  troops 
and  to  move  them  forward,  after  they  had  finally 
thwarted  the  great  German  effort. 

Posts  of  Command.     In  a  division  all  the 


M 

0\ 


^ 


o 
M 


tù 


o 

a 

<u 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        145 

commanders  of  units  from  the  General  of  Division 
to  the  Major  direct  the  fight  from  quarters  called 
Command,  Posts.  These  quarters,  rendered  as 
much  as  possible  proof  to  field-artillery  fire,  must 
overlook  the  battlefield.  They  are  fitted  with  all 
the  rapid  means  of  communication,  both  telegraph 
and  telephone.  The  wires,  although  numerous 
and  deeply  buried  seldom  resist  the  bombardment 
until  the  time  of  attack.  As  a  last  resource 
recourse  is  had  to  signals,  optical  devices,  carrier- 
pigeons,  and  messengers.  Apparatus  for  ground- 
telegraphy,  which  seems  destined  to  come  into 
general  use,  has  lately  been  employed,  but  we 
have  not  seen  it  in  operation. 

As  communications  between  the  advanced  lines 
and  the  rear  have  become  so  very  difficult  during 
the  preparation  bombardment  and  the  barrages, 
which  are  often  uninterruptedly  kept  up  for  several 
days,  the  western  armies  have  again  had  recourse 
to  the  carrier-pigeons,  which  are  furnished  in  large 
numbers  by  private  societies,  existing  before  the 
war.  Their  co-operation  is  very  useful  and  helps 
to  save  many  human  lives.  They  are  also  sent 
out  by  airplanes  whenever  the  use  of  wireless 
telegraphy  is  not  deemed  expedient.     They  render 

great  service  in  keeping  the  front  in  communica- 
10 


146       MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

tion  with  the  rear,  and  are  also  of  priceless  value 
for  connecting  the  rear  with  the  front. 

Signalling.  The  difficulty  of  communication 
between  the  rear  and  the  front  during  the  bom- 
bardments will  necessitate  the  increasing  use  of 
infantry  aircraft  for  the  direction  of  operations. 
The  aircraft,  connected  by  wireless  with  the  various 
divisional  headquarters,  are  able  to  send  in- 
formation and  in  turn,  to  receive  and  transmit 
orders  by  signal  to  the  troops  on  the  front. 

These  aircraft  will  also  maintain  a  connection 
between  the  infantry  and  the  field  artillery,  which 
must  be  close  and  continuous  if  demoralizing 
consequences,  such  as  have  only  too  frequently 
occurred  in  all  camps,  are  to  be  averted. 

After  the  Anglo- German  battles  in  Artois,  the 
German  prisoners,  respectively  of  the  infantry 
and  the  artillery,  had  to  be  separated,  so  great  was 
the  feeling  between  them.  The  infantrymen 
claimed  they  had  not  had  sufficient  protection,  and 
wanted  to  "take  it  out"  of  the  gunners. 

So  as  to  avoid  confusion  during  infantry  attacks, 
the  guiding  aircraft  ordinarily  send  up  but  one  sort 
of  rocket-signal,  indicating  to  the  artillery  either 
a  lengthening  or  a  shortening  of  the  range  by 
one  hundred  metres. 


0\ 


U5 


u 


-♦-> 

(I 

o 


;3 
o 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        147 

Battalions  of  Three  Companies.  At  the 
same  time  that  the  effectives  of  certain  divisions 
were  reduced,  the  battalions  were  returned  to  a 
three-company  formation. 

A  company  of  infantry  is  in  principle  composed 
of  two  hundred  and  fifty  men,  a  quota  which  is 
however  purely  theoretical,  as  this  number  becomes 
rapidly  reduced  by  various  causes,  such  as  illness, 
loss  in  battle,  etc. 

Framework  of  the  Army.  The  ranks  of  the 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  of  the  French 
Army  have  been  renewed  several  times  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  Many  captains  in  191 7 
were  mere  privates  in  19 14  and  most  of  them  are 
very  young.  They  are,  generally,  excellent 
officers,  and  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  those  who 
have  proved  their  worth  are  not  even  more  rapidly 
promoted. 

The  spirit  of  routine  that  prevails  in  an  army 
officered  by  soldiers  of  regular  professional  training 
is  often  responsible  for  the  promotion  to  high 
command  of  men  too  old  for  the  effective  direction 
of  a  long  and  exhausting  war  like  the  present  one. 

There  is  no  reason  to  think  that  the  American 
people,  any  more  than  the  British  and  the  French, 
will  meet  with   serious  difficulties  in  recruiting 


148        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

and  quickly  training  a  strong  staff  of  officers  of  all 
ranks.  They  will  also,  like  the  Allies,  find  no 
insuperable  difficulties  in  filling  the  gaps  which 
the  enemy's  fire  will  make  among  them. 

4.  A  word  about  cavalry.  If  in  this  treatise 
we  have  not  devoted  a  chapter  to  the  use  of  cavalry 
it  is  because,  since  September,  19 14,  cavalry  has 
had  but  few  opportunities  to  operate  as  such. 

The  cavalry  has  been  generally  used  in  the 
present  trench  warfare  in  the  same  manner  as 
the  infantry.  It  has  been  reduced  in  number; 
that  of  the  army  corps  has  been  suppressed,  and 
only  two  squadrons  have  been  allotted  to  each 
division. 

Some  regiments  of  cuirassiers  have  been  dis- 
mounted, for  want  of  proper  horses. 

But  we  think  that,  notwithstanding  the  small 
part  the  cavalry  has  taken  in  the  war  during  the 
last  thirty  months,  its  opportunity  is  bound  to 
come. 

Some  cavalry  corps,  comprising  several  divi- 
sions, have  been  retained,  andsduring  the  offen- 
sives they  are  held  in  readiness  to  move  to  the 
front  in  case  the  enemy  lines  should  be  broken. 

Cavalry  squadrons  rendered  good  services  to 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        149 

the  British  and  French  during  the  pursuit  in  March, 
1917. 

The  Germans  will  perhaps  not  always  be  able 
to  protect  their  retreats  by  the  desert-like  de- 
vastation of  thirty  or  forty  kilometres  of  country. 
Their  weak  point  will  be  found  some  day  or  other, 
and  on  that  day  the  cavalry  will  resume  its  im- 
portance. 

The  difficulty  in  feeding  and  obtaining  horses 
seems  to  have  compelled  the  Germans  to  reduce 
their  cavalry  forces  considerably. 


CHAPTER  VII 

FORBIDDEN  WEAPONS 

1.  Asphyxiating  gases. 

2.  Tear-producing  gases. 

3.  "Gaz- vesicant." 

4.  Liquid  fire. 

I.  Asphyxiating  gases.  During  the  present 
war  Germany  has  ransacked  the  arcana  of  science 
for  the  means  of  destroying  her  enemies.  Those 
to  which  she  resorted  had  been  forbidden  and 
condemned  as  belonging  to  barbarous  ages  by  all 
the  conventions  to  which  she  had  been  a  party, 
and  by  all  the  agreements  that  she  had  signed. 

Asphyxiating  gases  were  used  for  the  first  time 
against  the  British  troops  on  the  Yser.  The 
corrosive  vapours  of  chlorine  are  fatal  to  all  who 
have  been  sufficiently  exposed  to  them,  and  when 
first  directed  against  an  unprepared  and  unsuspect- 
ing enemy,  their  effects  were  terrible. 

Fortunately  the  use  of  these  gases  is  possible 
only  when  the  wind  is  favourable  and  the  weather 

150 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        151 

dry;  and  as  the  coincidence  of  these  conditions 
is  exceptional,  especially  in  the  north  of  France, 
the  Allies  had  time  to  invent  protective  masks  and 
distribute  them  to  their  troops. 

The  models  adopted  can  be  slipped  on  easily 
and  quickly  even  in  the  dark  and  are  effective 
for  several  hours.  Every  soldier  is  provided 
with  one. 

At  the  start,  when  gas-offensives  were  still  in 
the  experimental  stage,  the  German  attacks  were 
limited  to  single  discharges,  which  were  more  or 
less  rapidly  dissipated  by  the  wind  and  were  quite 
harmless  to  adversaries  equipped  with  good  masks. 

But  shortly  afterward,  when  their  weapons  were 
turned  against  them,  and  their  trenches  were 
"gassed"  by  the  Allies,  and  the  Germans  dis- 
covered by  experience  that  a  mask  causes  great 
fatigue  and  even  exhaustion  if  its  use  is  greatly 
prolonged  (since  it  interferes  so  much  with  the 
breathing),  they  altered  their  method  of  procedure 
and  began  to  take  advantage  of  favourable  winds 
to  launch  successive  waves  of  gas,  in  order  to. 
wear  their  enemies  out  by  keeping  them  in  their 
masks  as  long  as  possible. 

Next,  as  the  approach  of  the  whitish  gas-cloud 
was  easily  visible  and  was  always  promptly  sig- 


152        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

nailed  by  the  lookouts,  the  German  scientists,  in 
an  effort  to  catch  their  adversaries  unprepared, 
modified  their  original  formulas  and  produced 
colourless  gases,  which  are  more  difficult  but  by 
no  means  impossible  to  detect. 

2.  Tear-producing  gases.  The  next  step  was 
to  find  some  means  of  nullifying  as  much  as  possi- 
ble the  protection  of  respiratory  apparatus,  so  the 
good  Germans  invented  the  tear-producing  gases 
which,  in  spite  of  the  special  glasses  that  have  been 
added  to  the  masks,  rapidly  interfere  with  vision 
and  place  the  victim  hors  de  combat. 

The  Allies  were  forced,  in  self-defence,  to  resort 
to  similar  means. 

3.  **Gaz-¥ésicânt.''  A  new  gas  invented  also  by 
the  Germans  has  made  its  apparition  on  the 
Western  Front.  It  is  known  in  France  under  the 
name  of  gaz-vésicant;  it  acts  after  a  few  hours  only  ; 
it  is  colourless  and  inodorous;  it  destroys  all  the 
tissues  as  thoroughly  as  they  would  be  under  the 
action  of  sulphuric  acid. 

We  have  mentioned  the  preponderant  use  of 
asphyxiating  shells  in  neutralization  fire.  All  our 
armies  are  now  provided  with  a  variety  of  gas- 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        153 

generating  apparatus,  some  of  which  have  given 
excellent  results  as  regards  accuracy  and  rapidity 
of  discharge. 

There  is  another  reason  why  the  Germans  should 
be  unable  to  congratulate  themselves  on  this 
invention.  Westerly  and  north-westerly  winds 
are  more  frequent  in  France  than  easterly  winds, 
so  that  gas  attacks  can  be  made  oftener  by  the 
Allies  than  by  their  enemies. 

4.  Liquid  ûre  (flammenwerfer).  When  neither 
guns  nor  gases  fulfilled  their  expectations  and 
they  saw  that  the  "furor  Teutonica"  embodied  in 
the  mass-attacks  of  the  best  soldiers  of  the  Kaiser 
was  powerless  to  break  through  the  Franco- 
British  lines,  the  Germans  resorted  to  the  use  of 
liquid  fire. 

In  favourable  weather  before  the  attacks  are 
launched,  men  in  heavy  bullet-proof  steel  breast- 
plates are  sent  forward,  carrying  on  their  backs 
reservoirs  very  similar  to  those  used  on  farms  to 
sprinkle  sulphate  on  the  crops.  Through  nozzles 
connected  with  these  reservoirs  they  throw  by  the 
force  of  compressed  air  streams  of  burning  liquid 
to  a  distance  of  fifty  to  sixty  yards.  The  dense 
clouds  of  black   smoke   produced   by  the  liquid 


154       MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

fire  mask  its  bearers  from  the  sight  of  the 
enemy. 

Liquid  fire,  especially  at  the  beginning,  when  the 
Allies  were  unprepared  for  this  mode  of  attack, 
rendered  good  service  to  the  Germans  by  enabling 
them  to  take  some  advanced  trenches  at  small 
cost  to  themselves. 

The  present  results  are  less  brilliant.  Grenades 
have  done  the  work  against  the  mail-clad  bearers 
of  flammenwerfer  that  rifles  or  machine-guns  could 
not.  When  a  bearer  falls,  the  masterless  nozzle 
does  not  always  continue  to  spit  its  flames  in  the 
direction  of  the  enemy,  but  is  often  turned  against 
the  other  bearers,  and  even  against  the  very 
troops  whose  advance  it  is  intended  to  protect, 
thus  spreading  great  disorder  in  their  ranks. 

Recently,  in  order  to  compensate  for  the  de- 
creasing morale  of  their  troops  the  Germans  have 
resorted  more  and  more  to  the  use  oi flammenwerfer. 

The  Allies  have  in  their  turn  adopted  similar 
apparatus  and  the  Germans  have  more  than 
once  had  the  opportunity  to  realize  that  it  is  as 
useful  in  the  defensive  as  in  the  offensive. 

Gas  apparatus  and  flammenwerfer  should  be  as 
portable  and  as  handy  as  possible. 

They  should  never  be  operated  by  other  than 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        155 

specially   trained     troops,    fully    instructed    and 
thoroughly  skilled. 

In  France  detachments  of  sappers  or  miners 
are  entrusted  with  these  devices. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

CONCLUSION 

We  have  endeavoured  to  present,  without  en- 
tering into  the  technical  details  which  are  being 
taught  by  the  officers  composing  the  various  Allied 
missions,  a  general  sketch  of  the  conditions  and 
principal  factors  of  modem  warfare  that  will  be 
sufficient  to  give  an  idea  of  a  modern  army  and 
its  operation  in  the  field. 

It  is  hoped  that  our  explanations  will  aid  in 
reading  between  the  lines  of  the  ''communiqués," 
in  comprehending  the  plan  and  the  importance  of 
individual  engagements  and  finally  in  enabling 
those  who  have  relatives  at  the  Front  to  follow 
them  at  their  posts  of  duty  and  to  fully  realize 
the  importance  of  the  parts  assigned  to  them. 

Before  concluding,  we  should  like  to  be  granted 
the  privilege  of  expressing  our  personal  opinion 
concerning  the  methods  calculated  to  hasten  the 
instruction  of  the  new  armies  of  the  United  States. 

156 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        157 

Everyone  agrees  on  the  necessity  of  proceeding 
rapidly  and  effectively. 

The  defection  of'Russia  on  the  Eastern  Front  and 
the  recent  very  serious  reverses  of  the  Italians,  of 
which  the  Germans  have  not  failed  to  take  prompt 
advantage,  have  rendered  more  difficult  the  efforts 
of  the  Allied  Armies  on  the  Western  Front. 

The  instruction  of  the  American  units  can  be 
terminated  in  France,  first  in  camps  and  after- 
wards in  quiet  sectors,  until  the  American  High 
Command  considers  that  the  moment  has  come  to 
throw  its  forces  into  the  thick  of  the  fight. 

Notwithstanding  the  immense  resources  of  the 
United  States,  the  difficulties  of  transportation 
will  doubtless  be  such  as  to  force  the  military 
authorities  to  hold  a  certain  number  of  divisions 
in  the  instruction  camps  in  America. 

The  instruction  of  these  troops  ought,  we  think, 
to  be  as  thorough  as  possible. 

The  Allied  countries  have  delegated  to  the 
United  States  distinguished  officers  who  have 
participated  in  the  war  and  who  know  all  its 
difficulties.  We  should  wish  them  to  proceed,  if 
only  on  a  short  front,  with  an  exact  reproduction 
of  the  shell-torn  fields  over  which  the  American 
troops   are   destined   to    manoeuvre   in   Europe. 


158        MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY 

The  small  units  that  could  be  successively  and 
frequently  trained  on  these  prepared  fields  would 
thereby  have  less  time  to  spend  in  the  instruction 
camps  in  France  and  could  more  promptly  be 
sent  to  the  Front. 

In  the  vast  territories  of  the  United  States, 
ground  adapted  to  this  purpose  would  not  be 
difficult  to  find,  and  the  plan  would  afford  oppor- 
tunity to  give  the  last  divisions  to  embark  com- 
plete instruction  in  all  matters  of  detail,  and  a 
perfect  knowledge  of  all  the  component  elements 
of  an  army,  from  those  of  a  company  to  those  of 
a  division. 

Let  us  insist  on  the  fact  that,  in  this  war,  the 
art  of  rapid  excavation  and  intrenchment  is  one 
of  the  chief  things  to  be  learnt  by  the  troops,  as 
special  formations  cannot  be  detailed  for  this 
work,  and  every  soldier  has  to  carry  an  intrenching 
tool  and  must  know  how  to  use  it. 

It  will  therefore  be  necessary  for  the  units  to 
practise  intrenchment  on  a  large  scale,  and  finally 
to  perfect  their  instruction  by  exercise  over  shell- 
torn  ground  similar  to  that  of  the  Front. 

We  would  suggest,  in  order  to  familiarize  the 
troops  with  the  actual  mode  of  destroying  defensive 
works,  practice  with  such  obsolete  artillery  as  is 


MAKING  A  MODERN  ARMY        159 

not  fitted  for  use  at  the  Front.  It  is  of  para- 
mount importance  also  to  accustom  the  men  as 
rapidly  as  possible  to  the  sight  and  sound  of  gun- 
fire. We  would  suggest  that  the  final  exercises 
of  assault  be  accompanied  by  curtain  fires  made, 
to  avoid  all  risks  of  accident,  at  about  three  hun- 
dred metres  in  advance  of  the  first  lines. 

We  can  add  that  the  mode  of  instruction  we 
advocate  here  would  be  as  beneficial  to  the  Chiefs 
as  to  the  men.  Thus  only  will  they  fully  realize 
beforehand  the  difficulties  they  will  meet  when 
facing  the  one  factor  which  it  is  impossible  to 
include  in  any  course  of  training — the  Enemy; 
an  enemy  that,  to  the  end,  will  be  skilled  and 
formidable. 


INDEX 


Aerial  torpedoes,  84 
Agents  de  liaison ^  19 
Air  supremacy,  46 
Ammunition  (different  issues), 

109 
Anti-aircraft  artillery,  92 
Armoured  motor-cars,  94 
Army,  17 
Army  corps,  17 
Army  group,  17 
Artillery,  19,  68,  77,  80 
Artillery  (advance),  95 
Artillery  of  an  army  corps,  8 1 
Artillery  in  trenches,  68 
Artillery  of  a  division,  82 
Asphyxiating  gas,  17,  89,  150, 

152 
Asphyxiating  projectiles,  37 
Assaulting     and      occupation 

troops,  135 
Attack  in  Artois,  13 
Automatic  pistols,  121 
Aviation,  29,  45 
Aviators  (British),  46 

Balloons,  28,  43 

Barrage,  44,  87,  92,  109,  138, 

143 
Bastion,  59 
Battalions  of  three  companies, 

Battle  planes,  20,  34,  36 
Bayonet,  118 
Biplanes,  34 
Blockhouses,  64 
Boardwalk  flooring,  61 
Bombardments,  40 
Bombing  planes,  36 


Boyaux^  64,  66,  67 
Brigade,  19 
Burros,  105 

Camouflage,  63,  75,  106 

Camouflet,  70 

Carrel,  Dr.  Alexis,  22 

Carrier  pigeons,  145 

Casemates,  68 

Cavalry,  19,  148 

Centres  of  resistance,  55,  64 

Check  positions,  65 

Citations,  127 

Clayonnages,  60 

Command,  22 

Commissariat  department,  20 

Communication    tunnels,    57, 

64,  66,  67 
Compressed  air  mortars,  84 
Counterfiring,  88 
Craters,  53,  70 

Defensive,  134 
Defensive  engagements,  142 
Destructivejjfire,  88 
Dirigible  balloons,  49 
Division,  17,  131 
Division  front,  131 
Division  (General),  22 
Division,  its  dispositions,  132 
Dugouts,  57,  64 

Engineers,  19 

Engineers  (American),  74 

Field  artillery,  86,  92,  143 
Field  batteries,  81 
Firing  tables,  87 


161 


1 62 


INDEX 


"Flaming  onions,"  94 
Framework  of  the  army,  147 
Fronts  (distance  between),. 52 

Gaz-vésicant,  152 

Grenades,  53, 117, 119 

Gtm  (37  mm.) ,  94 

Gims  (75  mm.,  87  mm.),  87 

Gims  (120,  155,  220,  270,  280, 
305,  370,  400,  520,  19,  100, 
240,  224,  305,  340  mm.),  80 

Guynemer  (Captain),  34 

Harvest,  39 
Hearing  masks,  43 
Howitzers,  83 
Hydroplanes,  48 

Incendiary  projectiles,  37 
Infantry,  18,  112 
Inspections,  24 
Instruction,  122,  157 
Italian  airplanes,  37 

Liquid  fire,  11,  17,  153 
Listening  posts,  63,  70 
Loopholes,  62 

Machine-gun  rifle,  117 

Machine-gun  shelters,  62,  86 

Machine-guns,  35, 1 13,  115,  ii7 

Map  (directing),  42 

Masks,  89,  151 

Medical  department,  20 

'  '  Minenwerf  ers,  "  11,68 

Mines  and  countermines,  69 

Monoplanes,  34 

Morale  of  the  French,  58 

Motor  cars,  73,  104 

Motors,  39 

Munition  parks,  20,  100,  loi 

Munition  supply,  105 

Neutralization  fire,  89,  91 

Observation  planes,  40 
Observation  posts,  62,  66 
Offensive     engagements     and 
their  preparation,  136 


Officers  (duties  of),  123 
Office  staff,  25 

Pack  transport,  116 
Pare-éclats,  60,  66 
Periscopes,  66 
Pershing,  General,  58,  120 
Photographs,  aerial,  41 
Planes    for    directing    fire    of 

artillery  and  movements  of 

infantry,  20,  43 
Planes  for  reconnoitring,  20, 40, 

43 
Plants  of  the  Germans,  38,  39 

Post  of  command,  23,  144 
Powder,  102 

Prolonged  engagements,  143 
Protecting  Hne  of  the  artillery, 
65,68 

Railway  troops,  70 
Rear  organization,  18 
Re-entrants,  59 
Regiment,  19 
Relief  maps,  42 
Replacing  guns,  107 
Rest  hospitals,  21 
Retubing  of  guns,  108 
Rifle, 112, 122 
Rigoles,  61 
Rockets,  43,  44,  146 

Salients,  59 

Shells,  150  mm.,  54,  102 

Shelters,  54,  65 

Shock  troops,  129 

Signalling,  146 

Squadrillas,  35,  36 

Staffs,  24 

Stations  têtes  d'étapes,  ici 

Strategy,  11,  14,  15 

Supply  shelters,  104 

Support  trenches,  64,  84 

Tactics,  10,  14,  15 

Tanks,  84,  117 

Tear  producing  gas,  17,  152 


INDEX 


163 


Transportation  by  road,  73 
Transportation  of  munitions  by- 
railroad,  100 
Trench  artillery,  83 
Trench  knives,  121 
Trench  of  attack,  67 
Trench  organization,  51,  52,  58 
Tracks,  105 

Verdun,  12,  144 


Winged  torpedoes,  37 

Wire  entanglements,  63,  68,  86 

Wireless,  43 

Withdrawal  of  artillery,  97 

Wounded,  transportation  of ,  21 

Yser  front,  1 1 

Zeppelins,  48,  93 
Zone  d'étapes,  loi 


Tactics  and  Duties 

for 

Trench  Fighting 

By 
Georges  Bertrand 

Capitaine,  Chassetirs,  de  V  Armée  de  France 
and 

Oscar  N.  Solbert 

Major,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.S.A. 
Î6°*    35  Diagrams,    SL50  net    By  mail,  $1,65 


000.7  (OD)  ist  Ind. 

War  Department,  A.  G.  O.,  December  21,1917 — To  Major 

0.  N.  Solbert,  Corp  of  Engineers,  Office  of  the  Chief 
of  Engineers. 

1.  The  manuscript  forwarded  with  this  letter  has  been 
examined  in  the  War  College  Division  and  the  opinion 
given  that  it  has  exceptional  merit,  presenting  the  prin- 
ciples governing  trench  warfare  in  such  a  clear  and 
logical  manner  that  the  publication,  with  some  changes 
and  additions,*  will  be  of  considerable  value  to  our  Officers. 

2.  You  are  directed  to  confer  with  the  Chief  of  the  War 
College  Division  regarding  the  effecting  of  the  changes 
desired. 

By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War 

(Signed)  F.  W.  Lewis 
Adjutant  General. 
*  These  changes  have  been  made. 

G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  London 


FIRST  CALL 

BY 

ARTHUR  GUY  EMPEY 


GUIDE 
POSTS 

TO 

BERLIN 


Author  of  "OVER  THE  TOP" 

12"^.     Illustrated.    $1.50  {By  mail,  $1.65) 

In  the  amazingly  vivid  and  simple  way  that 
has  made  Over  the  Top  the  most  widely  read 
and  talked  of  book  in  America,  and  the  most 
successful  war  book  in  all  history,  Empey  teUs 
the  new  soldiers 

What  they  want  to  know 
What  they  ought  to  know 
What  they  ^11  have  to  know 

and  what  their  parents,  sweethearts,  wives,  and 
all  Americans,  wiU  want  to  know,  and  can  do  to 
help. 

A  practical  book  by  an  American  who  has 
been  through  it  all. 

The  chapters  headed  "  Smokes  "  and  "  Thank 
God  the  Stretcher  Bearers"  will  stand  among 
the  war  classics. 

Here  is  advice,  here  are  suggestions,  over- 
looked in  other  books,  that  will  safeguard  our 
boys  in  France. 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S   SONS 

New  York  London 


IT  IS  THE  REAL  STUFF 

OVER  THE  TOP 

BY  AN  AMERICAN  SOLDIER  WHO  WENT 

ARTHUR  GUY  EMPEY 

MACHINE  GUNNER,  SERVING  IN  FRANCE 


AUTHOR    OF 

''FIRST  CALL" 


For  a  year  and  a  half,  until  he 
fell  wounded  in  No  Man's  Land,  this 
American  soldier  saw  more  actual 
fighting  and  real  warfare  than  any  war 
correspondent  who  has  written  about 
the  war.  His  experiences  are  grim, 
but  they  are  thrilling  and  lightened  by 
a  touch  of  humor  as  original  as  the 
Soldiers  Three.     And   they  are  true. 

12°.    16  Illustrations  and  Diagrams,    $1,50  net 
By  mail,  $1,65 

TOGETHER  WITH  TOMMY'S  DICTIONARY  OF  THE 
TRENCHES 

''Over  The  Top  with  the  Best  of 

Luck  and  Give  Them  Hell!" 

The  British  Soldier's  War  Cry,  as  he  goes  over  the 
top  of  the  trench  to  the  charge 


Date 

Due 

m  R'.^fi 

OCT  2U 

APH  -  i 

FtB  0 

3  7007 

f 

1 

71475 


AUTHOR 
TITLE  -^        '  -N.  / 


aUê^-^^ 


-DPC^-Ë.  DUE 


1         n.r\r\ 


BORROWERS  NAME 


BOSTON  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  HEIGHTS 
CHESTNUT  HILL,  MASS. 


Books  may  be  kept  for  two  weeks  and  may 
be  renewed  for  the  same  period,  unless  re- 
served . 

Two  cents  a  day  is  charged  for  each  book 
kept  overtime. 

If  you  cannot  find  what  you  want,  ask  the 
Librarian  who  will  be  glad  to  help  you. 

The  borrower  is  responsible  for  books  drawn 
on  his  card  and  for  all  fines  accruing  on  the 
same. 


